The Problem from Evil--A question

[SMS]

Are there variants of the PoE that do not rely on the idea that there are moral facts or duties? If so, how? One could argue that it is not the evilness of the world that troubles the notion of God, but it's the suffering. Yet, what's the deal with suffering that causes there to be a problem if it is not evil?

[umop apisdn w,I]

There isn't a variant of the PoE that doesn't rely on the idea that there is a god, either. Mainly because the PoE is a critique of those ideas. If the ideas did not exist then there would be no need to critique them.

The PoE says that if Christians are right when they say that there is a god and that there is objective moraliity, then the amount of evil/suffering in the world means that their god cannot be the way they describe it.

The person making the argument doesn't rely on either the existence of objective moral facts or the existence of god, and neither does the argument itself.

What it relies on is that the Christian worldview posits the existence of both of those things as well as ascribing specific characteristics to its god, and is therefore internally inconsistent.

To use an analogy, if you say that you have a 3m long garage, and it contains a 500m long invisible dragon, I need claim neither that dragons exist myself nor that I own a garage in order to point out that your claims are inconsistent because a 500m long dragon won't fit inside a 3m long garage, invisible or not.

Similarly, if you claim that moral facts are objective, and that there is a god, and that that god is omni-max, and that there is suffering in the world, then I need make none of those claims myself in order to point out that your claims are inconsistent.

[SMS]

There isn't a variant of the PoE that doesn't rely on the idea that there is a god, either. Mainly because the PoE is a critique of those ideas. If the ideas did not exist then there would be no need to critique them.


When I speak of an idea is there is evil, I mean that they are claiming evil actually exists. I want to know if the premise that "unnecessary evil exists" commits them to moral realism. If so, then there seems to be a rather easy theistic response:


if unnecessary evil exists, then God does not.
If unnecessary evil exists, then moral facts exist.
If moral facts exist, then God exists.


These three show that unnecessary evil cannot exist.

The PoE says that if Christians are right when they say that there is a god and that there is objective moraliity, then the amount of evil/suffering in the world means that their god cannot be the way they describe it.


Cannot be the way to describe it? :dunno:

The person making the argument doesn't rely on either the existence of objective moral facts or the existence of god, and neither does the argument itself.


Can you show me a variant that does not amount to moral realism?


What it relies on is that the Christian worldview posits the existence of both of those things as well as ascribing specific characteristics to its god, and is therefore internally inconsistent.


Show me!

[JamesBannon]

There is also a flaw in the statement that morals flow from god's character necessarily makes them real in the sense of moral realism. This would be the case since morals would still be dependent on mind, the mind of god in this case, and hence cannot fit within a traditional realist ontology.

[gamera]

The problem of evil is only a problem is we are seeking to define God outside of a sacred text. A waste of time in my estimation.

the PoE is really just the flipside of being human. Or rather, one of the consequences of humanity is that we are subject to the choices of others (evil by agents) and to the limitations of existence, like gravity and death (finitude).

Without finitude we aren't human. Without moral choices we aren't human. So the plaint against the PoE is really an argument against our humanity, which I reject out of hand. I want to be human.

[umop apisdn w,I]

There isn't a variant of the PoE that doesn't rely on the idea that there is a god, either. Mainly because the PoE is a critique of those ideas. If the ideas did not exist then there would be no need to critique them.

When I speak of an idea is there is evil, I mean that they are claiming evil actually exists. I want to know if the premise that "unnecessary evil exists" commits them to moral realism.

As I've just explained, the PoE states that according to the Christian worldview that they are critiquing, unnecessary evil as defined in that worldview exists.

The person making the PoE need not believe that "evil" actually exists in any objective manner any more than they need believe that the "god" that they are referring to actually exists.

The person making the PoE is hypothetically granting that both exist in order to show the inconsistency in the worldview which states that both exist.

It's not rocket science.

The PoE says that if Christians are right when they say that there is a god and that there is objective moraliity, then the amount of evil/suffering in the world means that their god cannot be the way they describe it.


Cannot be the way to describe it? :dunno:

That's all right. Since you claim not to be a Christian then the PoE doesn't apply to you, so you've nothing to worry about.

The person making the argument doesn't rely on either the existence of objective moral facts or the existence of god, and neither does the argument itself.


Can you show me a variant that does not amount to moral realism?

1) There is much suffering in the world.

2) According to our worldview, this allowing this to happen if it can be prevented is not objectively evil, merely subjectively unpleasant.

3) According to the common Christian worldview, this allowing this to happen when it can be prevented is objectively evil.

4) According to the same Christian worldview, a god exists who is a) capable of seeing the suffering, b) objectively good according to the same principle in which they believe that they claim makes allowing the unnecessary suffering to happen objectively evil, and c) capable of preventing the suffering.

5) Therefore, that Christian worldview is internally inconsistent, and therefore not possibly right. If the worldview is correct about morality and about the existence of a god, then the god that it contains cannot have all three attributes that they claim it has. If it is right about the existence and nature of the god, then it cannot be right about the nature of morality. If it is right about the nature of morality and the nature of any gods that might exist then it cannot be right about whether that god actually does exist.

See - The PoE is an internal critique about the Christian worldview (or at least a very common Christian worldview). It doesn't rely on any of the aspects of that worldview being right in the real world - it merely says "what if" that worldview were correct and then points out the problems with that.

Saying that the PoE requires moral realism to work because it criticises a worldview which posits moral realism is just as silly as saying that it requires a god to work because it criticises a worldview which posits the existence of a god.

