Does morality make sense only with theism? (stumpjumper vs. wiploc)

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

This thread has been set up to provide a gallery for all members who wish to comment on the Rat Ring FORMAL DEBATE (http://talkrational.org/showthread.php?p=175752#post175752) between stumpjumper and wiploc on the following resolution:

Resolved: Only if there is a god is it reasonable to believe that we ought to behave in certain ways.

stumpjumper (going first) will affirm and wiploc will oppose. The debate will have six rounds and will employ a special format (see the OP of the debate thread for details).

We ask that the formal debate participants refrain from posting in the gallery until their formal debate comes to an end.

Enjoy the debate!

KWSN, RR Moderator

[BWE]

I for one will enjoy participating in this peanut gallery. I still think about the material Dean and I went through (oops, and Dave) in the other one and I think it's an important question.

Thanks to the participants.

[SMS]

There are two initial problems with the debate resolution:

1. The definition of the word "reasonable" is not established and this allows for prudentially reasonable reasons to believe we ought to behave x sans the existence of God. For instance, we may all understand that God does not exist and thus objective moral obligation does not exist. However, it may be in our rational best interest to act as if objective moral obligation exists. In this sense, wiploc is free to offer a form of moral fictionalism.

2. The "ought" within the resolution needs to qualify itself as a moral ought. Even a moral noncognitivist can consistently formulate a rational "ought" based upon what some desired antecedent and this does not require mentioning a God at all.

[BWE]

Well, I'll enjoy it anyway. When is the first post due?

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

For all those who are interested, stumpjumper's opening statement is up.

[Lisa0315]

Stumpjumper quote below: I don't see that it answers the question, but it has been years since I did formal debate. I do not remember the rules.

We ought to behave in certain ways because there are actions that are in accordance and/or further the benevolent path towards which existence is moving and there are paths that diverge or go against the purpose of existence. We find and uncover meaning in life because life and existence is, itself, meaningful. Our world has an intelligent cause, a purpose, and our life is filled with meaning. We encounter this meaning; we experience this meaning; and we respond to it with a sense of trust that it is good and purposeful.

This trust, which is simply our response to our encounter, then orients us and compels us to look at life in terms of right and wrong; oughts and ought nots; and good and bad. We create ethical systems and these systems have traditionally been and are still best justified by an appeal to a higher truth or a meaning or purpose that is much larger than the finite meaning and purpose that is transiently encountered in this life. Many of us call this higher truth God. Maybe it’s just a point of reference or a goal we are heading towards and even if it best justifies our beliefs it may not even be a true proposition or exist in the way or manner that we postulate. But, then again, maybe that high point at the far end of the trail really does exist and is not simply and illusion or a shadow caused by the peaks that are closer by. Right now, though, I’m not sure if that question is of utmost importance. What is important is that I believe it’s there, it gives me reason to ride the path that I’m on, and motivates me to not stray too far from that path.

[Jon]

que?

[Criada]

signing in.

[SMS]

Stumpjumper,

You should have clarified your premises and then argued them one by one in a structured format. I read your statement and I am puzzled as to what your argument is and how it meets its conclusion.

[BWE]

Stumpjumper,

You should have clarified your premises and then argued them one by one in a structured format. I read your statement and I am puzzled as to what your argument is and how it meets its conclusion.

Yikes!

I like Ike.

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

wiploc's response in now up.

(wiploc has requested that I post a notification in the Rat Ring Gallery when a debate statement is up, so I shall do so for the rest of the debate).

[Ray Moscow]

To me it's basically a non-starter. All societies have morality, but not all of them have gods. Modern European societies are a good example: mostly agnostic or weak atheist, but the morality works pretty well most of the time.

The state churches here are regarded by most as an annoying joke.

[Lisa0315]

Being a Christian, I naturally, am rooting for Stumpjumper. However, I have to admit that Wiploc's rebuttal was dead on. It was very readable, and it made a lot of sense to me. The three examples were solid. I do hate that he Godwined so early.

Lisa

[SMS]

Some notes on wiploc's statement...


If a god were mean, and had bad purposes, should we go along with those purposes? Of course not. We have no moral obligation to do bad things.

