Discussion on objective morality [split from Rat Ring Proposals]

[Eudaimonist]

Neither Platonic ideas or Aristotelian Virtue Ethics are "atheistic" by definition.

What definitions are you using? Aristotle's arguments in his Nicomachean Ethics do not depend on the existence of gods.


eudaimonia,

Mark

[Preno]

1). No ethical system has truth-value.
2). The term "realism" is not normally applied to ethical philosophy.


Please propose an actual item for debate in this area and I may consider it.
(But be forewarned. I devour.)If you want to argue against the truth-aptness of moral claims (your point 1), I'm up. No Gods or lack thereof involved, but also no objective moral precepts "out there" that can be said to exist in some kind of real sense or any kind of "do universals exist" non-sense.

[Rathpig]

If you want to argue against the truth-aptness of moral claims (your point 1), I'm up. No Gods or lack thereof involved, but also no objective moral precepts "out there" that can be said to exist in some kind of real sense or any kind of "do universals exist" non-sense.

Then it would appear we take the same point. I think moral objectivity is impossible.

[Preno]

If you want to argue against the truth-aptness of moral claims (your point 1), I'm up. No Gods or lack thereof involved, but also no objective moral precepts "out there" that can be said to exist in some kind of real sense or any kind of "do universals exist" non-sense.Then it would appear we take the same point. I think moral objectivity is impossible.I don't think so - for one thing, I don't think any fundamental distinction between "objective" and "subjective" makes much sense, for another, I do think that moral claims can be true or false regardless of our opinions about them. If you believe that "no ethical system has truth-value", then we don't take the same point (and I don't mean that it's true "for" someone or something like that).

[Rathpig]

I do think that moral claims can be true or false regardless of our opinions about them.

So you do believe that moral values are either true or false outside of cultural constructs?

[BWE]

I do think that moral claims can be true or false regardless of our opinions about them.

So you do believe that moral values are either true or false outside of cultural constructs?
Yes.

ETA: I'm with Preno on this one. (maybe) As long as you don't move out to morality being related to non sentient things. The subjective/objective divide can be done away with for logic's sake as long as it's an agreed upon symbol. IOW, all constructs are subjective in that we need language to communicate them and consciousness to interpret them. Outside of that, truth is not relative, nor are morals.

ETA2: After the discussion between umop upside I'm, Dave Hawkins and myself, I think I can defend that God is not necessary for moral realism.

[Rathpig]

truth is not relative, nor are morals.

Obviously "truth" must be absolute for it to have factual meaning, but morals are by their nature culturally relative. To argue universal moral value you have to argue a universal empirical value.

I would go so far as to say that theist moral values are by definition relative.

[BWE]

truth is not relative, nor are morals.

Obviously "truth" must be absolute for it to have factual meaning, but morals are by their nature culturally relative. To argue universal moral value you have to argue a universal empirical value.

I would go so far as to say that theist moral values are by definition relative.

Oops. I used the wrong word. Relative is probably correct although I categorically disagree that they are culturally relative in that two cultures can hold different moral beliefs and cannot objectively tell which one is better.

ETA: morals are relative to humanity or life but within that set they are not relative. That's what I meant.

[Rathpig]

Relative is probably correct although I categorically disagree that they are culturally relative in that two cultures can hold different moral beliefs and cannot objectively tell which one is better.

Seriously? You've studied anthropology right?

In the somewhat homogenized post-modern world it does seem like the Abrahamic moral ideal predominates, but this is a very recent phenomena and highly divergent even within Abrahamic morals.

Contrast Miami Beach, Florida to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

[BWE]

Relative is probably correct although I categorically disagree that they are culturally relative in that two cultures can hold different moral beliefs and cannot objectively tell which one is better.

Seriously? You've studied anthropology right?

In the somewhat homogenized post-modern world it does seem like the Abrahamic moral ideal predominates, but this is a very recent phenomena and highly divergent even within Abrahamic morals.

Contrast Miami Beach, Florida to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
Yep.

[Rathpig]

Yep.

So you agree that morality is strictly relative to culture?

[BWE]

Yep.

So you agree that morality is strictly relative to culture?
'scuse me. m drinking t'night.
No. Morality isn't relative to culture. Cultures develop moral systems but two opposing moral systems aren't equal. There is a better and worse moral in every case. And there is an absolute answer to e3very moral question.

How d'y'like them apples?

[BWE]

Relative is probably correct although I categorically disagree that they are culturally relative in that two cultures can hold different moral beliefs and cannot objectively tell which one is better.

Seriously?Yep.
You've studied anthropology right?Yep.

In the somewhat homogenized post-modern world it does seem like the Abrahamic moral ideal predominates, but this is a very recent phenomena and highly divergent even within Abrahamic morals.yep.

Contrast Miami Beach, Florida to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.Yep.[/quote]

Yep.

So you agree that morality is strictly relative to culture?
nope.

[Rathpig]

There is a better and worse moral in every case.

Based on what?

[BWE]

There is a better and worse moral in every case.

Based on what?
gotta stop posting or stop drinking. I'll stop posting.

Here's a link to where I started to figger out what I mean by that:

link (http://talkrational.org/showthread.php?p=82008#post82008)

[Preno]

I do think that moral claims can be true or false regardless of our opinions about them. So you do believe that moral values are either true or false outside of cultural constructs?I believe they are (or: some of them are) true in the same sense in which many other statements which we normally consider to be true or false are (for example, your claim that moral values are not true or false outside of cultural constructs). Iow, if you want to argue that there these moral claims are not "objectively true", you will also have to admit that many other claims are not "objectively true". I don't believe they have some sort of (vaguely defined) special epistemic status of the kind that would correspond to a lack of "objectivity".

Of course they, like any other sentence, depend on "cultural constructs" in the trivial sense that the truth of "you shouldn't have hit him" depends on the social fact that "hit" doesn't mean "greeted", for example. And there are Quinean problems with translation/meaning that can be put as "dependence on cultural constructs", but again, these apply to pretty much all statements, moral or not.

[KnightWhoSaysNi]

The above discussion has been split from this thread (http://talkrational.org/showthread.php?t=6110) in the Rat Ring Proposals forum.

KWSN, Rat Ring Moderator

[Rathpig]

Iow, if you want to argue that there these moral claims are not "objectively true", you will also have to admit that many other claims are not "objectively true".

Which is meaningless in context.

Ethical systems are relative to culture.

This is not the same as saying ethic are strictly subjective to individual determination. Obviously the member of a culture is defined by the cultural mores and more importantly laws of their society. It is therefore meaningless on a practical level for an individual to make moral determinations outside the cultural construct. One can be a libertine, but this is defined by the relative nature of their culture.

In other words, being a libertine only has meaning because a cultural moral system exists to which one rebels.

So in this sense morality is "truth" as it is defined in cultural context. It is not universally "true" because morals are not questions of universality. Morals are cultural questions. Exceptions to any specific moral pronouncement always exist in some divergent cultural aspect, and these exceptions depend solely on specific cultural definitions.

An example of this would be the three big "questions" of all human morality:

1). Murder. We know that numerous exceptions to this exist in society. I won't belabor the point. War, execution, self-defense. This isn't a universal.
2). Rape. Even in western society spousal rape is a very recent moral violation. Judicial rape is still present in many cultures, and some sociologists argue effectively that homosexual judicial rape remains an underlying aspect of Western incarceration practices.
3). Pedophilia. Western society has redefined the word to mean sex or anything of a sexual nature with a minor rather than the specific prepubescent nature of the word, but historically marriage at 12-14 years of age for females was common in Western society. Low ages of consent are not rare world-wide. Some societies still practice pederasty as a cultural marker though it is often "unspoken love" in a public sense.

If it is this easy to demonstrate a wide divergence in what are three of the most serious areas of morality, how can it not be argued that cultural relativity is literal? We can point to cultural relativity within our own historical mores. Our ethical attitudes toward murder, rape, and pedophilia have changed drastically in the past 100 years.

Moral cultural relativity is axiomatic.

[Preno]

Iow, if you want to argue that there these moral claims are not "objectively true", you will also have to admit that many other claims are not "objectively true".Which is meaningless in context.I don't understand.
Ethical systems are relative to culture.

This is not the same as saying ethic are strictly subjective to individual determination. Obviously the member of a culture is defined by the cultural mores and more importantly laws of their society. It is therefore meaningless on a practical level for an individual to make moral determinations outside the cultural construct. One can be a libertine, but this is defined by the relative nature of their culture.

In other words, being a libertine only has meaning because a cultural moral system exists to which one rebels.

So in this sense morality is "truth" as it is defined in cultural context. It is not universally "true" because morals are not questions of universality. Morals are cultural questions. Exceptions to any specific moral pronouncement always exist in some divergent cultural aspect, and these exceptions depend solely on specific cultural definitions.

An example of this would be the three big "questions" of all human morality:

1). Murder. We know that numerous exceptions to this exist in society. I won't belabor the point. War, execution, self-defense. This isn't a universal.
2). Rape. Even in western society spousal rape is a very recent moral violation. Judicial rape is still present in many cultures, and some sociologists argue effectively that homosexual judicial rape remains an underlying aspect of Western incarceration practices.
3). Pedophilia. Western society has redefined the word to mean sex or anything of a sexual nature with a minor rather than the specific prepubescent nature of the word, but historically marriage at 12-14 years of age for females was common in Western society. Low ages of consent are not rare world-wide. Some societies still practice pederasty as a cultural marker though it is often "unspoken love" in a public sense.I wouldn't mind going over that point by point, but the thing is I don't see what any of the facts you just mentioned have to do with the morality of murder, rape or pedophilia, and what connection the fact that some societies find it moral has with the question of whether it is moral or not.
If it is this easy to demonstrate a wide divergence in what are three of the most serious areas of morality, how can it not be argued that cultural relativity is literal?That's kinda like asking if it is this easy to demonstrate a wide divergence in cosmology between cultures, how can it not be argued that cosmology is relative? :dunno:

Intercultural differences in moral beliefs are simply irrelevant, unless you want to say that the fact that there are cultures which believe the world was made of clay means that the Big Bang theory is only true in some "culturally relative" sense.
Moral cultural relativity is axiomatic.Yes, for you, it appears to be.

[Rathpig]

Preno,

You are confusing questions of fact, such as cosmology, with question of culture such as morality. Moral facts simply do not exist. That is the point. Morality only has meaning in a cultural context.