So, since you aren't a Christian, there's nothing to worry about. If any of your Christian acquaintances try to claim that you can't use the PoE because it requires moral realism and moral realism is only valid if a god exists, you can simply tell them that they are trying to use the most dishonest form of sleight-of-hand presuppositional apologetics, and that they should stop being such liars-for-the-lord.

What it relies on is that the Christian worldview posits the existence of both of those things as well as ascribing specific characteristics to its god, and is therefore internally inconsistent.


Show me!

I just have.

[umop apisdn w,I]

I want to know if the premise that "unnecessary evil exists" commits them to moral realism. If so, then there seems to be a rather easy theistic response:


if unnecessary evil exists, then God does not.
If unnecessary evil exists, then moral facts exist.
If moral facts exist, then God exists.


These three show that unnecessary evil cannot exist.

I ignored this bit in my previous response, because as I have explained, the PoE doesn't commit anyone to anything so it is irrelevant.

But my advice to you as one atheist to another is that if a Christian tries to claim that "If moral facts exist, then God exists" then you should just laugh at them and ask them to prove it. They won't be able to, and they will have to engage in the sort of dishonest sleight-of-hand we see here and try to trap you into granting their (unwarranted) assumptions before the argument even starts.

If you agree to that debate with me (http://www.talkrational.org/showthread.php?t=6110), then I'll show you in more detail how dishonest their argument is and how easily refuted it is. You have nothing to worry about from "presuppositionists". They have nothing to offer the world of apologetics except an aggressive I'll-keep-you-so-busy-trying-to-defend-the-claims- that-I've-tricked-you-into-making-that-you-won't-have-chance- to-notice-that-my-own-claims-aren't-worth-shit-and-I'm-just-asserting- that-since-the-claims-I've-tricked-you-into-making-are-false-then-my-own- claims-must-be-true-by-default style; which is all sound and fury and of no significance; and (from my experience in previous debates with them) a rather petulant attitude when their dishonesty and the vacuity of their claims is pointed out to them.

It's sad in a way how these liars-for-the-lord have to try to trick people into thinking that a god exists because they have no real evidence or arguments to show, but it is amusing to toy with them and let them think their "killer technique" is going to work before pulling the rug out from under them. You should try it sometime...

Be careful though. Some of them are so dishonest that they will even claim not to be Christian apologists, and will claim to be atheists who are "having difficulty refuting" the Christian claims. These types are even more dishonest than usual, so you should simply treat them with the contempt that they deserve.

[SMS]

There is also a flaw in the statement that morals flow from god's character necessarily makes them real in the sense of moral realism. I didn't say that, I suppose it is more plausible than its negation.



This would be the case since morals would still be dependent on mind, the mind of god in this case, and hence cannot fit within a traditional realist ontology. When we say that such morals are independent, we are first restricting the domain to human beings. Moreover, it's not that the good is dependent upon the mind of God, the good is (identity) God.

[SMS]

I want to know if the premise that "unnecessary evil exists" commits them to moral realism. If so, then there seems to be a rather easy theistic response:


if unnecessary evil exists, then God does not.
If unnecessary evil exists, then moral facts exist.
If moral facts exist, then God exists.


These three show that unnecessary evil cannot exist.

I ignored this bit in my previous response, because as I have explained, the PoE doesn't commit anyone to anything so it is irrelevant.

But my advice to you as one atheist to another is that if a Christian tries to claim that "If moral facts exist, then God exists" then you should just laugh at them and ask them to prove it. They won't be able to, and they will have to engage in the sort of dishonest sleight-of-hand we see here and try to trap you into granting their (unwarranted) assumptions before the argument even starts.

If you agree to that debate with me (http://www.talkrational.org/showthread.php?t=6110), then I'll show you in more detail how dishonest their argument is and how easily refuted it is. You have nothing to worry about from "presuppositionists". They have nothing to offer the world of apologetics except an aggressive I'll-keep-you-so-busy-trying-to-defend-the-claims-that-I've-tricked-you-into-making-that-you-won't-have-chance-to-notice-that-my-own-claims-aren't-worth-shit-and-I'm-just-asserting-that-since-the-claims-I've-tricked-you-into-making-are-false-then-my-own-claims-must-be-true-by-default style; which is all sound and fury and of no significance; and (from my experience in previous debates with them) a rather petulant attitude when their dishonesty and the vacuity of their claims is pointed out to them.

It's sad in a way how these liars-for-the-lord have to try to trick people into thinking that a god exists because they have no real evidence or arguments to show, but it is amusing to toy with them and let them think their "killer technique" is going to work before pulling the rug out from under them. You should try it sometime...

Be careful though. Some of them are so dishonest that they will even claim not to be Christian apologists, and will claim to be atheists who are "having difficulty refuting" the Christian claims. These types are even more dishonest than usual, so you should simply treat them with the contempt that they deserve.


What an odd way to sneak in your personal views of me.

[umop apisdn w,I]

I want to know if the premise that "unnecessary evil exists" commits them to moral realism. If so, then there seems to be a rather easy theistic response:


if unnecessary evil exists, then God does not.
If unnecessary evil exists, then moral facts exist.
If moral facts exist, then God exists.


These three show that unnecessary evil cannot exist.

I ignored this bit in my previous response, because as I have explained, the PoE doesn't commit anyone to anything so it is irrelevant.

But my advice to you as one atheist to another is that if a Christian tries to claim that "If moral facts exist, then God exists" then you should just laugh at them and ask them to prove it. They won't be able to, and they will have to engage in the sort of dishonest sleight-of-hand we see here and try to trap you into granting their (unwarranted) assumptions before the argument even starts.