Under a divine command theory, wiploc’s language becomes problematic because badness depends on God’s command, nature or will. Let’s say God willed us to rape children. Now, under a divine command ethic, we’d have an obligation to rape children. Thus, we can say that if God commanded us to rape children, then we’d have an obligation to rape children. However, the divine command ethicist can point out that the above implication is true despite it being impossible that God could command us to rape children. Implications with impossible antecedents are still true. It is true that we have an obligation to never do bad things and that’s coherent under a divine command ethic because God’s will or command impossibly amounts to bad things.

Let's take our theories out for a test drive: A couple of proto-rapist perverts see a potential victim. The first one thinks, "I'd like to knock her down and do her, but that wouldn't fit well with the benign purpose of the universe, so I'd better not." The second one thinks, "I'd like to knock her down and do her, but she wouldn't like that, so I'd better not."

Wiploc’s language is unclear here. That someone “better not” is not clearly indicating that there is a moral obligation not to. If we construe the rapist as saying “she wouldn’t like that, so I ought not” then it seems reasonable to ask where this oughtness is coming from and why it is objective. Is wiploc saying that he has an on objective obligation not to do anything that others would not like?

One might argue that parsimony favors my morality over his, makes it more reasonable. Using the rape example, my morality can be sound if I'm right about only two things: that rape makes people unhappy, and that it's good not to make people unhappy.

Ah, now we get clarification! However, recall that this debate is over moral obligation and not necessarily over what is good. If wiploc wishes to argue that there is an obligation to do what whatever is good, then he needs to argue that.

If you don’t make people unhappy, then it is good. ~U> G

Understandably, you have made some people happy by not raping a woman. However, what about the malicious sadists who feel unhappy when women are not raped? Under this view, not raping a woman would both make some people happy and unhappy. You may claim that since it does make people happy, then you can deduce the consequent:

~U>G
~U
G


But then it also makes people unhappy and so U is true, too. Yet, that’s a contradiction. Thus, wiploc may alter his claim to something like:

If you don’t make all people unhappy, then that is good.


Or

If you don’t make some people unhappy, then that is good.

But, either of these claims are obviously problematic. Not to mention that wiploc seems to be reducing goodness to a psychological response and hence leaves him open to arguing that he is committing the so-called naturalistic fallacy. Other objections could be along the lines that he is conflating evaluative claims to descriptive claims (this is not the naturalistic fallacy).

One might argue that parsimony favors my morality over his, makes it more reasonable.

Yes, one might! So, where is it?

Using the rape example, my morality can be sound if I'm right about only two things: that rape makes people unhappy, and that it's good not to make people unhappy. Stumpjumper's morality requires that there be a god, that god have a purpose for the world, that god's purpose be benign, that the pervert understands the purpose, that rape is contrary to the purpose, and that we (for some reason) ought to go along with that purpose. If we could assign each assumption a fifty percent chance of being right, then I would have one chance in four of having a sound morality, and stumpjumper would have but one chance in sixty-four.


What wiploc is actually claiming:


Rape makes people unhappy
Making people unhappy is not good
We have a secular and objective moral obligation to do the good or to refrain from doing the not good.


I should also note that the debate requirements do not obligate stumperjumper to argue that God exists or that the pervert understands the purpose. The former is not necessary to argue that moral obligation only makes sense if God exists. The latter is just an epistemological complication.

Anyhow, I’m confused here. Is wiploc granting that the principle of indifference? That the there is a .5 a priori chance of stumperjumper’s claims to be true? What is he granting the .5 to? I don’t see how wiploc’s reasoning is correct here.

Anyhow, I’m going to stop reading here.

[SMS]

Resolved: Only if there is a god is it reasonable to believe that we ought to behave in certain ways

I should point out that both debaters seem to be transcending the debate requirements. The resolution can be formulated as:

If it reasonable to believe that we ought to behave in certain ways, then God exists.

You'll notice that this does not commit anyone to argue that God exists. If Wiploc is to provide reasons to think that the above is false, then he is to argue that there are reasonable grounds to believe we ought to behave in certain ways and God does not exist. Or, depending on how the debate was structured, wiploc could just argue that there is no good reason to think that

If it reasonable to believe that we ought to behave in certain ways, then God exists.

is true. Yet, as we all know, having no good reason to think any x is true is not reason to think it is false.

[SMS]

Addendum:

It is not entirely obvious, but it appears as if wiploc is arguing from Mill's utilitarianism. In this case, what is wrong is acts that tend to produce unhappiness and what is right are acts that tend to produce happiness. This, however, is entirely different than wiploc's crude of it. From there, wiploc depends on the principle of utility. The principle of utility is that we ought to maxmize the good and minimize the bad.