If you say for instance pedophilia is morally "wrong". You can only do this from your own cultural context. You can't do this from any external point of "fact". Any experiment you may conduct to show harm, with harm being a determination of "wrong", can only be presented in the context of the culture to which the experiment applies.

Sociologically speaking, morality is a form of cultural bias. This makes it relative to culture by definition. Any truth-value exists only within a specific cultural marker.

Don't confuse this with external questions such as cosmology. Ethics is not a science. No independent experiment exists. This is where the axiomatic nature of moral cultural relativism is found. To define the word "morality", you must speak to a specific culture whether you realize it or not. If you say a question of morality is "true", you are doing so from your own cultural bias.

[JamesBannon]

I'm with Preno on this one. Moral reasoning is certainly human, but that does not mean it is necessarily relative. The fact that different cultures have different practices is irrelevant.

[Preno]

Preno,

You are confusing questions of fact, such as cosmology, with question of culture such as morality. Moral facts simply do not exist. That is the point. Morality only has meaning in a cultural context.And you are begging the question.

R: moral divergence between cultures -> morality is culturally relative.
P: then why not cosmological divergence between cultures -> cosmology is culturally relative?
R: because morality is, unlike cosmology, culturally relative.

Regardless of what you think about morality, how can you not see how circular this argument is? We're exactly at the point where we began, i.e. is morality culturally relative.
If you say for instance pedophilia is morally "wrong". You can only do this from your own cultural context. You can't do this from any external point of "fact". Any experiment you may conduct to show harm, with harm being a determination of "wrong", can only be presented in the context of the culture to which the experiment applies.

Sociologically speaking, morality is a form of cultural bias. This makes it relative to culture by definition. Any truth-value exists only within a specific cultural marker.

Don't confuse this with external questions such as cosmology. Ethics is not a science. No independent experiment exists. This is where the axiomatic nature of moral cultural relativism is found. To define the word "morality", you must speak to a specific culture whether you realize it or not. If you say a question of morality is "true", you are doing so from your own cultural bias.Well, you can make thought experiments, just like in other areas of philosophy, you can give examples and counter-examples and it helps to have first-hand knowledge of the situation you are talking about. You cannot make any "experiment" to decide whether "morality is culturally relative" is true, either, yet you have no problem with accepting that assertion (the experiment where you look at how divergent a view of morality different cultures hold doesn't work, as I just pointed out).

(Also, you don't need to define or indeed have in your vocabulary the word "morality" in order to be able to make moral assertions.)

[Rathpig]

Regardless of what you think about morality, how can you not see how circular this argument is?

You missed one important point. I can measure cosmology from an objective scale. I can observe cosmology and translate the exact same data between cultures. A culturally external system exists, generally in the form of mathematics, to define the terms.

Morality is not derived from an external source, so you are confusing two non-related concepts. On top of this you are trying to torture logic in a case where it doesn't apply, but we can overlook that since you are confused on the basis of you comparison.

Now my question for you would be how do you define "truth" in morality without a cultural definition of the terms? How do you control for cultural bias in your definitions?

[Rathpig]

I'm with Preno on this one. Moral reasoning is certainly human, but that does not mean it is necessarily relative. The fact that different cultures have different practices is irrelevant.

Different cultures have wildly divergent differing moral views. Our own culture has experienced widely divergent moral views in the past 100 years. It isn't that somehow we practice different actions. We hold different beliefs.

This seems to be the mistake being made. Morals are merely a belief. At no point can someone demonstrate objectively the "fact" of a moral statement. You can show the "is" and you can even argue the "ought", but you cannot give a culturally external and empirical source for your moral belief.


This is why even theistic morality is culturally relative.

[Preno]

You missed one important point. I can measure cosmology from an objective scale. I can observe cosmology and translate the exact same data between cultures. A culturally external system exists, generally in the form of mathematics, to define the terms.What do you mean by "objective", then, and how do you empirically tell which claims are objective?

If you cannot make any experiment to tell which claims are objective and which are not, you have no right to assert that objective morality doesn't exist because you cannot make any experiment to verify moral claims. If you can make such an experiment, propose one.
Morality is not derived from an external source, so you are confusing two non-related concepts. On top of this you are trying to torture logic in a case where it doesn't apply, but we can overlook that since you are confused on the basis of you comparison.What do you mean? Your argument was horribly circular. I wasn't trying to "torture logic", I simply put it so as to expose its circular core.
Now my question for you would be how do you define "truth" in morality without a cultural definition of the terms? How do you control for cultural bias in your definitions?I don't define "truth" in morality. Neither do I define "truth" in physics or for that matter any other field (except in a deflationary 'snow-is-white' manner). Why would I need to?

[Rathpig]

Preno,

All you are doing now is equivocating the point to try and confuse two very dissimilar areas of inquiry. You do define truth value in physics and you do define an objective language of inquiry. It is simply a lie to say you don't.

If I say, "gravity on a celestial body causes object to fall up", you will say that my statement is "untrue" due to the definition of "gravity". It doesn't matter if I am from Arizona or Azerbaijan, if I state the concept of gravity in the context of modern physics, I am talking about the exact same thing. This is how scientific inquiry works. We don't talk about the American concept of gravity versus the Asian concept of gravity. It is an objective area of inquiry. Even when we argue Higgs-Boson or the graviton particle we are discussing how we can arrive at an objective understanding of the physical universe through duplicable experiment.

Contrasting this to morality, the moral philosopher does not make a statement and demonstrate it's validity through duplicable experiment in the Ethics Laboratory. The moral philosopher speaks in an completely different language.

In colloquial language we use "right" and "wrong" for moral views, but these are emotional place holders for our cultural bias. When we speak in moral terms we are displaying feelings rather than facts. We can make quasi-objective statements such as Kant's Categorical Imperative, but then others will immediately point to the exceptions to which no duplicable experiment will offer respite.

Even in the most dire ethical consequence such as murder we can point to an exception such as self-defense. We cannot point to the situation where the force of gravity on a celestial body falls up.

[BWE]

Iow, if you want to argue that there these moral claims are not "objectively true", you will also have to admit that many other claims are not "objectively true".

Which is meaningless in context.

Ethical systems are relative to culture.ethical systems are not the same as morality. The systems are specific to culture in that a culture usually follows a specified moral code and relative in that the moral positions relate to the survival of that culture.That doesn't mean that the morals themselves are relative, just that the ones enumerated by a culture are products of the culture. They can be wrong and demonstrably wrong, even to members of the culture.

This is not the same as saying ethic are strictly subjective to individual determination. Obviously the member of a culture is defined by the cultural mores and more importantly laws of their society. It is therefore meaningless on a practical level for an individual to make moral determinations outside the cultural construct. One can be a libertine, but this is defined by the relative nature of their culture.Dangerous perhaps but not meaningless. If a member of a group has figured out that the volcano isn't a deity who requires the sacrifice of virgins, then that individual possesses information unavailable to the other members of the tribe. Their moral decision wouldn't be within the cultural context, nor would it be meaningless.

In other words, being a libertine only has meaning because a cultural moral system exists to which one rebels.Rebellion may be a moral decision in some cases. When it is, I submit that it is the product of interpreting a bit of information differently than the cultural moral system. In that sense, it can be evaluated for it's accuracy as, at some point, can all moral choices.

So in this sense morality is "truth" as it is defined in cultural context. It is not universally "true" because morals are not questions of universality. Morals are cultural questions. Exceptions to any specific moral pronouncement always exist in some divergent cultural aspect, and these exceptions depend solely on specific cultural definitions.I disagree. Whatever the context, once you apply the context, you have an objective question with an objective answer. The moral question is really situation specific rather than culturally specific. Just that cultures develop systems which generate many situations over and over, so the decision appears to be cultural.

An example of this would be the three big "questions" of all human morality:

1). Murder. We know that numerous exceptions to this exist in society. I won't belabor the point. War, execution, self-defense. This isn't a universal.It's situation specific and the morality of the decision can always be deduced by anyone given enough information. As are the examples below.

2). Rape. Even in western society spousal rape is a very recent moral violation. Judicial rape is still present in many cultures, and some sociologists argue effectively that homosexual judicial rape remains an underlying aspect of Western incarceration practices.
3). Pedophilia. Western society has redefined the word to mean sex or anything of a sexual nature with a minor rather than the specific prepubescent nature of the word, but historically marriage at 12-14 years of age for females was common in Western society. Low ages of consent are not rare world-wide. Some societies still practice pederasty as a cultural marker though it is often "unspoken love" in a public sense.

If it is this easy to demonstrate a wide divergence in what are three of the most serious areas of morality, how can it not be argued that cultural relativity is literal? We can point to cultural relativity within our own historical mores. Our ethical attitudes toward murder, rape, and pedophilia have changed drastically in the past 100 years.Attitudes are changing because information is accumulating.
Moral cultural relativity is axiomatic.Used to be. Now, not so much. Says me anyway.

[The AntiChris]

I do think that moral claims can be true or false regardless of our opinions about them.It's not clear what "our" in the above sentence refers to. Does it mean anyone's opinion or just the opinion of an individual assessor?

I ask because if the latter is what you're saying, then you could simply be saying that a moral claim is true if the majority hold that opinion, whereas if it's the former (ie true or false regardless of anybody's opinion) I'd be interested to know what conditions must hold for a [moral] opinion to be true.

Chris

[BWE]

Preno,

All you are doing now is equivocating the point to try and confuse two very dissimilar areas of inquiry. You do define truth value in physics and you do define an objective language of inquiry. It is simply a lie to say you don't.

If I say, "gravity on a celestial body causes object to fall up", you will say that my statement is "untrue" due to the definition of "gravity". It doesn't matter if I am from Arizona or Azerbaijan, if I state the concept of gravity in the context of modern physics, I am talking about the exact same thing. This is how scientific inquiry works. We don't talk about the American concept of gravity versus the Asian concept of gravity. It is an objective area of inquiry. Even when we argue Higgs-Boson or the graviton particle we are discussing how we can arrive at an objective understanding of the physical universe through duplicable experiment.

Contrasting this to morality, the moral philosopher does not make a statement and demonstrate it's validity through duplicable experiment in the Ethics Laboratory. The moral philosopher speaks in an completely different language.

Maybe the philosopher but not the average Joe. And the philosopher would be wrong. The reason it isn't available to empirical testing is simply because there are too many variables. Not because it isn't an empirical question.