If you agree to that debate with me (http://www.talkrational.org/showthread.php?t=6110), then I'll show you in more detail how dishonest their argument is and how easily refuted it is. You have nothing to worry about from "presuppositionists". They have nothing to offer the world of apologetics except an aggressive I'll-keep-you-so-busy-trying-to-defend-the-claims-that-I've-tricked-you-into-making-that-you-won't-have-chance-to-notice-that-my-own-claims-aren't-worth-shit-and-I'm-just-asserting-that-since-the-claims-I've-tricked-you-into-making-are-false-then-my-own-claims-must-be-true-by-default style; which is all sound and fury and of no significance; and (from my experience in previous debates with them) a rather petulant attitude when their dishonesty and the vacuity of their claims is pointed out to them.

It's sad in a way how these liars-for-the-lord have to try to trick people into thinking that a god exists because they have no real evidence or arguments to show, but it is amusing to toy with them and let them think their "killer technique" is going to work before pulling the rug out from under them. You should try it sometime...

Be careful though. Some of them are so dishonest that they will even claim not to be Christian apologists, and will claim to be atheists who are "having difficulty refuting" the Christian claims. These types are even more dishonest than usual, so you should simply treat them with the contempt that they deserve.


What an odd way to sneak in your personal views of me.

That is my honest view of that sort of dishonest Christian. If you aren't one of those then you should not feel slighted by however much contempt I have for them - although it would behoove you to do your best to make it clear that you aren't one, otherwise people might get the wrong impression of you.

[JamesBannon]

When we say that such morals are independent, we are first restricting the domain to human beings. Moreover, it's not that the good is dependent upon the mind of God, the good is (identity) God.
Are we? That's special pleading. i could, just as easily, argue that the good is humanity to get over that one. In any case, the good is god doesn't make any sense in a Judeao-Christian belief.

[umop apisdn w,I]

When we say that such morals are independent, we are first restricting the domain to human beings.

Why? That's just special pleading. If a moral "fact" is to be objective, it must be independent of all moral agents and - as you said in the debate set-up thread - of minds. Not "of all minds except one" or "of all moral agents except one".

Why would you accept such special pleading from a Christian? Why would you not just laugh at such a blatant dodge?

[SMS]

There isn't a variant of the PoE that doesn't rely on the idea that there is a god, either. Mainly because the PoE is a critique of those ideas. If the ideas did not exist then there would be no need to critique them.

When I speak of an idea is there is evil, I mean that they are claiming evil actually exists. I want to know if the premise that "unnecessary evil exists" commits them to moral realism.

As I've just explained, the PoE states that according to the Christian worldview that they are critiquing, unnecessary evil as defined in that worldview exists.

The person making the PoE need not believe that "evil" actually exists in any objective manner any more than they need believe that the "god" that they are referring to actually exists.

The person making the PoE is hypothetically granting that both exist in order to show the inconsistency in the worldview which states that both exist.

It's not rocket science.

Yet, that's not what most do. They argue that either evil or unnecessary suffering actually do exist. Surely, they can show that the Christian viewpoint leads to inconsistencies, when they assume premises or use hypotheticals, but they usually don't.



1) There is much suffering in the world.


Here you changed the nature of the argument. It's no longer 'evil', but 'suffering'. And, moreover, are you sure you don't mean that there is too much suffering in the world?


3) According to the common Christian worldview, this allowing this to happen when it can be prevented is objectively evil.

"this allowing this" :dunno:


4) According to the same Christian worldview, a god exists who is a) capable of seeing the suffering, b) objectively good according to the same principle in which they believe that they claim makes allowing the unnecessary suffering to happen objectively evil, and c) capable of preventing the suffering.

Wow. What a clutter. But you see, under a Christian worldview, the domain of (x)( If Unnecessary suffering x --> Objectively Evil x) is restricted. This does not apply to God under a Christian worldview and hence there is no inconsistency.

This is why I was bringing up the relation between God and morality. And this is also why I think the atheist needs to argue away from any internal inconsistency within the Christian worldview.

[SMS]

Why? That's just special pleading. If a moral "fact" is to be objective, it must be independent of all moral agents and - Did you just call it special pleading without reading my answer? It is divorced from God because he is the arbiter of the good and evil. He is the Good.

as you said in the debate set-up thread - of minds. Not "of all minds except one" or "of all moral agents except one". huh?

Why would you accept such special pleading from a Christian? Why would you not just laugh at such a blatant dodge? Because I (unlike others) understand their moral ontology.

[umop apisdn w,I]

Here you changed the nature of the argument. It's no longer 'evil', but 'suffering'. And, moreover, are you sure you don't mean that there is too much suffering in the world?

Nope. I simply mean suffering. And I haven't changed the nature of the argument, this is simply a basis on which the argument is founded. The connection between allowing suffering that could be prevented and objective evil is an integral part of the Christian worldview and is introduced later.

3) According to the common Christian worldview, this allowing this to happen when it can be prevented is objectively evil.

"this allowing this" :dunno:

The first "this" in that sentence is simply a typo and shouldn't be there.

But you see, under a Christian worldview, the domain of (x)( If Unnecessary suffering x --> Objectively Evil x) is restricted. This does not apply to God under a Christian worldview and hence there is no inconsistency.

There's that special pleading again to try to get out of the inconsistency. You want to watch those Christians for that. They're a dishonest bunch who'll try to sneak it in whenever they can.

They will try to claim that their god is special, but be unable to consistently and coherently explain how it is special without resorting to dancing between the horns of Euthyphro's dilemma or by using terms of art which have no real meaning but serve only to try to shut down the argument by sounding authoritative.