If that's wiploc's case, then wiploc needs to give a reason why we ought to and explain how this is objective.

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

stumpjumper's Round 2 statement is up.

[GenesisNemesis]

Morality doesn't "make sense" at all.

[David B]

Morality doesn't "make sense" at all.

Not even as part of an emerging extended phenotype of social animals of a certain level of complexity?

David B (personally, believes that he makes sense of morality along those lines)

[SMS]

Consistency is even more important than parsimony. Even the simplest and most parsimonious answer can be incorrect if it is not consistent with the underlying facts and/or findings of our philosophical point of view. Although I may like (indeed I do) the answer offered by the humanist, I would still have to say that the sadist is much more reasonable. He may be a loony but he can support and justify his ethical system and it is consistent with his atheistic view of the world which, by almost all counts, precludes overarching meaning and purpose.

The question of parsimony is a tool of preference between two competing albeit equally probable theories.

“Since Occam's Razor ought to be invoked only when several hypotheses explain the same set of facts equally well, in practice its domain will be very limited…[C]ases where competing hypotheses explain a phenomenon equally well are comparatively rare (Holsinger 1980, pp. 144-5).”
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/simplicity/#2


I take it that wiploc argues that his theory is more likely true (although he did not argue why we ought to maximize happiness is true without God) but even if it were not more likely true and instead the theories were equal, then parsimony would favour wiploc’s theory over stumperjumper's theory. It’s fair point. But as stumperjumper seems to argue, wiploc lacks the necessary foundations that enable a theory to stand on its feet. And, moreover, I’d also like to point out—again—that stumperjumper needs not to be committed to the existence of God for his case. Thus, wiploc cannot use the question of God’s existence as being less parsimonious than his own theory.

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

wiploc's Round 2 statement is up.

[David B]

One little quibble with wiploc's latest.

In fact, the world is a mixed bag, containing both good and bad. If this world reflects a god's purpose, a disinterested observer would have to conclude that god intends a lot of suffering.

I'd prefer 'In fact, the world is a mixed bag, containing both good and bad. If this world reflects a god's purpose, a disinterested observer would have to conclude that god intends, or is indifferent to, a lot of suffering.'

Further - I'm not at all sure that 'grounding' is as important as the protagonists seem to think.

Physics still isn't grounded, though the LHC may make further progress towards it, Chemistry is, pretty much, grounded in physics, AFAIK, but wasn't always, it is only recently that geology has become more grounded in plate tectonics, and biology more grounded in DNA.

But still, progress was made in all these and many other areas of study before progress was made towards grounding them.

'Start in the middle, and work out' as Dennett said, seems to me a good idea for making progress.

I'd suggest that progress towards grounding morality is being made, on a number of consilient lines.

From game theory.

From ev psych.

From Matt Ridley's hypothesis that trade was 'the Origin if Virtue'.

...

In haste now - work calls

I'd also that we can make progress in grounding theism (though not god (s), from fields like phychology (including ev psych), from anthropology etc - Pascal Boyer has made an early attempt to do so, which to my mind provides progress though not completely right, and far from complete

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religion_Explained

David B (does not think that trying to ground something in what is essentially magic a particularly good idea)

[SMS]

One little quibble with wiploc's latest.

In fact, the world is a mixed bag, containing both good and bad. If this world reflects a god's purpose, a disinterested observer would have to conclude that god intends a lot of suffering.

I'd prefer 'In fact, the world is a mixed bag, containing both good and bad. If this world reflects a god's purpose, a disinterested observer would have to conclude that god intends, or is indifferent to, a lot of suffering.'

Two problems:

wiploc's problem: Wiploc's language does not permit him to say that God intends on a lot of suffering. What his language permits is simply the trivially true statement that God intends the world to be a mixed bag of good and bad. That there is a mixed bag of good and bad does not speak of the quantity of bad. I should also note that the debate resolution is about duty and not descriptive claims about what is good/bad.

Your problem: Wiploc's antecedent is that if the mixed bag reflects, then..... While god may be indifferent, there is no need for wiploc to say it within this context.

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

stumpjumper's 3 questions are now up.