In colloquial language we use "right" and "wrong" for moral views, but these are emotional place holders for our cultural bias. When we speak in moral terms we are displaying feelings rather than facts. We can make quasi-objective statements such as Kant's Categorical Imperative, but then others will immediately point to the exceptions to which no duplicable experiment will offer respite.

Even in the most dire ethical consequence such as murder we can point to an exception such as self-defense. We cannot point to the situation where the force of gravity on a celestial body falls up.
Because the moral rule "thou shalt not kill" is a general rule with many provisos and exceptions. It is based on a basic set of information. When the situation requires a drill-down to more specific information, then the moral question changes.

[BWE]

I do think that moral claims can be true or false regardless of our opinions about them.It's not clear what "our" in the above sentence refers to. Does it mean anyone's opinion or just the opinion of an individual assessor?

I ask because if the latter is what you're saying, then you could simply be saying that a moral claim is true if the majority hold that opinion, whereas if it's the former (ie true or false regardless of anybody's opinion) I'd be interested to know what conditions must hold for a [moral] opinion to be true.

Chris
Not sure if I'm arguing the same thing as preno but if so, then it mean's anyone. But using the word opinion is misleading because opinion is based on information. If you assume it's a random thing to hold an opinion, you assume your conclusion of morals being arbitrary. Opinion isn't arbitrary nor are moral decisions.

[Preno]

Preno,

All you are doing now is equivocating the point to try and confuse two very dissimilar areas of inquiry.No, what I am doing is pointing out that you (along with everyone I've so far argued with about this) are incapable of pointing out in a non-circular manner what the difference in status between moral claims and other kinds of claims is. For one thing, you haven't explained how to tell whether a claim is "objective" or not, for another, your criterion is self-refuting for the reason I've explained above (it applies to "moral claims are not objective", too, along with many other philosophical statements ordinarily considered to be true or false).

The fact is, I would be very pleased if you could come up with a coherent, non-circular statement of the difference between morality and, say, physics that I too intuitively feel. But simply repeating that one is subjective and the other is objective is no explanation at all, and your explanation of objectivity (based on the possibility of making an experiment) undercuts itself (and many other philosophical claims with it).
You do define truth value in physics and you do define an objective language of inquiry. It is simply a lie to say you don't.First of all, you originally said "truth", not "truth value", but no, there is no such thing as a "definition of truth" in physics. I honestly have no idea what such a thing would look like, care to explain?

And defending the objectivity of physics by saying that in physics, you define an objective language of inquiry is just plain ridiculous. (Unless you want to offer some further elucidation of what you mean by an "objective language".)
If I say, "gravity on a celestial body causes object to fall up", you will say that my statement is "untrue" due to the definition of "gravity". It doesn't matter if I am from Arizona or Azerbaijan, if I state the concept of gravity in the context of modern physics, I am talking about the exact same thing. This is how scientific inquiry works. We don't talk about the American concept of gravity versus the Asian concept of gravity. It is an objective area of inquiry. Even when we argue Higgs-Boson or the graviton particle we are discussing how we can arrive at an objective understanding of the physical universe through duplicable experiment.Yes.
Contrasting this to morality, the moral philosopher does not make a statement and demonstrate it's validity through duplicable experiment in the Ethics Laboratory. The moral philosopher speaks in an completely different language.Neither did you when you said that moral claims are not objective. You didn't answer this objection.
In colloquial language we use "right" and "wrong" for moral views, but these are emotional place holders for our cultural bias. When we speak in moral terms we are displaying feelings rather than facts. We can make quasi-objective statements such as Kant's Categorical Imperative, but then others will immediately point to the exceptions to which no duplicable experiment will offer respite.Yes, such is your assertion. You made no argument for it, other than the one that applies equally well to your claim that morality is not objective and plenty of other philosophical claims that people ordinarily consider to be true or false.
Even in the most dire ethical consequence such as murder we can point to an exception such as self-defense. We cannot point to the situation where the force of gravity on a celestial body falls up.That's relativity of a completely different (and irrelevant) kind. It's pretty trivial that you can pretty much always come up with an exception - so can you with most claims in social science.

(Also, note that the truth of "the force of gravity on a celestial body caused the body to go up" is dependent on one's theory of gravity. For example, in a full-fledged theory of gravity, there is no such a thing as "the force of gravity".)
I do think that moral claims can be true or false regardless of our opinions about them.It's not clear what "our" in the above sentence refers to. Does it mean anyone's opinion or just the opinion of an individual assessor?Anyone's opinion (I don't know how "an individual assessor" is).
I ask because if the latter is what you're saying, then you could simply be saying that a moral claim is true if the majority hold that opinion, whereas if it's the former (ie true or false regardless of anybody's opinion) I'd be interested to know what conditions must hold for a [moral] opinion to be true.I don't know for sure what conditions must hold for a moral opinion to be true. One sufficient condition could be, for example, that an action that seriously harms someone but doesn't really help anyone (at least compared to the harm) is immoral.
Not sure if I'm arguing the same thing as preno but if so, then it mean's anyone.I'm not sure, either.

[Rathpig]

Says me anyway.

If you really examine what you are saying then I think you will realize you are square in my camp.

Everything you said leads to morals as relative to a culture and not containing truth-value. A person within a culture can't violate the moral code for what is considered a greater benefit unless the code is culturally derived. If these codes are culturally derived and can be violated for a greater benefit then they obviously do not contain truth-value.

Equivocating between "ethical systems" and moral codes is really not overly meaningful in the context of this discussion. They are both of a similar enough nature to be interchangeable for the sake of cultural relativity.

I'm not saying cultural relativity equates to correctness in a specific instance. Obviously a society who tosses virgins into the volcano is not "correct" even if they consider themselves moral. This is why morals are not as aspect of truth-value. The correctness or incorrectness or a moral action lies outside the realm of morality and must be found in sociology and psychology as well as practicality.

[BWE]

Says me anyway.

If you really examine what you are saying then I think you will realize you are square in my camp.

Everything you said leads to morals as relative to a culture and not containing truth-value. A person within a culture can't violate the moral code for what is considered a greater benefit unless the code is culturally derived. If these codes are culturally derived and can be violated for a greater benefit then they obviously do not contain truth-value.
WWhoah Nelly! Is that what I said? I've become indecipherable lately. :(

I mean the opposite of that. I mean that the culture uses it's best information to make it's moral code so the code appears culturally specific but that's illusory. What we really have is the best rule possible given the available info. Just as Newton's gravity is wrong but the best we had and was replaced by relativity which is more correct, morals can be functional but still wrong. My claim is that there is always an absolute "right" answer in every situation and that many moral systems may fail that test.

What was the guy who cut the last tree on Easter Island thinking? Probably about dinner that night and maybe getting laid...

Equivocating between "ethical systems" and moral codes is really not overly meaningful in the context of this discussion. They are both of a similar enough nature to be interchangeable for the sake of cultural relativity.Nope. Ethical systems are sets of rules based on specific, identifiable information. Morality is the term which means determining right or wrong.

Ethical systems can be wrong. A moral choice can be wrong. But there is only one correct moral choice in any situation. [edited that last sentence]

I'm not saying cultural relativity equates to correctness in a specific instance. Obviously a society who tosses virgins into the volcano is not "correct" even if they consider themselves moral. This is why morals are not as aspect of truth-value. The correctness or incorrectness or a moral action lies outside the realm of morality and must be found in sociology and psychology as well as practicality.I think we have a definitions problem.^^

[Rathpig]

Preno,

Are you seriously trying to say that no one can define objective truth in science? And that somehow the known reality of empirical science is as quirky as the opinions of social science? (Since History is my field, I can tell you that the Humanities (social sciences) are really quirky. Defined truth is a fleeting as large salaries.)

You have equivocated yourself into meaningless.

First of all, truth-value in moral philosophy is fleeting even for those who claim it. Most moral philosophers do not make determinations of truth. Scientists spend their entire career doing exactly that. These two fields are so far apart that I now have no idea what you are talking about.

Do you honestly think that their is no determination of truth in physics, but somehow there is a determination of truth in moral philosophy? Seriously?

[Rathpig]

I mean that the culture uses it's best information to make it's moral code ...

That definition isn't even colloquially sustainable much less in a systematic examination. Historically unexamined and unexplained superstition through religion has had as much influence on morality as actual information. Only in the past few hundred years has actual information been applied to morality.

But The moral choice can't be wrong.

I think this is a nineteenth century philosophic view.

You know that I'm not overly post-modern in my analysis, but to even claim that there exist "The Moral Choice" is questionable. Even Utilitarianism is suspect, but "The Moral Choice" seems to be bumping into Natural Law or some other questionable view.

By what criteria is this choice found?

[The AntiChris]

I don't know for sure what conditions must hold for a moral opinion to be true. One sufficient condition could be, for example, that an action that seriously harms someone but doesn't really help anyone (at least compared to the harm) is immoral.Doesn't this just shift the problem back one step?

Is it possible that claims of harm can be true regardless of anyone's opinion of them? If so, how do we determine what is harmful?

Chris

[Preno]

Preno,

Are you seriously trying to say that no one can define objective truth in science?I'm saying I haven't heard any coherent definition of "objective truth". I know what "truth" is alright, but what is "objective truth"?
And that somehow the known reality of empirical science is as quirky as the opinions of social science? (Since History is my field, I can tell you that the Humanities (social sciences) are really quirky. Defined truth is a fleeting as large salaries.)I didn't say that (and I see and raise your disrespect for social science). Afaict, lots of claims of social scientists (I have mainly sociologists in mind, but I assume there are some in history, too) are simply meaningless rubbish, which is not true at all in physics.
You have equivocated yourself into meaningless.Point out a single place in any of my posts where I was equivocating and state clearly what two meanings was I equivocating between.
Most moral philosophers do not make determinations of truth. Scientists spend their entire career doing exactly thatThat's kind of the whole point of what we are arguing about, isn't it? So I don't understand why all of a sudden you're assuming it.
These two fields are so far apart that I now have no idea what you are talking about.I am talking about the fact that I have so far not heard any kind of coherent, non-circular explanation of what "objective truth" (as opposed to just truth) is supposed to be.
Do you honestly think that their is no determination of truth in physics, but somehow there is a determination of truth in moral philosophy? Seriously?I think there is determination of truth in both. I don't understand how you got the idea that I don't think physical claims are incapable of being true or false. If I did, I would hardly be studying physics, would I?