This is why I was bringing up the relation between God and morality. And this is also why I think the atheist needs to argue away from any internal inconsistency within the Christian worldview.

Nah - when debating with Christians, we atheists should stress the internal inconsistencies within the Christian worldview and make Christians attempt to explain them properly, rather than just let them get away with handwaving them away with special pleading and meaningless terms of art.

After all, what's good for the goose is good for the gander, and if Christians demand to be allowed such special pleading we can simply dismiss all their arguments with special pleading of our own, for example when dealing with presuppositionalist arguments like the one you are describing, we could simply state that objective morals simply exist a priori, and when asked what caused them to come into being we could reply that "the domain of causation is restricted" and therefore they need no cause.

See how that works?

They wouldn't let us get away with it about morals being excused from causation, so we shouldn't let them get away with it when they try to excuse their god - who by their own definition is a moral agent with a mind - from objective moral judgement.

Of course, they'll try to come up with some kind of bullshit like saying that their god's nature is inherently good - but then we can simply ask them where the objective standard is by which they can judge its nature to be good - and they are forced to admit that they are either judging their god's nature to be good by comparing it to their god's nature, which is inherently subjective and circular, or they have to come up with some objective standard (external to their god) by which it can be judged.

And you can bet your bottom dollar that any objective standard external to their god that they can come up with will be equally valid or invalid whether their god exists or not - it has to be if it is to be objective rather than subjective based on the nature they claim their god has.

So they are forced into admitting that their "objective" morality is either subjectively "whatever their god's nature happens to be" or is something that is equally valid whether their god exists or not.

[umop apisdn w,I]

Why? That's just special pleading. If a moral "fact" is to be objective, it must be independent of all moral agents and - Did you just call it special pleading without reading my answer? It is divorced from God because he is the arbiter of the good and evil. He is the Good.

See - that's just what I was talking about.

This sort of claim - that objective morality is "divorced from" the god of the Christians because he "is" the good is simply circular.

By what objective standard can this god be defined as "the good"? If "good" is defined as being according to his nature, then he is defined as being good whatever his nature is and the definition is therefore totally subjective - based on whatever he happens to be like.

But if there is some objective moral fact against which he can be measured, then you should make the Christian asserting that back up their assertion by saying where that objective moral fact can be found.

[SMS]

Nope. I simply mean suffering. And I haven't changed the nature of the argument, this is simply a basis on which the argument is founded. The connection between allowing suffering that could be prevented and objective evil is an integral part of the Christian worldview and is introduced later.

Yet, in the later parts of your argument, you qualified it and said "unnecessary suffering." See point (4). Suffering, per se, is not against the Christian worldview. In fact, suffering is essential. How did Jesus die again, Dean?

They will try to claim that their god is special, but be unable to consistently and coherently explain how it is special without resorting to dancing between the horns of Euthyphro's dilemma or by using terms of art which have no real meaning but serve only to try to shut down the argument by sounding authoritative.

You have not explained how it is incoherent and inconsistent.


Nah - when debating with Christians, we atheists should stress the internal inconsistencies within the Christian worldview and make Christians attempt to explain them properly, rather than just let them get away with handwaving them away with special pleading and meaningless terms of art.

In other words: You don't get this philosophy stuff. :)

After all, what's good for the goose is good for the gander, and if Christians demand to be allowed such special pleading we can simply dismiss all their arguments with special pleading of our own, for example when dealing with presuppositionalist arguments like the one you are describing, we could simply state that objective morals simply exist a priori, and when asked what caused them to come into being we could reply that "the domain of causation is restricted" and therefore they need no cause.

what is existing a priori? How are these cases similar? i liken the Christian case to the typical atheistic response that

Whatever begins to exist has a cause


has a restricted domain to what is in the universe and not of the universe. Will you be declaring special pleading there, too?

Of course, they'll try to come up with some kind of bullshit like saying that their god's nature is inherently good - but then we can simply ask them where the objective standard is by which they can judge its nature to be good - and they are forced to admit that they are either judging their god's nature to be good by comparing it to their god's nature, which is inherently subjective and circular, or they have to come up with some objective standard (external to their god) by which it can be judged.

It depends on who you want to construe the divine command ethic. If it is only objective duty that comes from god, then there is no immediate issue in describing God good. We can, as others do, describe God as good because of his moral virtues that hold are not influenced by a deontic divine command ethic. On other grounds, the claim that God is good can be said to actually mean non-moral things like God is love or God is loving. It's good in the sense that God is good to us. Personally, I think the deontic formulations are much better.

[JamesBannon]

No matter which you slice it, basing any morality on god's will, nature or whatever is subjective, because it is dependent on mind. The only way it could be objective, in a traditional realist sense, is if there is some independent realm of abstract objects / ideas.

[umop apisdn w,I]

Nope. I simply mean suffering. And I haven't changed the nature of the argument, this is simply a basis on which the argument is founded. The connection between allowing suffering that could be prevented and objective evil is an integral part of the Christian worldview and is introduced later.

Yet, in the later parts of your argument, you qualified it and said "unnecessary suffering." See point (4).

Yep - within the Christian worldview there is an omnipotent god who knows about the suffering and could stop it if he wanted, so the suffering is unnecessary. But at the beginning of the argument we are not yet talking about the Christian worldview so we simply say that there is suffering.

It's all quite straightforward.

They will try to claim that their god is special, but be unable to consistently and coherently explain how it is special without resorting to dancing between the horns of Euthyphro's dilemma or by using terms of art which have no real meaning but serve only to try to shut down the argument by sounding authoritative.