[David B]

My responses would be, in short

1.) How would my opponent reason with a sadistic, nihilistic atheist that does not wish to do things to make other people happy?

If you put your sadism into practice with non consenting adults, or those deemed not to have the ability to give informed consent, then society will sanction you.

2.) Both the sadistic, nihilistic atheist and the humanistic atheist share the same underlying metaphysics. What factors convince my opponent that his ethical system is more consistent with the world around us than that of the sadistic nihilist?

The approval/disapproval of society as a whole, which is an important part of the world around us.

3.) If my opponent's ethical system (a way for how to act meaningfully in the world) is not grounded or consistent with his view of the world, how can he claim that it is reasonable?

I would argue that my ethical system is grounded, and consistent with my world view, insofar as it is a part of my world view that ethics are part of an extended phenotype of our species in general, this culture in particular.

This view could be supported, I'd suggest, from various fields of study, including game theory, sociology, psychology, evolutionary psychology...

David B

[SMS]

Here's something that may raise some discussion-

Assume that what wiploc means by good is "whatever maximizes happiness". What stumperjumper means by good is "whatever corresponds/follows God's purpose". Let's say they disagree on whether abortion is good. We can say that wiploc believes abortion is good and stumper jumper feels that it is not good. In a morally descriptive sense, the claims "good" and "not good" concerning abortion contradict each other. Yet, when we exchange them for their theoretical substitutions, we get:

Abortion maximizes happiness
abortion does not correspond/follow God's purpose

Yet, there's no contradiction here. In fact, both can be true.

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

wiploc's responses are up.

[Kissaki]

"Resolved: Only if there is a god is it reasonable to believe that we ought to behave in certain ways."

Excuse me if I'm some sort of party crasher here, but I don't understand this at all. What does the existence/non-existence of deities have to do with whether there is such a thing as objective morality or not? The way I see it, if there IS a god who rewards and punishes, then there is strong incentive to behave in accordance with his/her/its wishes, but how does it follow that his/her/its opinions aren't every bit as subjective as our's?

"IT IS WRONG BECAUSE I SAY SO."

But why does he/she/it say so? Is it objective because he/she/it has the power to reward or punish you according to how well you conform to his/her/its wishes? That's the old "might is right" argument.

[SMS]

Wiploc's latest statement gives the title-

Resolved: The Argument From Motion Is a
Rationally Compelling Argument For the Existence Of God.

Suppose someone believed that women liked to be raped; we could talk to women and learn the truth. 'No' means 'yes'! ;)

Stumpjumper would have the same problem with a sadistic nihilistic theist. Because what is the point of complying with god's will? Stumper may give reasons like damnation of hell or the rewards of heaven. However, this seems to be rational ought rather than moral ought. But insofar as we are talking about the Christian God or the god of the philosophers, then there is no sadistic nihilistic theist. It's a conceptual impossibility. Surely the theist may utter that he is a sadistic nihilistic theist, but I'd take it he's either dishonest or does not understanding the meaning of the words.


Good moral rules are pretty much of two kinds. One kind ("Do your homework!") urges delaying gratification: someone makes a sacrifice now, in order to reap greater benefits later. The other kind ("Pay your taxes!") urges people to make personal sacrifices so that the larger community can reap greater benefits.

This is a remarkably shallow analysis.


Now that's a screwy definition of an ethical system.

I agree.


My system is grounded at least as well as stumpjumper's: I think being benign is good; I think helping people is benign; I think helping people is good.

Wiploc needs to be careful here or at least not so vague. We could construe this as the "is" of identity and that the "good" is the same "good" that is equivalent to "whatever maximizing the net happiness". however, once we do that, we have:

1. good=helping people.
2. good=whatever maximizing the net happiness.
3. helping people=maximizing the net happiness.

I'm sure we can see the problems that 3 possesses insofar as it is not a contradiction to help people and not maximize the net happiness.


If stumpjumper's answer is that we should make people happy, then---though he doesn't realize it---his morality is really grounded in utilitarianism.
This does not follow. It's not only utilitarianism that has some sort of monopoly on obligation to make people happy. We can easily construe a deontological theory that obligates us to make people happy.