Also, please back up or retract your claim that there is some "definition of truth value in physics". (Are you a logical positivist or something?)
Doesn't this just shift the problem back one step?Yes. So does any other statement of conditions of truth of any sentence. I don't know what answer are you expecting.

Maybe a direct demonstration will be more convincing. Please state what the truth conditions are for "the shop is open" (without talking about shops and opening hours, the existence of which I, for the sake of the argument, don't recognize).

[Rathpig]

Preno,

I have no idea how you are pining this entire argument on the use of the word "objective". This is fairly common usage when discussing moral philosophy because so many people point to "subjective" truth. Since I personally can find no truth-value of any form in morality, these terms are only short-hand.

What I don't understand is how you can compare physics to moral philosophy.

Physics deals with reality through systematically searching for and finding evidenced truth. Moral philosophy is merely someone's emotions about a relative issue within society. You can't compare the two. Morals are relative to cultures and contain no truth-value. Nothing has been presented to suggest otherwise except your misplaced accusation of circular reasoning.

If you think morality contains truth-value and exist outside of a cultural construct then demonstrate your case.

[The AntiChris]

Maybe a direct demonstration will be more convincing. Please state what the truth conditions are for "the shop is open" (without talking about shops and opening hours, the existence of which I, for the sake of the argument, don't recognize).This is where the disagreement lies.

My view is that there is a difference in kind, and not simply degree, between statements which can only be truthful if they accurately report an assessor's emotional response (eg response to perceived harm) and the truth of a response which can only make sense when it depends on the accuracy of an assessor's evaluation with reference to an agreed [albeit, possibly implicit], external, universal standard.

I think most people find this a useful distinction. :dunno:

Chris

[Preno]

Preno,

I have no idea how you are pining this entire argument on the use of the word "objective". This is fairly common usage when discussing moral philosophy because so many people point to "subjective" truth. Since I personally can find no truth-value of any form in morality, these terms are only short-hand.Because you've used it pretty much in every step in your argument so far, and I have no idea why you would keep saying "objective truth" when simply "truth" would have done (especially since my original formulation was simply that moral claims are truth-apt). That's just a totally weird and uncooperative way to speak.

If your argument doesn't depend on the word "objective", then just, you know, state it without using it.
What I don't understand is how you can compare physics to moral philosophy.I am not comparing physics to moral philosophy (any more than I am comparing physics to social science when I say that both of their claims are, or at least can be, true or false). I am merely saying that you have so far failed to produce a criterion that would set moral claims apart from the rest of our claims.
Physics deals with reality through systematically searching for and finding evidenced truth. Moral philosophy is merely someone's emotions about a relative issue within society.Yes, so you keep repating. Do you have any argument for that? I don't feel any particular emotion when I say that we should minimize harm to others. Hell, I can even feel disgust at, say, homosexuals but be persuaded rationally that there is nothing immoral about homosexuality.
If you think morality contains truth-value and exist outside of a cultural construct then demonstrate your case.My case is simply that the burden is on you to demonstrate that, contrary to appearances, moral claims have no truth value. Moral claims (or at least many moral claims) are treated as if they had a truth value, we assert them, argue against them, use logical operations on them, give examples and counter-examples. We treat them as sentences that have a truth value, not sentences which express emotions.

Of course, appearances can be deceptive, but the burden is on you to explain why sentences which are normally treated as if they had a truth value in fact don't.

[Preno]

My view is that there is a difference in kind, and not simply degree, between statements which can only be truthful if they accurately report an assessor's emotional response (eg response to perceived harm) and the truth of a response which can only make sense when it depends on the accuracy of an assessor's evaluation with reference to an agreed [albeit, possibly implicit], external, universal standard.Some kind of standard is always implicit in making any kind of assertion. You need to say what difference is there is the standard we use to evaluate "you shouldn't have hit Peter" to the standard we use to evaluate "the shop is open".

It would be misleading to believe that there is some sort of complete, universal standard of morality, though. If there were, then people would hardly disagree about matters of morality, would they?
I think most people find this a useful distinction. :dunno:Most people found the distinction between the "analytic" and "synthetic" useful, too.

[Rathpig]

Moral claims (or at least many moral claims) are treated as if they had a truth value, we assert them, argue against them, use logical operations on them, give examples and counter-examples. We treat them as sentences that have a truth value, not sentences which express emotions.

I did demonstrate this early in the thread. We culturally assign truth-value to moral statements because these are relative to our cultural viewpoint.

Of course, appearances can be deceptive, but the burden is on you to explain why sentences which are normally treated as if they had a truth value in fact don't.

Because moral questions are not assigned on the basis of strict utility or any other extra-cultural method of value determination, the use of inter-cultural value doesn't translate to a universal. This isn't merely a case of "appearances can be deceptive", it is a case of cultural norms being linguistically predominate.

An example:

If I say, the Koran teaches that Mohammad married Aisha at 9 years of age; therefore Allah has determined the proper age for female marriage is 9. You can counter that 9 is too young, that harm will result in possible childbirth, that this is predatory, that it is socially harmful. All of which may be true, but none of which speak specifically to morality in the context of Islam.

You can't say, "Utility is the basis of morality". You can say, "Utility ought to be the basis of morality". This is something that is very difficult to work around in a philosophical sense, but it is almost impossible to work around in a cultural sense.

The Islam culture which may believe that "9 is the proper age of marriage" will call this "true". You may believe this is "untrue". You may even be able to demonstrate some form of evidenced rebuttal to their claim of "truth", but you can't alter the cultural aspect of their morality without altering the culture. All your ideas of harm will be countered with the idea of Divine Command. How can your ideas triumph over the ideas of Allah?

To carry this to the next step. What if you show 50% harm, yet the Muslim can show 50% positive results? Is "truth" then at an impasse?

Remember that even in our own "enlightened" Western cultures the age of marriage consent was almost this young less than 100 years ago. Was that culture more "untrue" than the current or merely different?

[BWE]

I mean that the culture uses it's best information to make it's moral code ...

That definition isn't even colloquially sustainable much less in a systematic examination. Historically unexamined and unexplained superstition through religion has had as much influence on morality as actual information. Only in the past few hundred years has actual information been applied to morality.
Well, my contention is that it is specifically sustainable. Are you claiming that a culture's superstition is held as something other than information? In fact, once we determine that it is wrong information, we hold morals created using the wrong information to be morally wrong.

But The moral choice can't be wrong.

I think this is a nineteenth century philosophic view.

You know that I'm not overly post-modern in my analysis, but to even claim that there exist "The Moral Choice" is questionable. Even Utilitarianism is suspect, but "The Moral Choice" seems to be bumping into Natural Law or some other questionable view.

By what criteria is this choice found?

You have to define the boundaries. If your question is why is it good? then I refer you to my closing statement in the morality discussion:
At the morality level of recursion, (give me a few lines, I'll try to clear up this concept right away) where I think you want to go with this would be the question "Why do we call the drive to survive good? Isn't that arbitrary?" And the answer is, no. It isn't arbitrary at all. Good means that which helps us survive. Unless you want to go all Wittgenstein (I think it would be out of place in my argument but maybe not) or even, heaven forbid, post modernist on me, we don't need to unpack the language/meaning bundle. (However, the possible reduction of the argument to even more simple terms to check them for accuracy illustrates my point even more.)

Good food,
Good job,
Good place to…
She's good at..
and etc.

All these boil down to fitness statements. If you want to say that morality needs to account for fitness and life itself, to answer why we have a drive to survive and reproduce, then I think my formulation successfully dismisses the need to answer. I only need to cover a subset within the set of life. The levels I talked about in the last paragraph look like this as I describe them:

[Life = random event ------------\ .............../ ---------- back to 'life' ]
{living =drives -Survive, Reproduce-\.......... /---------- back to 'living'}
-------------------------------------|..... |-----------------------------
(morality = system by which we form decisions relating to survival and reproduction)


If your criticism requires an answer to why we have drives or to explain life then my answer is I didn't include that in this essay because I addressed the narrower focus from the third level. As far as I can tell, no moral question will ever leave that third level. It is an error to use the outer bracket's logical framework within the inner bracket unless the result ends up at the same level you started. That is how the logic of propositional calculus works as far as I know. Each level can have its own arbitrary assumptions but you have to leave each set within its own brackets. You can carry them down but not above their unique level. I'm paraphrasing Douglas Hofstadter's "Gödel Escher Bach" from memory so I'll stop before I get too far off-track but I assume you understand the point. It may be arbitrary that life exists but once you carry that rule into the drives level, it becomes a given in that level. And the Proposition can't move up. If morality is inextricably entangled in the second level, it still wouldn't substantially affect my argument's logic only its vocabulary. If morality is either the principles, the information or a combination of the two, that inform our decisions regarding survival and reproduction then it isn't at the same level as the source of the drive to reproduce and isn't subject to answer questions at that level at all.

If we disagree over a moral principle today, we reflexively begin the drill-down process to find the error. That assumes one exists. What if underlying assumptions that only benefit one party could be valid? What if two villagers from an ancient time could get to the bottom of a pile and say, "oh, I see. You think it's OK to kill all the firstborn children and I don't. Hmm. I guess we have different systems."? Then it would be arbitrary. But that isn't the case at all. The reason we don't accept things like that is because we can break the belief down into smaller components for quite a while. At some point, the belief will be supported by an empirically testable bit of information.

When we discover an intentional deception or otherwise uncharitable bit of information in examining moral foundations of others, we usually call it manipulation, duplicity, lying, or some other generally frowned upon behavior and consider it immoral due to the obvious benefit imbalance. In the cases where morality appears to demand those kinds of deceptions the problem is morally more complicated or even difficult if the benefit lacks an obvious necessity. But in all cases, the moral value of the decision can be verified with enough shared information.