You have not explained how it is incoherent and inconsistent.

In the past I have been given "explanations" by Christians and they have been incoherent, inconsistent, or both.

You have yet to even give an explanation about why the Christian god should be special. When you do so, I shall look at it to see whether or not it is coherent and consistent.

But you can't fault me for not yet having criticised something that you haven't yet given.

Doing that just makes it look like you're trying to dodge the issue.

In other words: You don't get this philosophy stuff. :)

Get, yes. Accept unquestioningly, no.

I'm not so gullible as to simply accept apologetics dressed up as "philosophy".

After all, what's good for the goose is good for the gander, and if Christians demand to be allowed such special pleading we can simply dismiss all their arguments with special pleading of our own, for example when dealing with presuppositionalist arguments like the one you are describing, we could simply state that objective morals simply exist a priori, and when asked what caused them to come into being we could reply that "the domain of causation is restricted" and therefore they need no cause.

what is existing a priori? How are these cases similar?

Because they both try to avoid inconsistencies by giving special status to the thing that is causing the inconsistency.

i liken the Christian case to the typical atheistic response that

Whatever begins to exist has a cause

has a restricted domain to what is in the universe and not of the universe. Will you be declaring special pleading there, too?

I disagree that everything that begins to exist must have a cause. I think that developments in quantum mechanics undercut that - but that's a huge discussion, and one for a different thread.

Of course, they'll try to come up with some kind of bullshit like saying that their god's nature is inherently good - but then we can simply ask them where the objective standard is by which they can judge its nature to be good - and they are forced to admit that they are either judging their god's nature to be good by comparing it to their god's nature, which is inherently subjective and circular, or they have to come up with some objective standard (external to their god) by which it can be judged.

It depends on who you want to construe the divine command ethic. If it is only objective duty that comes from god, then there is no immediate issue in describing God good.

You're just equivocating now. You are still stuck with the fact that you have no objective criterion by which we can judge that it is our duty to do what is good other than "because god says so" - and you have no objective criterion by which we can judge that we ought to do what god says.

The circularity and subjectiveness is still there, you are just trying to hide it by switching terminology.

We can, as others do, describe God as good because of his moral virtues that hold are not influenced by a deontic divine command ethic.

And your objective source for those virtues, your source that is not god because that would be circular, is?

Good luck finding an objective source of deontological virtues which isn't either subjective or circular, but which also isn't equally valid regardless of whether there is a god or not.

On other grounds, the claim that God is good can be said to actually mean non-moral things like God is love or God is loving. It's good in the sense that God is good to us.

And we're back to subjective again - unless you have an objective criterion by which your, sorry, the Christians' god can be judged to be good to us.

Personally, I think the deontic formulations are much better.

I suppose of the two it is "better" in that it is a less transparent dodge, since it is more complicated and uses more terms of art in an attempt to intimidate the reader.

It's still just a dodge to try to handwave away the inconsistency in the Christian worldview though.

[umop apisdn w,I]

No matter which you slice it, basing any morality on god's will, nature or whatever is subjective, because it is dependent on mind. The only way it could be objective, in a traditional realist sense, is if there is some independent realm of abstract objects / ideas.

Yep - but if he accepts that then he has to accept that moral realism is just as compatible (or incompatible, depending on your view of such a realm) with atheism as it is with theism.

And if he accepted that, it would completely nullify all the presuppositionalist apologetics and arguments for god that he is using.

Not that that would be a problem for the rest of us. He isn't saying anything that we haven't already seen and refuted many times before...

[SMS]

Yep - within the Christian worldview there is an omnipotent god who knows about the suffering and could stop it if he wanted, so the suffering is unnecessary.

Yah, that's non-sequitur.



It's all quite straightforward.
I actually found it to be convoluted and sloppy.

In the past I have been given "explanations" by Christians and they have been incoherent, inconsistent, or both.

You have? Well, I'm convinced! :D

You have yet to even give an explanation about why the Christian god should be special. When you do so, I shall look at it to see whether or not it is coherent and consistent. I have given reason why the Christian God is excluded from it. I'd say that the closest secular terms that I can explain it to you is that commands are agent-relative, but that this muddles the relation between God and the command. If you'd like to debate me on divine ethic, then I'd love to do that in more detail.

But you can't fault me for not yet having criticised something that you haven't yet given.

I gave the claim as to why. Now what's inconsistent and incoherent about it?


Because they both try to avoid inconsistencies by giving special status to the thing that is causing the inconsistency.

What you have just said is consistent with exclusions that are not special pleading. So, you really havent said much.


I disagree that everything that begins to exist must have a cause. I think that developments in quantum mechanics undercut that - but that's a huge discussion, and one for a different thread.
You didn't answer the question.



You're just equivocating now. You are still stuck with the fact that you have no objective criterion by which we can judge that it is our duty to do what is good other than "because god says so" - and you have no objective criterion by which we can judge that we ought to do what god says.

There is no argument here.

The circularity and subjectiveness is still there, you are just trying to hide it by switching terminology.
or here.


And your objective source for those virtues, your source that is not god because that would be circular, is?

So long as it is not God, then what does it matter?


And we're back to subjective again - unless you have an objective criterion by which your, sorry, the Christians' god can be judged to be good to us.

Yah...so? It defeats the initial objection.

[umop apisdn w,I]

Yep - within the Christian worldview there is an omnipotent god who knows about the suffering and could stop it if he wanted, so the suffering is unnecessary.

Yah, that's non-sequitur.