[Columbus]

The atheistic humanist has nowhere to appeal and holds an inconsistent ethical system.
This is where Stump goes wrong, if you ask me.
While we can argue for centuries about whether a particular action improves or degrades the human situation, if your basic goal is the improvement of the human situation, you have something concrete to which you can appeal. If, on the other hand, your goal is to do as God wishes, then you must both determine which image of God is the true image, and then determine what He says to do. There is no definitive image of God, much less agreement about what He says. That is why there is no consistent theistic moral system. Utilitarianism is consistent.

Take abortion as an example. Who but a theist would argue for letting a woman die in agony due to a tubal pregnancy rather than operate to remove the fetus? Not all theists argue this, but the ones who do are arguing from their own interpretation of the "Word of God". The theists who consider life-saving medical technology a gift from God are arguing from their's. The inconsistency of moral codes based on people's interpretation of what God wants us to do makes religious moral codes so dangerous. In the 19th century Christians argued for slavery, in the 20th they argued for affirmative action. 21st century theists argue for both "Holy War" and global peace. The lack of moral consistency among theists is due to the disconnect between their moral beliefs and reality. By basing their morality on their own personal interpretation of semi-fictional accounts from long ago, they have nothing concrete to appeal to, except their own personal authority. Secular humanists have something objective to appeal to, the betterment of the Human Situation, even if they don't always agree upon what will result in this.
Tom

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

stumpjumper has just posted his responses to wiploc. Now wiploc will ask stumpjumper 3 questions.

[TransverseWave]

Wiploc's three questions are now up.

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

stumpjumper's three replies are now up.

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

wiploc's 3 replies to sj's replies are up.

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

stumpjumper's evaluation is up.

[TransverseWave]

Wiploc's evaluation is up.

[BWE]

I gotta say though,
Stumpjumper briefly adopts extreme moral relativism: All moralities are equally rational so long as one contrives to hold a justifying metaphysical view. (This makes it pointless for stumpjumper to claim that his morality is rational.)

Reversing himself, he rejects primitive barbarisms in favor of benevolence. (Now his pole star is that of utilitarianism.)

Then he makes an appeal on behalf of the god of Hellfire, the Fall, and the Flood. This is a nice god, stumpjumper says, and it is only by following this god (who commanded the rape and murder of the Midionites (Numbers 31:17-18)) that we have any reason to avoid bad stuff like rape and murder.

Notice that he ends on this utilitarian note. He's not (in this paragraph) against rape because god is. He's against it because he thinks it's cruel and barbarous. (That is, it makes people unhappy.)

^^is pretty direct. If you can't tell for sure what god wants but you can tell for sure that something's bad, well the utility angle gives a darn good explanation whereas the futility angle fives us a word that ends up meaning not so much. God. Definitions to follow.

Just sayin'.

[SMS]

Wiploc..

Notice that he ends on this utilitarian note. He's not (in this paragraph) against rape because god is. He's against it because he thinks it's cruel and barbarous. (That is, it makes people unhappy.)

Firstly, mill's utilitarianism is not that you should not make people unhappy, but that you should maximize happiness. In some scenarios, the maximization of happiness will make at least some people unhappy. Secondly, I'd hesitate to that stumperjumper's outlook on rape as "cruel and barbarous" and on that account he's using utilitarianism. We may ask stumperjumper what's wrong with "cruel and barbarous" behaviour, and to which he could offer a deontological reply.

[trendkill]

Secondly, I would ask my opponent what makes some good? How is my opponent judging whether or not God's will is malign? It could be argued that whatever God wills is, by necessity, good simply because God is the source of our morality.No it can't, because of the definitions of terms such as "malign" and "benign". We identify the malign by the fact that it's motivated by ill will or the desire to harm. Even if the thing in question is morally right, therefore, this does not change the fact that it's malign. It would simply be a case of malignity being morally right. In which case we might well be within reason to say "fuck morality". And I'd suggest that any definition of morality under which it might be reasonable to say that is inadequate.

Regardless, though, I would say that it is more reasonable to act in accordance with God's vision for the universe and that means acting in ways that are consistent with God's will.You just implied that it's reasonable to act in accord with God's vision for the universe even if that vision is malign. This is a ridiculous claim, at least if you're talking about anyone who is a part of the universe in question.

A Christian or other theist may not understand what the best course of action is in many situations but the position that God is benevolent and wishes good for all of humanity is an integral part of faith.Er, right, just ask any Calvinist. :rolleyes:

It's an aspect of some faiths, but by no means an integral part of all of them.