In the case above, maybe the tribe can't support them. In that case, the decision moves down to lower, more basic rules to assemble the bits available into the best predicted action. Maybe you go down a level and discover a principle that informs you that it is more humane to kill an infant than an adult because the infant doesn't need to feel fear. That sounds pretty arbitrary, right? But you can still drill down. Beneath that assumption lie assumptions about infant mortality experiences, witnessing of prior deaths, things that left fear traces in memory, the burden vs. productivity ratio, itself informed by memories of past times of dearth. The value of each member of the tribe factors in there, each involving countless factors all assembling individual principles which eventually combine to form the situation and inform the action. At the end of the chain it boils down to information. that informs mini predictions that eventually combine to inform the final action. All that information and principle building is weighed against the drive to survive and reproduce but the drive isn't arbitrary in the sense of mutable. It just is. It is the reality we encounter. Why reality appears the way it does is beyond the scope of a discussion on morality for me since I'd be giving away all my secrets.

In our own time, we could conceivably face a devastating famine or shortage that necessitates a similar kind of terrible decision. Who gets to decide who lives and who dies in that scenario? Judging by experience, those with the capacity to decide will probably choose to save themselves and sacrifice those they can define as somehow other. Does that refute my hypothesis? I maintain that, given perfect knowledge, perfect predictive power, knowing the outcome of all choices, all people will agree exactly on the moral course(s) of action.

Whether those with the power to choose would choose the moral course or not is irrelevant. That they would know it is what I claim. In our sets of information regarding moral choices lies that one I just mentioned- realization that those in power are not likely to make the moral choice. But that in itself reflects an imbalance of information. Knowing the moral choice and making it are two different things. Knowing that we lack the perfect information we need is frustrated by the knowledge that someone else may possess that knowledge. I suspect that issue at the root of religious assurances of a reward for making the moral choice as dictated. The individual rests assured that they have enough information and it allows the ones to be sacrificed some solace in their decision.

[Preno]

Moral claims (or at least many moral claims) are treated as if they had a truth value, we assert them, argue against them, use logical operations on them, give examples and counter-examples. We treat them as sentences that have a truth value, not sentences which express emotions.I did demonstrate this early in the thread. We culturally assign truth-value to moral statements because these are relative to our cultural viewpoint.So why are they relative to our cultural viewpoint? Surely not only because different cultures disagree about them.
Of course, appearances can be deceptive, but the burden is on you to explain why sentences which are normally treated as if they had a truth value in fact don't.Because moral questions are not assigned on the basis of strict utility or any other extra-cultural method of value determination, the use of inter-cultural value doesn't translate to a universal. This isn't merely a case of "appearances can be deceptive", it is a case of cultural norms being linguistically predominate.

An example:

If I say, the Koran teaches that Mohammad married Aisha at 9 years of age; therefore Allah has determined the proper age for female marriage is 9. You can counter that 9 is too young, that harm will result in possible childbirth, that this is predatory, that it is socially harmful. All of which may be true, but none of which speak specifically to morality in the context of Islam.

You can't say, "Utility is the basis of morality". You can say, "Utility ought to be the basis of morality". This is something that is very difficult to work around in a philosophical sense, but it is almost impossible to work around in a cultural sense.Why couldn't I say "utility is the basis of morality"? Lots of people do.
The Islam culture which may believe that "9 is the proper age of marriage" will call this "true". You may believe this is "untrue". You may even be able to demonstrate some form of evidenced rebuttal to their claim of "truth", but you can't alter the cultural aspect of their morality without altering the culture. All your ideas of harm will be countered with the idea of Divine Command. How can your ideas triumph over the ideas of Allah?I have no idea why you're putting forth the fact that some culture forcefully holds the belief X as an argument against X having a truth value. I mean, again, surely you don't believe this holds in general, so what non-circular (!!!) reason do you have to say that it holds in the case of moral claims.
To carry this to the next step. What if you show 50% harm, yet the Muslim can show 50% positive results? Is "truth" then at an impasse?I guess he would claim that adherence to the Quran is positive, which I would counter by explaining to him that it's a book of fables. Whether he will become convinced or cut my head off is quite immaterial to our discussion.
Remember that even in our own "enlightened" Western cultures the age of marriage consent was almost this young less than 100 years ago. Was that culture more "untrue" than the current or merely different?Yes, their idea was probably wrong.

Again, you seem to be making the absurd argument from cultural differences to cultural relativity.

Oh, and I almost forgot:
please back up or retract your claim that there is some "definition of truth value in physics"Not that this directly relates to our current discussion, but I hate it when people ludicrous claims like this and then simply abandon them.

[BWE]

An example:

If I say, the Koran teaches that Mohammad married Aisha at 9 years of age; therefore Allah has determined the proper age for female marriage is 9. You can counter that 9 is too young, that harm will result in possible childbirth, that this is predatory, that it is socially harmful. All of which may be true, but none of which speak specifically to morality in the context of Islam.
Maybe not. But demonstrating the Koran to be mythology isn't all that tough and therefore, once someone determines it not to be authoritative...

If it were corrects, then 9 would be the right age regardless of the consequences. It isn't true, at least allah isn't a person and didn't dictate any book, so the information is flawed, therefore the moral choice of muslims is based on inaccurate information.

You can't say, "Utility is the basis of morality". You can say, "Utility ought to be the basis of morality". This is something that is very difficult to work around in a philosophical sense, but it is almost impossible to work around in a cultural sense.
Name one example of a moral choice that is not based on information. I think you are wrong here.

The Islam culture which may believe that "9 is the proper age of marriage" will call this "true". You may believe this is "untrue". You may even be able to demonstrate some form of evidenced rebuttal to their claim of "truth", but you can't alter the cultural aspect of their morality without altering the culture. All your ideas of harm will be countered with the idea of Divine Command. How can your ideas triumph over the ideas of Allah?see above.

To carry this to the next step. What if you show 50% harm, yet the Muslim can show 50% positive results? Is "truth" then at an impasse?
Truth in this case is misapplied. The application would be the 'truth' that a moral decision is 'correct'.



Remember that even in our own "enlightened" Western cultures the age of marriage consent was almost this young less than 100 years ago. Was that culture more "untrue" than the current or merely different?

Examine the information and the answer becomes apparent.
We create moral rules because the systems are so damn complicated we have to approximate.

[Rathpig]

Oh, and I almost forgot:
please back up or retract your claim that there is some "definition of truth value in physics"Not that this directly relates to our current discussion, but I hate it when people ludicrous claims like this and then simply abandon them.

I will answer this as a stand alone since it is bothering you.

There must exist a definition of truth-value in physics or you could never agree on an issue. If I point to one issue and say it is "true" and you say it is "not true", then we have to refer to some definition outside ourselves, but accepted within physics, to determine the truth-value.

Normally this is where experts in the field are cited as evidence of a point. Some points can be contested, but a huge body of information has been determined "truth" and is simply not open for discussion. You don't walk into an introductory physics class and question Newton on thermodynamics.

[BWE]

Oh, and I almost forgot:
please back up or retract your claim that there is some "definition of truth value in physics"Not that this directly relates to our current discussion, but I hate it when people ludicrous claims like this and then simply abandon them.

I will answer this as a stand alone since it is bothering you.

There must exist a definition of truth-value in physics or you could never agree on an issue. If I point to one issue and say it is "true" and you say it is "not true", then we have to refer to some definition outside ourselves, but accepted within physics, to determine the truth-value.

Normally this is where experts in the field are cited as evidence of a point. Some points can be contested, but a huge body of information has been determined "truth" and is simply not open for discussion. You don't walk into an introductory physics class and question Newton on thermodynamics.
No, but isn't it possible that, given the relevant expertise, a physicist might make a discovery and publish a paper questioning or contradicting Newton?

[Rathpig]

Are you claiming that a culture's superstition is held as something other than information?

It is subjective cultural information. It may have no meaning outside of a narrow context. It often has limited or no meaningful provenance. It almost always exists as unquestioned. It may fit the broad definition of "information", but it is relative to the culture.

In fact, once we determine that it is wrong information, we hold morals created using the wrong information to be morally wrong.

This is where the error occurs in your thinking. You have confused your version of the situation with a moral universal.

Suppose you can demonstrate in some manner that by your way of interpreting information, a morally accepted action is "wrong", then the culture which embraces this information says "so what, you are the wrong one". (Allah is blessed :) )

Are they then simply "ignorant", and you are "enlightened"?


Take the entire issue of harm. What if my culture says harm is warranted for moral good. How can you then say that your moral "right" even exists?


I can dismiss a demonstration in physics (to use the Preno example), but you can repeat the demonstration so that I must continue to deny it in light of evidence. Gunpowder versus magic being a classic example of a demonstration I deny at my own peril. You can't do this with moral examples. I must simply accept your determination of the information as "true".

[Rathpig]

No, but isn't it possible that, given the relevant expertise, a physicist might make a discovery and publish a paper questioning or contradicting Newton?

This is a speculation that must be accompanied by massive duplicable demonstration. It is possible, but is it probable? Newton isn't accepted because the Gods of Physics wrote his name in a book. Newton isn't accepted because the emotion of empathy leads us to the conclusion. Newton isn't accepted because he was a pretty cool guy, and eh doesn't afraid of apples.

I can speculate that murder is the highest form of moral good. I can even demonstrate in a specific instance where murder would be the highest form of moral good. Does this exception turn all moral philosophy upside down? No? It is situational and subjective. It is relative.

If I disprove Newton as a general theory, I destroy two centuries of thought in physics. That is what non-relative truth means.

[Rathpig]

I have no idea why you're putting forth the fact that some culture forcefully holds the belief X as an argument against X having a truth value. I mean, again, surely you don't believe this holds in general, so what non-circular (!!!) reason do you have to say that it holds in the case of moral claims.

Because moral claims can not be demonstrated empirically.

You said this yourself. I can say the Koran is the sacred word of God. You can say that it is a book of fables. Any concept of morality stemming from our divergent viewpoint is merely an opinion based on out relative view.

Morality is like food.

I can tell you how great it is to eat sushi. I can explain that this vegetarian norimaki is not "raw fish", but you can shake your head and reply that you still don't want to try sushi. You can have a thousand reasons or none. It really doesn't matter. I think I am right. You think you are right. For either of us to change we have to change our relative view because in reality "sushi is good or bad" doesn't have a definitive truth-value.

[The AntiChris]

My view is that there is a difference in kind, and not simply degree, between statements which can only be truthful if they accurately report an assessor's emotional response (eg response to perceived harm) and the truth of a response which can only make sense when it depends on the accuracy of an assessor's evaluation with reference to an agreed [albeit, possibly implicit], external, universal standard.Some kind of standard is always implicit in making any kind of assertion. You need to say what difference is there is the standard we use to evaluate "you shouldn't have hit Peter" to the standard we use to evaluate "the shop is open".I'd have thought the first clearly relies, ultimately, on the truth of an emotional response (being hit usually elicits a negative emotional response) whereas the truth of the second simply relies on essentially unemotional intersubjective agreement on language usage.