It's all quite straightforward.
I actually found it to be convoluted and sloppy.



You have? Well, I'm convinced! :D

I have given reason why the Christian God is excluded from it. I'd say that the closest secular terms that I can explain it to you is that commands are agent-relative, but that this muddles the relation between God and the command. If you'd like to debate me on divine ethic, then I'd love to do that in more detail.



I gave the claim as to why. Now what's inconsistent and incoherent about it?




What you have just said is consistent with exclusions that are not special pleading. So, you really havent said much.



You didn't answer the question.





There is no argument here.


or here.


And your objective source for those virtues, your source that is not god because that would be circular, is?

So long as it is not God, then what does it matter?


And we're back to subjective again - unless you have an objective criterion by which your, sorry, the Christians' god can be judged to be good to us.

Yah...so? It defeats the initial objection.

Well, I see that you've run out of substance and are down to one-liners, so there's not much left to discuss...

You took a single sentence of mine out of its explanatory context and called it a non-sequitur in isolation - which is just irrelevant and distracting rhetoric.

You called my version of the PoE - which is what your OP was asking for "convoluted" and "sloppy" but have noticeably failed to point out any actual flaws in it. Again just irrelevant rhetoric designed to distract.

You say that you have given a reason for the Christian god to be excluded from moral judgements, but haven't. You've asserted that morality doesn't apply to him (because "the domain is restricted") but you haven't given a reason for the domain to be restricted in this way -merely an assertion that it is.

You try to imply that it "doesn't matter" where objective deontological virtues come from so long as it is not the Christian god - but unless that can be explained (and explained in a way that is incompatible with the non-existence of that god) then the entire presuppositional argument falls apart.

So well done.

We've successfully shown the vacuity and inadequacy of presuppositional arguments, and shown how they rely on dishonest rhetorical tactics rather than sound logic.

Of course, we both knew that before we started, but it's nice to get it confirmed.

Oh well, that's no loss to either of us atheists, is it? And I suppose it was a good example for those people reading who might have otherwise been convinced by some passing presuppositionalist. You've done those people a good turn by showing them how to not let dishonest Christians trick them.

[SMS]

Well, I see that you've run out of substance and are down to one-liners, so there's not much left to discuss...


Dean, you're not giving any argument here. My one-liners are a response to your declarations that you seem to believe are arguments.

You took a single sentence of mine out of its explanatory context and called it a non-sequitur in isolation - which is just irrelevant and distracting rhetoric.

Are you at least admitting that the below does not follow?

Yep - within the Christian worldview there is an omnipotent god who knows about the suffering and could stop it if he wanted, so the suffering is unnecessary. But at the beginning of the argument we are not yet talking about the Christian worldview so we simply say that there is suffering.

You called my version of the PoE - which is what your OP was asking for "convoluted" and "sloppy" but have noticeably failed to point out any actual flaws in it. Again just irrelevant rhetoric designed to distract.

I pointed out that you assumed there is no restricted domain. You may think I'm wrong that there is a restricted domain, but let's not say that I failed to point out the problem of your logic.


You say that you have given a reason for the Christian god to be excluded from moral judgements, but haven't. You've asserted that morality doesn't apply to him (because "the domain is restricted") but you haven't given a reason for the domain to be restricted in this way -merely an assertion that it is.


That's simply false. I have stated that it is because god is the arbiter of those rules. God does not issue commands to himself, Dean.

You try to imply that it "doesn't matter" where objective deontological virtues
come from so long as it is not the Christian god

There are moral virtues and then there moral duties. The latter is deontological and the latter comes from God. I've never heard of a deontological virtue. Do you understand the words you are using, Dean?


- but unless that can be explained (and explained in a way that is incompatible with the non-existence of that god) then the entire presuppositional argument falls apart.


The virtues are things like "loving" and "caring". These aren't deontological terms.

[umop apisdn w,I]

Are you at least admitting that the below does not follow?

Yep - within the Christian worldview there is an omnipotent god who knows about the suffering and could stop it if he wanted, so the suffering is unnecessary. But at the beginning of the argument we are not yet talking about the Christian worldview so we simply say that there is suffering.

Don't be ridiculous. Of course I'm not.

If there is an omnipotent god, then he has the capability to achieve whatever ends he desires without involving anyone having to suffer - if he didn't have that capability then he wouldn't be omnipotent.

Therefore, whatever the aims of this omnipotent god are, suffering is not needed to achieve them.

Therefore, since the suffering is not needed, it is unnecessary.

See? If you don't posit an omnipotent god then suffering may be unavoidable; but with an omnipotent god then all suffering is avoidable, and therefore any suffering that happens is - by definition - unnecessary.

I pointed out that you assumed there is no restricted domain. You may think I'm wrong that there is a restricted domain, but let's not say that I failed to point out the problem of your logic.

That my logic doesn't to take into account your special pleading is not a problem of my logic. It is a problem of your special pleading. If you want your special pleading to be accepted then you need to justify it, not just state it as if it were fact and then claim that doing so is "pointing out the problem of my logic".

I have stated that it is because god is the arbiter of those rules. God does not issue commands to himself, Dean.

And by what objective moral criterion do you judge that a person making moral rules or issuing moral duties and commands is exempted from following those rules/duties/commands? Or is "I don't have to follow my own rules because I make them" itself merely a subjective command given by the Christian god?

You try to imply that it "doesn't matter" where objective deontological virtues come from so long as it is not the Christian god

There are moral virtues and then there moral duties. The latter is deontological and the latter comes from God. I've never heard of a deontological virtue. Do you understand the words you are using, Dean?