[TransverseWave]

Stumpjumper's conclusion is up.

[TransverseWave]

Wiploc's concluding statement is up.

This concludes the debate. The participants may now join the Gallery for further discussion, if they wish.

[wiploc]

Addendum:

It is not entirely obvious, but it appears as if wiploc is arguing from Mill's utilitarianism.

I can't call it "Mill's utilitarianism." I'd have to read his book before I could do that. My utilitarianism is just regular utilitarianism. Orphan utilitarianism. Idiot's utilitarianism.

I've been told that I'm not a utilitarian at all, that I'm really a deontologist. But I don't remember why they said that.



In this case, what is wrong is acts that tend to produce unhappiness and what is right are acts that tend to produce happiness. This, however, is entirely different than wiploc's crude of it. From there, wiploc depends on the principle of utility. The principle of utility is that we ought to maxmize the good and minimize the bad.

Then, I'm a principle-of-utility utilitarian.




If that's wiploc's case, then wiploc needs to give a reason why we ought to and explain how this is objective.


Not if stump didn't give a reason. I can match any reason he gives, but first he has to give a reason.

[wiploc]

One little quibble with wiploc's latest.

In fact, the world is a mixed bag, containing both good and bad. If this world reflects a god's purpose, a disinterested observer would have to conclude that god intends a lot of suffering.

I'd prefer 'In fact, the world is a mixed bag, containing both good and bad. If this world reflects a god's purpose, a disinterested observer would have to conclude that god intends, or is indifferent to, a lot of suffering.'


Good point. That's better than what I said.




Further - I'm not at all sure that 'grounding' is as important as the protagonists seem to think.

Physics still isn't grounded....

Wow, excellent point!

[wiploc]

One little quibble with wiploc's latest.

In fact, the world is a mixed bag, containing both good and bad. If this world reflects a god's purpose, a disinterested observer would have to conclude that god intends a lot of suffering.

I'd prefer 'In fact, the world is a mixed bag, containing both good and bad. If this world reflects a god's purpose, a disinterested observer would have to conclude that god intends, or is indifferent to, a lot of suffering.'

Two problems:

wiploc's problem: Wiploc's language does not permit him to say that God intends on a lot of suffering.

Granted. I should have said that, given the mixed state of the evidence, if it were fair for stump to reach his conclusion (that god is benign) then it would equally fair to reach the opposite conclusion (that god is malign).



What his language permits is simply the trivially true statement that God intends the world to be a mixed bag of good and bad. That there is a mixed bag of good and bad does not speak of the quantity of bad. I should also note that the debate resolution is about duty and not descriptive claims about what is good/bad.

Your problem: Wiploc's antecedent is that if the mixed bag reflects, then..... While god may be indifferent, there is no need for wiploc to say it within this context.

Good stuff. I'm looking forward to our debate.

[wiploc]

But insofar as we are talking about the Christian God or the god of the philosophers, then there is no sadistic nihilistic theist. It's a conceptual impossibility. Surely the theist may utter that he is a sadistic nihilistic theist, but I'd take it he's either dishonest or does not understanding the meaning of the words.
I guess I don't understand the words. But I'd listen to an elaboration.




This is a remarkably shallow analysis.
Would you care to offer one about half again deeper?



If stumpjumper's answer is that we should make people happy, then---though he doesn't realize it---his morality is really grounded in utilitarianism.This does not follow. It's not only utilitarianism that has some sort of monopoly on obligation to make people happy. We can easily construe a deontological theory that obligates us to make people happy.You are right that we could develop such a deontological theory. But I didn't think stump was doing that. And there was a word limit on the posts. This was a case where I was debating the specific opponent rather than trying to cover all possible responses that other opponents could have made.

Stump never really stated his own theory. I had to make it up for him, and hope my inferences didn't amount to misrepresentations. There was no way I was going to cover every hypothetical response to my guess as to what he was trying to say.

But if he had come back with the deontological move, I was prepared to point out that deontology is either grounded in utilitarianism ... or groundless.

[Crazy Liz]

Although I marked the debate thread, I never followed it. Just never got interested enough. Then today my atheist son made a remark about the 10 Commandments he'd just read from Dennet or Dawkins or somebody & we got off on a long discussion. Came to the conclusion that morality and culture are interdependent, but theism is not necessary.

Now I'll go read the debate & see whether it touched on any of the topics we discussed.