Chris

[Preno]

Because moral claims can not be demonstrated empirically.Well, that's finally something non-circular I can argue with. But it still undercuts itself, because for example "claims that cannot be demonstrated empirically have no truth value" cannot be demonstrated empirically (along with many other philosophical claims that people normally have no problem with). Try again with a formulation that doesn't deny itself and that applies only to morality (and not, for example, the bulk of philosophy).

(I still don't understand why you repeated that it's "merely an opinion based on out relative view", as it that somehow constituted an argument for, as opposed to a trivial reformulation of the relativity of moral claims. Srsly, why instead of getting to the point you keep repeating the assertion?)
I will answer this as a stand alone since it is bothering you.

There must exist a definition of truth-value in physics or you could never agree on an issue. If I point to one issue and say it is "true" and you say it is "not true", then we have to refer to some definition outside ourselves, but accepted within physics, to determine the truth-value.No, you don't. I have never heard a definition of "shop" or "open" (unless you're talking about topology), yet I have no problem with agreeing with others on whether the shop is open or not. You don't need definitions in order to agree on something. That's just a logical positivist myth, that has been thoroughly debunked by post-positivist analytic philosophy.

It's just blatantly false that you need to know some magic formula called the "definition" in order to be able to successfully use a word. Just look at your own usage of language.
Normally this is where experts in the field are cited as evidence of a point. Some points can be contested, but a huge body of information has been determined "truth" and is simply not open for discussion. You don't walk into an introductory physics class and question Newton on thermodynamics.Of course it's open for discussion. It flies completely in the face of the history of physics to say that it's not open for discussion.
I'd have thought the first clearly relies, ultimately, on the truth of an emotional response (being hit usually elicits a negative emotional response) whereas the truth of the second simply relies on essentially unemotional intersubjective agreement on language usage.Well, sure, the truth of "you shouldn't have hit John" depends also on John's negative emotional response to being hit in the face. So does the truth of "John doesn't like being hit in the face", which people normally don't have problems with. So you need a better criterion (try some obvious counter-examples before formulating it).

[Rathpig]

I have never heard a definition of "shop" or "open" (unless you're talking about topology), yet I have no problem with agreeing with others on whether the shop is open or not.

That is simply bullshit Preno. If you didn't have an exact working knowledge of these definitions then you wouldn't have any idea what someone was talking about.

You are either trying to troll or just talking shit at this point.

As I have pointing out in numerous examples, moral points are based on cultural definitions and these definition have no specific truth-value. You have yet to demonstrate, or even try to demonstrate, moral universality or the existence of moral truth. So it is your turn to actually post something other than a silly accusations of circular reasoning or the blatant lie that you don't to define language to understand it.


Oh yea, and please challenge Newton in physics class with the same weak shit you have pulled so far in this thread. Newton is not "open for discussion" any more than Einstein is "open for discussion" on anything less than an very theoretic level.

[BWE]

Are you claiming that a culture's superstition is held as something other than information?

It is subjective cultural information. It may have no meaning outside of a narrow context. It often has limited or no meaningful provenance. It almost always exists as unquestioned. It may fit the broad definition of "information", but it is relative to the culture.
No, not the information, the moral rule. The culture holds a bit of information which, though inaccurate, appears to work. They hold the information as fact. That isn't relative to anything and is about as objective as we can get, no? Then, they apply the false information and create from that false information a moral rule. The rule is an application of something they hold to be valid information. That isn't subjective either.

The moral is therefore "wrong" by an objective standard. Because the culture was unaware of the falsifying information does not mean that the moral is "right" subjectively. It means a precept of the culture is wrong and some of the theorems made from its mistaken axioms are therefore wrong.

Not subjectively wrong. Objectively wrong.

In fact, once we determine that it is wrong information, we hold morals created using the wrong information to be morally wrong.

This is where the error occurs in your thinking. You have confused your version of the situation with a moral universal.

Suppose you can demonstrate in some manner that by your way of interpreting information, a morally accepted action is "wrong", then the culture which embraces this information says "so what, you are the wrong one". (Allah is blessed :) )

Are they then simply "ignorant", and you are "enlightened"?
Only if they are indeed ignorant and I am indeed in possession of better (more accurate) information. Always an uncertainty. But that uncertainty doesn't mean that there isn't better information. It merely means I am not in possession of it.



Take the entire issue of harm. What if my culture says harm is warranted for moral good. How can you then say that your moral "right" even exists?
Examine the information upon which your moral is based.


I can dismiss a demonstration in physics (to use the Preno example), but you can repeat the demonstration so that I must continue to deny it in light of evidence. Gunpowder versus magic being a classic example of a demonstration I deny at my own peril. You can't do this with moral examples. I must simply accept your determination of the information as "true".

Wrong. Everything is verifiable. Just that most of it is too complicated to do so.

No, but isn't it possible that, given the relevant expertise, a physicist might make a discovery and publish a paper questioning or contradicting Newton?

This is a speculation that must be accompanied by massive duplicable demonstration. It is possible, but is it probable? Newton isn't accepted because the Gods of Physics wrote his name in a book. Newton isn't accepted because the emotion of empathy leads us to the conclusion. Newton isn't accepted because he was a pretty cool guy, and eh doesn't afraid of apples.
I guess that's my point. It's possible. Einstein did it with gravity. Someone will probly do it with einstein.

I can speculate that murder is the highest form of moral good. I can even demonstrate in a specific instance where murder would be the highest form of moral good. Does this exception turn all moral philosophy upside down? No? It is situational and subjective. It is relative.
No. You assume there is a moral which states that all killing is wrong. That moral has many many exceptions and therefore is not an absolute. It might turn out that, given enough information, it turns out to be true but we don't have that info for now so we settle with the best we have: a theoretical construct which tries to account for the evidence we do have.

If I disprove Newton as a general theory, I destroy two centuries of thought in physics.
So? If Galileo disproves geocentrism, he destroys ten thousand centuries of thought in astronomy. So what? They were wrong, now we're less wrong.
That is what non-relative truth means.
I don't follow. What is what non-relative truth means?

[The AntiChris]

I'd have thought the first clearly relies, ultimately, on the truth of an emotional response (being hit usually elicits a negative emotional response) whereas the truth of the second simply relies on essentially unemotional intersubjective agreement on language usage.Well, sure, the truth of "you shouldn't have hit John" depends also on John's negative emotional response to being hit in the face. So does the truth of "John doesn't like being hit in the face", which people normally don't have problems with. So you need a better criterion (try some obvious counter-examples before formulating it).I should have been more precise.

What I should have said is that the truth of "you shouldn't have hit Peter" relies on an emotional response [on the part of the speaker] either to people being hit in general or to Peter being hit in particular.

Clearly, the claim "John doesn't like being hit in the face" is a purely factual claim and is not dependent on the speaker's emotional response.

Chris

[Preno]

I should have been more precise.

What I should have said is that the truth of "you shouldn't have hit Peter" relies on an emotional response [on the part of the speaker] either to people being hit in general or to Peter being hit in particular.

Clearly, the claim "John doesn't like being hit in the face" is a purely factual claim and is not dependent on the speaker's emotional response."I'm really angry now" depends on the speaker's emotional response (for example to being hit), too. So does, for example, "my blood pressure is rising".

ETA: to go even further, so does "I hit Peter back".

[Preno]

I have never heard a definition of "shop" or "open" (unless you're talking about topology), yet I have no problem with agreeing with others on whether the shop is open or not.That is simply bullshit Preno. If you didn't have an exact working knowledge of these definitions then you wouldn't have any idea what someone was talking about.A definition is a sentence that defines something in terms of other things. You don't need to know any such sentence in order to be able to use the word "shop" correctly.

Seriously, even assuming that you (like many people; this is not meant as an offense) have difficulty with looking objectively at your own language usage, have you never heard of Wittgenstein's discussion of games, for example?
You are either trying to troll or just talking shit at this point.Come on. You were a philosophy minor or something, weren't you? Have you not in the entirety of your philosophical studies read Quine or Wittgenstein?

The view that you need to define words before you can use them is definitely the minority view in modern analytic philosophy. In fact, of the top of my head I can't think of any analytic philosopher who currently holds such a view. So if I am a troll, so are Quine and Wittgenstein. (In before accusations that I'm comparing myself to them.)

Your view is an outdated and unrealistic preconception about language. That would actually be ok, if you were willing to support it by some arguments that haven't been refuted already, but if you think that people who don't share it are trolling - LOL!

I have never heard the definitions of the vast majority of the words I am using, and would in many cases have difficulties constructing them. That doesn't prevent me from using them correctly. How can any competent, self-conscious user of language claim otherwise is a mystery to me. (If you have a new argument in favour of this, I'd like to hear it, of course.)
As I have pointing out in numerous examples, moral points are based on cultural definitions and these definition have no specific truth-value. You have yet to demonstrate, or even try to demonstrate, moral universality or the existence of moral truth. So it is your turn to actually post something other than a silly accusations of circular reasoningYou keep repeating that morality is subjective because it's culturally relative because moral claims have no truth value because they are based on cultural definitios that have no truth-value. I'm sorry that you cannot see the circularity in this. The two times you stepped out of this circle and said that the problem is that there is no experiment / empirical evidence for claims, you completely ignored my response that such an argument is self-denying.
or the blatant lie that you don't to define language to understand it.lol

I wonder how you "define language" (I assume you meant "a language", right). Perhaps with the help of another language?

Ok, I think the argument is over, since you don't recognize the circularity of your arguments. Basically, you are strongly convinced that moral claims are culturally relative and seem to think that repeating this in various forms constitutes an argument. I'll also note that you didn't even attempt to address the two times I explained why your attempt at a non-circular definition objectivity is self-undercutting.

(Also, I don't understand how you can claim that they are both "merely someone's emotions" and "based on cultural definition" - those are two completely different and incompatible assertions. That you are using them both demonstrates again that you're more interested in keeping morality apart from the rest of our knowledge at any cost rather than in having a sober look at your own arguments.)