That's meant to say simply "virtues" not "deontological virtues", sorry. It's an artefact of me going back and re-wording what I originally wrote. I missed deleting a word. It's too late to edit now, I suppose.


- but unless that can be explained (and explained in a way that is incompatible with the non-existence of that god) then the entire presuppositional argument falls apart.

The virtues are things like "loving" and "caring". These aren't deontological terms.

But you are still left with the same issue.

If the duties/rules/commands come from a god, they are merely subjective and based on it's whim - and moreover, there is no objective reason why we ought to be morally bound by whatever subjectively-moral-because-it-says-so duties come from that god (or why the god itself isn't bound by those duties).

So far, so subjective.

But if you want to claim that the Christian god is objectively "good" because of some kind of objective set of virtues that it possesses, (and therefore that because the duties that it gives are based on that objectively good nature, they could not be any other than they are and can therefore be considered to be objective themselves) then you are still stuck.

You need to show the objective morality by which we can judge those traits that it possesses to be virtues (as opposed to vices, or simply morally neutral traits) in the first place. Is the trait of being "loving" good or evil? I'd say that I subjectively judge it to be good, but if you want to claim that you can hang objective morality from it then you need to be able to objectively judge it to be good.

It is the problem you will always have, and that is why presuppositional apologetics will never be anything other than sleight of hand.

If you define your morality by the Christian god's commands or desires or "nature", then it is inherently subjective and based on whatever the whim/personality/nature of that god happens to be.

If you try to get around that subjectivity by claiming that the Christian god's nature is objectively moral because it is based on some external set of objective virtues then all you have done is claimed that there is an external virtue-based morality independent of the god.

And if you can show that objective virtues exist independently of the Christian god, then those objective virtues are equally valid with or without the god - and therefore objective (virtue based) morality is equally valid with or without the god.

The whole combination of "divine command" and "virtue" is a bait-and-switch tactic unworthy of a carnival huckster playing the shell game.

The presuppositionalist claims that objective moral duties come from divine command - and therefore we need a god to exist in order to have objective morality; and hopes that we won't notice that the only way to make divine commands objective is to have some other objective morality "behind the scenes" - one which doesn't need a god, such as a virtue based one. We aren't supposed to notice that. We are supposed to come away thinking both "ah, so we do need a god for morality" and "ah, so divine commands are objective" without noticing that the only way to achieve the second conclusion is by invalidating the first one.

You, of course, have embraced the bait-and-switch by trying to claim that objective virtues make the divine commands objective but then handwaving away the virtues themselves by saying that it "doesn't matter" where they come from.

But it does matter. If those "virtues" are only virtues because the god says they are, or because they happen to be the particular set of traits that the god has, then they are no less subjective than the god's commands. And if they come from somewhere else and are objective, then the god is unnecessary for morality.

Either way, the presuppositional argument is screwed.

(By the way - you're starting to forget that you are supposed to be talking hypothetically about the Christian worldview and the Christian idea of god, and you are slipping into simple "God is like this..." statements. You need to watch that, or people will start thinking you actually believe in the god that you are talking about. And you wouldn't want that would you? What with not being a Christian and all...)

[gamera]

Don't be ridiculous. Of course I'm not.

If there is an omnipotent god, then he has the capability to achieve whatever ends he desires without involving anyone having to suffer - if he didn't have that capability then he wouldn't be omnipotent.

Therefore, whatever the aims of this omnipotent god are, suffering is not needed to achieve them.

Therefore, since the suffering is not needed, it is unnecessary.

See? If you don't posit an omnipotent god then suffering may be unavoidable; but with an omnipotent god then all suffering is avoidable, and therefore any suffering that happens is - by definition - unnecessary.

Well, this positing is the discourse (or part of the discourse) of historical Christianity, namely propositional theology. But that hardly constitutes "the Christian worldview," whatever that is. Christianity is a complex strain of numerous traditions. And some of those traditions, both old and new, don't find it necessary to discern attributes of God in order take the sacred text of Christianity (the gospel) seriously or to heart. Indeed, whether it's Meister Eckhardt or Jean Marion, there is a strong tradition that knowledge of God is an oxymoron, not to mention a useless task.

So while what you say describes the particular pathologies of a particular tradition in Christian discourse, it isn't a sine qua non for Christianity per se. The sine qua non of Christianity is the gospel, which is a narrative that has its own internal rules, and doesn't require speculation about God's omnipotence. Hence modernly Narrative Theology has no interest in God's omnipotence, and in the past mystical traditions had a similar disinterest.

Suffering is necessary for human existence, something we do know about. Which is sufficient, isn't it?

[JamesBannon]

That's not exactly what we're discussing here, Gamera. The PoE is a perennial subject in presuppositional apologetics, not in liberal, post-modern analysis. That's like comparing chalk with cheese.

[gamera]

That's not exactly what we're discussing here, Gamera. The PoE is a perennial subject in presuppositional apologetics, not in liberal, post-modern analysis. That's like comparing chalk with cheese.

Wow, thanks for that clarification. But I was responding to what umop apisdn w,I posted, not to your particular hobbyhorse of anti-postmodern thought.

[JamesBannon]

That's not exactly what we're discussing here, Gamera. The PoE is a perennial subject in presuppositional apologetics, not in liberal, post-modern analysis. That's like comparing chalk with cheese.

Wow, thanks for that clarification. But I was responding to what umop apisdn w,I posted, not to your particular hobbyhorse of anti-postmodern thought.
I suggest you re-read, perhaps a tad less defensively this time. I said nothing in that post that could have been construed as a critique of post-modernism.