[BWE]

Well, sure, the truth of "you shouldn't have hit John" depends also on John's negative emotional response to being hit in the face. So does the truth of "John doesn't like being hit in the face", which people normally don't have problems with. So you need a better criterion (try some obvious counter-examples before formulating it).I should have been more precise.

What I should have said is that the truth of "you shouldn't have hit Peter" relies on an emotional response [on the part of the speaker] either to people being hit in general or to Peter being hit in particular.

Clearly, the claim "John doesn't like being hit in the face" is a purely factual claim and is not dependent on the speaker's emotional response.

Chris
That's the subjective issue framed quite nicely. 'Shouldn't' implies a reason.

And I assume that for it to be a moral position the reason needs to be based on a system of proposed cause and effect. In which case, a big enough lab setting could determine it's accuracy. Thus making the claim objective.

"For these reasons." And yes, I see the issue here that you might not agree with 'these reasons' but now we're out of the realm of moral choices and into the personal. Criminals don't like to go to jail either but it isn't immoral by the information we have at our disposal (or I have at my disposal) to lock up serial killers and people who abuse power.

For the reason to be moral, it needs to show group or social consequences.
And then we begin again with a definition of morality.

Dean's definition:
What is morality?

Well, while I have no wish to "argue by dictionary", the dictionary is a good place to start. The Oxford English Dictionary defines "morality" as follows:2

morality(noun: pl. moralities)
1 principles concerning the distinction between right and wrong or good and bad behaviour.
2 moral behaviour
3 the extent to which an action is right or wrong.
4 a system of values and moral principles.

Clearly, the first definition is key here. Morality is the set of principles that we use to distinguish between behaviour which we consider "right" or "good" and behaviour which we consider "wrong" or "bad" (we could use "evil" as a synonym for bad in this case). I think that my opponents would agree with this basic definition. The question is: where do such principles come from, and are they universal and external (i.e. Objective) or are they personal and internal (i.e. Subjective)?My definition:
But I am not a moral relativist. Although morals tend to shift and adapt with society, and rightly so since our situation changes so rapidly, I accept as true that there is a perfect metric by which we judge the quality of our moral views. I also consider that metric to be unchanging relative to our position.

With all that in mind, I decided to define morality as the following: the framework and knowledge we employ to inform certain kinds of behavior, helping us to see the bigger picture of our own goals. This is commonly called the ability to distinguish between the subjective right and wrong of the moment where short term individual decisions, no matter their immediate consequences, are weighed against long term personal, and hopefully societal, goals. Morality then, is a set of information.Dave Hawkins' definition:
MORALITY IS SUBJECTIVE FROM THE CREATOR'S PERSPECTIVE
Yes, let me explain. Morality is subjective from the perspective of the Creator and it is objective from the human perspective. Morality can be thought of as simply the rules by which one lives while passing through life in the universe. And IF there is a Creator who created the universe and controls it and sustains it and will one day judge mankind and destroy the present universe and recreate it, then it behooves humans to figure out the rules of this universe that the Creator has built into it.For starters.

[BWE]

Ok, I think the argument is over, since ...
Preno, before you walk away, do you think we are saying the same thing? I can't quite tell.

Are you saying:
A)Morality is based on objective criterion, and if relative, then only relative to us as a species and a life form.

B) That an absolute metric could theoretically determine the relative correctness between any two opposing moral stances?

[Preno]

Preno, before you walk away, do you think we are saying the same thing? I can't quite tell.I'm not walking away, I just think arguing any further with Rathpig would be pointless.
Are you saying:
A)Morality is based on objective criterion, and if relative, then only relative to us as a species and a life form.Not quite. I don't think the objective/subjective distinction makes much sense in the first place. I simply think that moral claims are true or false, because we treat them as such and ther is no compelling reason to believe that this is just some sort of illusion. I don't really think I have any positive view of what morality is based on (neither do I feel the need for some such "basis").
B) That an absolute metric could theoretically determine the relative correctness between any two opposing moral stances?No, in fact, I don't think any such metric is available for any other kind of claims, either. Expecting there to be some sort of general algorithm or some single norm of rationality for telling which sentence is true is imo too optimistic, whether we're talking about moral claims, scientific claims or ordinary, every-day statements.

So it looks like we're pretty much mutual opposites, too. Interesting that we both deny the subjectivity of morality on completely different grounds.

[David B]

If I disprove Newton as a general theory, I destroy two centuries of thought in physics. That is what non-relative truth means.

OK, I'll play stooge.

It was relative truth that did actually disprove Newton as a general theory.

David B (takes the view that morals are objective insofar as they can be studied objectively - by observing how people actually behave in games of the Prisoner's Dilemma, perhaps, or by viewing at a variety of levels of reduction peoples reactions when presented with videos of actors doing nice or nasty things to each other, loads of other ways)

[BWE]

Preno, before you walk away, do you think we are saying the same thing? I can't quite tell.I'm not walking away, I just think arguing any further with Rathpig would be pointless.
Are you saying:
A)Morality is based on objective criterion, and if relative, then only relative to us as a species and a life form.

Not quite. I don't think the objective/subjective distinction makes much sense in the first place. I simply think that moral claims are true or false, because we treat them as such and ther is no compelling reason to believe that this is just some sort of illusion. I don't really think I have any positive view of what morality is based on (neither do I feel the need for some such "basis").
Well, I might have framed that wrong because that's close to where I'm coming from too. It's the distinction between subjective/objective that hangs me up. Once you supply a subject to a subjective statement, it becomes objective in the sense of accuracy. That makes for a tough time when arguing over the relative differences.

Relativity however, is an important piece because at some level even an objective bit of data is relative to the observer. That too makes for a clusterfuck in definitions.


B) That an absolute metric could theoretically determine the relative correctness between any two opposing moral stances?
No, in fact, I don't think any such metric is available for any other kind of claims, either. Expecting there to be some sort of general algorithm or some single norm of rationality for telling which sentence is true is imo too optimistic, whether we're talking about moral claims, scientific claims or ordinary, every-day statements.
In this, we do not agree and it might make for an interesting thread on its own because I can't really even imagine what you might mean.

So it looks like we're pretty much mutual opposites, too. Interesting that we both deny the subjectivity of morality on completely different grounds.

Number 2 there anyway.

[Rathpig]

You were a philosophy minor or something, weren't you?

So you and BWE have been comparing notes. I guess I should be flattered.

I have never heard the definitions of the vast majority of the words I am using, and would in many cases have difficulties constructing them.

I don't think you can blame that on Wittgenstein.

I'll also note that you didn't even attempt to address the two times I explained why your attempt at a non-circular definition objectivity is self-undercutting.

Ironically, judging by you non-defined language response. I have offered numerous examples of moral cultural relativity. Your response to these examples was as lacking as any evidence that somehow empirical evidence as a definition of objectivity is "undercutting".

(Also, I don't understand how you can claim that they are both "merely someone's emotions" and "based on cultural definition" - those are two completely different and incompatible assertions.

Really? Somehow you think that individual emotional responses do not exist as an element of learned culture? Is this your new unique take on the nature-nurture issue? These are neither incompatible or completely different. Emotional reactions are learned behavior in a vast majority of cases. The best example of this is the "macho" reaction to insult found in many cultures. This is an emotion which creates a reaction which stems directly from cultural attitudes. It was once a commonly accepted cultural aspect of the now "enlightened" West.


If you are keeping score Preno, just note that you neither answered my numerous examples nor posted anything in support of your own viewpoint. It seems the basis of your argument is that you don't define your own language, but you trust that you are using it correctly. For Wittgenstein's sake, I hope this works for you.

[Rathpig]

(takes the view that morals are objective insofar as they can be studied objectively - by observing how people actually behave in games of the Prisoner's Dilemma, perhaps, or by viewing at a variety of levels of reduction peoples reactions when presented with videos of actors doing nice or nasty things to each other, loads of other ways)

But how applicable is this across cultures?

You may can form an intra-cultural study and perhaps call it "objective".

But will 9th century Vikings, 20th century Cobol programmers, and 18th century Barbary pirates all have similar moral views in the context of the observed reaction? What it seems you are calling "objective" would be the ability of one culture, your own, to apply experimental methodology. This really doesn't speak to a specific culture's view of morality.

[Preno]

Well, I might have framed that wrong because that's close to where I'm coming from too. It's the distinction between subjective/objective that hangs me up. Once you supply a subject to a subjective statement, it becomes objective in the sense of accuracy. That makes for a tough time when arguing over the relative differences.I think I still disagree. How do you propose to tell which sentences are subjective?
No, in fact, I don't think any such metric is available for any other kind of claims, either. Expecting there to be some sort of general algorithm or some single norm of rationality for telling which sentence is true is imo too optimistic, whether we're talking about moral claims, scientific claims or ordinary, every-day statements.In this, we do not agree and it might make for an interesting thread on its own because I can't really even imagine what you might mean.I meant just what I said. There is no general algorithm for determining whether something is true or not. This is true even of mathematics, a fortiori if you include empirical knowledge. (Well, it's also true for empirical claims regardless of any Godel-like arguments, so there might be something to argue about. If you start a thread about this, I'll participate.)
You were a philosophy minor or something, weren't you?So you and BWE have been comparing notes. I guess I should be flattered.what
I have never heard the definitions of the vast majority of the words I am using, and would in many cases have difficulties constructing them.I don't think you can blame that on Wittgenstein.No, I can't. But you must be incapable of simple self-reflection if you're saying that you have.

That claim is ridiculous on the face of it. Anyone can plainly see that unless maybe your father was an OED editor, you probably never heard the definitions of the vast majority of the words you are using.

Also, you didn't answer: have you actually read Quine or Wittgenstein? If not and if you think I'm wrong, do read them (since I'm clearly incapable of convincing you). If so, where do you disagree with them?
Ironically, judging by you non-defined language response. I have offered numerous examples of moral cultural relativity. Your response to these examples was as lacking as any evidence that somehow empirical evidence as a definition of objectivity is "undercutting".Well, if you're saying that only sentences for which there is empirical evidence can be objectively true, then you can hardly claim that "only sentences for which there is empirical evidence can be objectively true", can you? Or you're not claiming that it's objectively true? If so, why should I be bothered by it?
Really? Somehow you think that individual emotional responses do not exist as an element of learned culture? Is this your new unique take on the nature-nurture issue? These are neither incompatible or completely different. Emotional reactions are learned behavior in a vast majority of cases. The best example of this is the "macho" reaction to insult found in many cultures. This is an emotion which creates a reaction which stems directly from cultural attitudes. It was once a commonly accepted cultural aspect of the now "enlightened" West.You're just being sloppy with words. Again, you see this as a matter of "relative" vs. "not relative", instead of paying attention to the actual formulations. Definitions are not emotions. Definitions are sentences that say what something is in terms of other things. Surely you see the difference between an emotion and a sentence?
If you are keeping score Preno, just note that you neither answered my numerous examples nor posted anything in support of your own viewpoint.What example? All you posted were examples of people having different opinions about morality. What should I do with them, other than pointing out that they're irrelevant?

ETA: what is "my own viewpoint", other than that your arguments are either circular or self-contradicting? (And that we normally treat moral claims as if they had a truth value, so in the absence of arguments to the contrary, it makes sense to believe they do.)
It seems the basis of your argument is that you don't define your own language, but you trust that you are using it correctly. For Wittgenstein's sake, I hope this works for you.Your view of language is completely ridiculous and unrealistic. Please explain how you "define a language", if not by more language.

Are you saying we learn language by learning some definitions? Really? Honestly?

This is not even a philosophical question that there can be some sort of controversy about. Any linguist (or indeed anyone with a healthy view of language) will laugh his ass off if you say this to their face.

[Rathpig]

No, not the information, the moral rule. The culture holds a bit of information which, though inaccurate, appears to work. They hold the information as fact. That isn't relative to anything and is about as objective as we can get, no?

How is that "objective" when it is relative to that specific culture?

Then, they apply the false information and create from that false information a moral rule. The rule is an application of something they hold to be valid information. That isn't subjective either.

First of all, how do you determine the information is "false" and in what context is it "false". Why wouldn't this be a "subjective" viewpoint regardless of the truth-value since it is culture specific?


Only if they are indeed ignorant and I am indeed in possession of better (more accurate) information.

The question would be by what criteria you are judging "better" or "accurate". Sometimes this can be determined and many times it can't. An example of this is consensual adult incest. Is this morally wrong if you have no intention or are incapable of reproduction? (I know that is a crazy example, but go with it.)

Examine the information upon which your moral is based.

Take the Abrahamic injunction against pork as an example. This was a moral law based on questionable or unknown information which was technically correct for the period. Pork is "unclean" in this context.


Wrong. Everything is verifiable. Just that most of it is too complicated to do so.

Is it? Is it especially in a moral sense? Is it immoral to eat meat? Is it immoral to have a nice house when someone else lives on the street? Are these questions of emotional value or absolute truth?



No. You assume there is a moral which states that all killing is wrong. That moral has many many exceptions and therefore is not an absolute. It might turn out that, given enough information, it turns out to be true but we don't have that info for now so we settle with the best we have: a theoretical construct which tries to account for the evidence we do have.

And what would we call this state of "a theoretical construct"? Wouldn't we say that it was relative to the situation? Isn't this much the same thing as being relative to a culture?

What is what non-relative truth means?

The world is helio-centric regardless of what The Church or Galileo have to say. Marrying a 12 year old is relative to the cultural more.

[Rathpig]

What example? All you posted were examples of people having different opinions about morality. What should I do with them, other than pointing out that they're irrelevant?

You seem determined to spin this into a convoluted discussion of language rather than to actually discuss the topic of the thread. This is not a thread about how many ways Preno can avoid the central issue.

In the claim that morality is relative to culture, you can't dismiss examples which show cultural relativity by simply saying that "they're irrelevant" to the discussion of cultural relativity. The point of these examples is that cultures define morality. Any outside view of that morality is defined from another cultural view.



As to your derail about language, are you seriously claiming that the definitions of words are meaningless to understanding words?

[Preno]

What example? All you posted were examples of people having different opinions about morality. What should I do with them, other than pointing out that they're irrelevant?You seem determined to spin this into a convoluted discussion of language rather than to actually discuss the topic of the thread. This is not a thread about how many ways Preno can avoid the central issue.Lol, yes, pointing out that we do not learn language by learning definitions (and that definitions are just more language) is "convoluted". You haven't even attempted to refute that, probably because at some level you must be aware just how ridiculous that claim is.
In the claim that morality is relative to culture, you can't dismiss examples which show cultural relativity by simply saying that "they're irrelevant" to the discussion of cultural relativity. The point of these examples is that cultures define morality. Any outside view of that morality is defined from another cultural view.Those examples show that different cultures have different beliefs about morality. What on Earth does that have to do with a lack of objectivity? Once again, we're going into the same circle. Why does this not apply to cosmology, for example? (If it's because cosmology is unlike morality objective / factual / empirically verifiable, you're either a retard or trolling, in cases #1 and #2 because of circularity, in #3 because this argument denies its own validity.)
As to your derail about language, are you seriously claiming that the definitions of words are meaningless to understanding words?I (along with every single linguist in the world and probably also the vast majority of living philosophers) am saying that it's not necessary to know a word's definition in order to understand it and use it correctly.

I take it that since you ignore it, you acknowledge my point about your sloppiness re definitions & emotions? Similarly for this point:
Well, if you're saying that only sentences for which there is empirical evidence can be objectively true, then you can hardly claim that "only sentences for which there is empirical evidence can be objectively true", can you? Or you're not claiming that it's objectively true? If so, why should I be bothered by it?

[David B]

(takes the view that morals are objective insofar as they can be studied objectively - by observing how people actually behave in games of the Prisoner's Dilemma, perhaps, or by viewing at a variety of levels of reduction peoples reactions when presented with videos of actors doing nice or nasty things to each other, loads of other ways)

But how applicable is this across cultures?

Good question! One which is being thought about - but I'll get back to that later. Currently extant cultures would be easier to research, but in the case of historical or prehistorical cultures one is more limited.

We have written and oral records, artifacts that can be interpreted or misinterpreted.

I have something of an inkling of the methodological problems in historical research, and I've no doubt that you are better informed about them than I.

But would you say that history is just intractable, and hence valueless as a field of study?

I'd guess not. I don't think that history is valueless, anyway - understanding the past might be necessarily imperfect, but it can still make progress, supply some insights, don't you think?



You may can form an intra-cultural study and perhaps call it "objective".

Even an extra-cultural one, even a historical one, and claim that there is some objectivity to it.

I'd deny that 'objective/subjective' is an on off switch. Shades of gray!

As I said - 'insofar as they can be studied objectively'. Any degree of objectivity is enough to refute the idea that morality is subjective, in the on/off switch sense of the word.

But will 9th century Vikings, 20th century Cobol programmers, and 18th century Barbary pirates all have similar moral views in the context of the observed reaction? [/quite]

There might be degrees of similarity, and the best work in numbers of fields might well, I suggest, provide some insight into whether, and to what degree, similarities might exist.

See link at end of post, which also refers to something I said earlier.

[quote]What it seems you are calling "objective" would be the ability of one culture, your own, to apply experimental methodology.

Well, I'm hoping for future progress. But so what! Isn't what you have been calling 'objective' the ability of modern Western culture to do physics, what with your appeals to Newton?

This really doesn't speak to a specific culture's view of morality.

Historical research can tell us nothing about Roman or Greek views of morality?

I repeat - insofar as they can be studied objectively.

Not perfectly, but not uselessly, IMV.

Now - to an early piece of research, on which, hopefully, further progress can be built.

Brown's list of Human Universals.

Some of which have, I suggest, relevance to morality.

http://condor.depaul.edu/~mfiddler/hyphen/humunivers.htm

David B

[Rathpig]

pointing out that we do not learn language by learning definitions (and that definitions are just more language) is "convoluted".

I haven't spoken to the methodology behind learning language. This is something you pulled out of thin air.

it's not necessary to know a word's definition in order to understand it and use it correctly.

And this has absolutely no bearing on the thread or the issue at hand.

You have pulled a few meaningless and often unrelated issues out to post rants, but you haven't tried in the least to support your own view.

1). If morality is not cultural relative then what is it?
2). If morality has truth-value then how is this determined?

[Rathpig]

studied objectively.

Nobody has disputed that claim.

Studying morality objectively does make for objective morality.

[Torboto]

Isn't the difference between morality and cosmology that facts about the latter are true independent of observation? Isn't that what "objective" means, in this context?

Preno is correct that we don't have complete information about cosmology and so we shouldn't be overly bold with our claims to the truth, but "The Truth Is Out There (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_X-Files)." Is BWE correct that morality is likewise a simple matter of collecting more data? Do we discover that an act is immoral, or do we decide that it is immoral because we discover that it impacts us in ways we consider negative?

No matter how much information is available, won't different people and cultures always interpret it differently?

If an act can be considered moral as long is it appears to be the best available choice, yet can be turned on its head and deemed immoral by new information, then how can we say that any act is moral? Doesn't this render the idea meaningless? Is morality a forever unreachable goal, or is there an ultimate truth to be found? Either way, it sounds almost religious.

[The AntiChris]

I should have been more precise.

What I should have said is that the truth of "you shouldn't have hit Peter" relies on an emotional response [on the part of the speaker] either to people being hit in general or to Peter being hit in particular.

Clearly, the claim "John doesn't like being hit in the face" is a purely factual claim and is not dependent on the speaker's emotional response."I'm really angry now" depends on the speaker's emotional response (for example to being hit), too. So does, for example, "my blood pressure is rising".

ETA: to go even further, so does "I hit Peter back".These are all clear examples of factual reporting. You've either misread or misunderstood what I'm saying.

The truth of "I'm angry" doesn't depend my emotional response to being angry (which is what would follow if you accurately applied my criterion).

Chris

[The AntiChris]

Well, sure, the truth of "you shouldn't have hit John" depends also on John's negative emotional response to being hit in the face. So does the truth of "John doesn't like being hit in the face", which people normally don't have problems with. So you need a better criterion (try some obvious counter-examples before formulating it).I should have been more precise.

What I should have said is that the truth of "you shouldn't have hit Peter" relies on an emotional response [on the part of the speaker] either to people being hit in general or to Peter being hit in particular.

Clearly, the claim "John doesn't like being hit in the face" is a purely factual claim and is not dependent on the speaker's emotional response.

Chris
That's the subjective issue framed quite nicely. 'Shouldn't' implies a reason.Sure, and everyone's reason is different (sometimes only subtly but sometimes dramatically). The precise "reason" is subject-dependent.

Chris