[TransverseWave]

When I speak of an idea is there is evil, I mean that they are claiming evil actually exists. I want to know if the premise that "unnecessary evil exists" commits them to moral realism. If so, then there seems to be a rather easy theistic response:


if unnecessary evil exists, then God does not.
If unnecessary evil exists, then moral facts exist.
If moral facts exist, then God exists.


These three show that unnecessary evil cannot exist.
How are the elements in your list supposed to be related? You haven't labelled any of them as premise or conclusion; do you take them to be an argument?

(I don't see any reason to grant your third proposition.)

[wiploc]

Are there variants of the PoE that do not rely on the idea that there are moral facts or duties?

Sure.



If so, how? One could argue that it is not the evilness of the world that troubles the notion of God, but it's the suffering.That's how. The problem of evil is often called the problem of suffering. If god is good, then he doesn't want us to suffer. If we suffer, then god---if he exists---either isn't all good or he isn't all powerful.



Yet, what's the deal with suffering that causes there to be a problem if it is not evil?
It all depends on how you define evil. The only coherent definition I know of is, "the sources of unhappiness." By that definition, if something makes someone unhappy, it is evil.

But even if you mean something else by "evil," the PoE still works. Either god is good or he's not. If he's good, then either he wants us to be happy, or the word "good" is vague and meaningless. If the word is vague and meaningless, then it cannot be praise to say, "God is good."

If god is good in a meaningful way, then he wants us to be happy. If he wants us to be happy, then we would be happy if he were all-powerful.

So, since suffering exists, either god is not all good, or he is not all powerful, or he does not exist.

[gamera]

[

If god is good in a meaningful way, then he wants us to be happy. If he wants us to be happy, then we would be happy if he were all-powerful.

So, since suffering exists, either god is not all good, or he is not all powerful, or he does not exist.

Your premise is at issue. God can be good in a meaningful way, and still not want us to be happy, if suffering (or not being happy) is important to our humanity. I could argue, just off the cuff, that being happy is not a particularly important goal in life, but rather empathy, love, selflessness, authenticity, growth, and depth of feeling are. If so, then being happy might be exactly what we do not need, and might be an impediment to our humanity, and hence might be exactly what God does not want for us.

Indeed, I would in fact argue just that (as many others have), or at least some variation of that. I would rather have an authentic existence in which I suffer than a soma-induced felicitous and complaisant existence, where all I do is consume things that make me happy.

This reverses the problem of evil problem, and makes happiness the enemy of the good. And I think Christianity at its core takes this position.

[wiploc]

[

If god is good in a meaningful way, then he wants us to be happy. If he wants us to be happy, then we would be happy if he were all-powerful.

So, since suffering exists, either god is not all good, or he is not all powerful, or he does not exist.

Your premise is at issue. God can be good in a meaningful way, and still not want us to be happy, if suffering (or not being happy) is important to our humanity. I could argue, just off the cuff, that being happy is not a particularly important goal in life, but rather empathy, love, selflessness, authenticity, growth, and depth of feeling are. If so, then being happy might be exactly what we do not need, and might be an impediment to our humanity, and hence might be exactly what God does not want for us.

Indeed, I would in fact argue just that (as many others have), or at least some variation of that. I would rather have an authentic existence in which I suffer than a soma-induced felicitous and complaisant existence, where all I do is consume things that make me happy.

This reverses the problem of evil problem, and makes happiness the enemy of the good. And I think Christianity at its core takes this position.

You make an excellent point. Some people prefer to talk about "flourishing" rather than being happy. That's fine with me.

For, "happiness," or, "flourishing," you may substitute, "empathy, love, selflessness, authenticity, growth, and depth of feeling." That works for me too.

The Problem of Evil:


P1: A good god would want us to be E.L.S.A.G.D. (empathetic, loving, selfless, authentic, growing, and deeply feeling).
P2: An all-powerful god would be able to facilitate things so that we would be E.L.S.A.G.D.
C1: Therefore, if an all-good and all-powerful god existed, we would be E.L.S.A.G.D.
P3: We are not E.L.S.A.G.D.
C2: Therefor, no completely good and all-powerful god exists.

You can think of "happy" as shorthand for your longer formulation.

Or not. The PoE is compelling either way. Because, wouldn't a good god want us to be happy in addition to being E.L.S.A.G.D.? Isn't H.E.L.S.A.G.D. better than E.L.S.A.G.D.? Happiness doesn't logically conflict with E.L.S.A.G.D., so



P1: An all-powerful god could have us H.E.L.S.A.G.D. if he wanted us H.E.L.S.A.G.D.
P2: A good god would want us H.E.L.S.A.G.D.
C1: Therefore, if there were an all-powerful all-good god, we would be happy (in addition to being E.L.S.A.G.D.).
P3: Some of us are not happy.
C2: It follows that god, if he exists, is not all that good or all that powerful.

[gamera]

[

If god is good in a meaningful way, then he wants us to be happy. If he wants us to be happy, then we would be happy if he were all-powerful.

So, since suffering exists, either god is not all good, or he is not all powerful, or he does not exist.

Your premise is at issue. God can be good in a meaningful way, and still not want us to be happy, if suffering (or not being happy) is important to our humanity. I could argue, just off the cuff, that being happy is not a particularly important goal in life, but rather empathy, love, selflessness, authenticity, growth, and depth of feeling are. If so, then being happy might be exactly what we do not need, and might be an impediment to our humanity, and hence might be exactly what God does not want for us.

Indeed, I would in fact argue just that (as many others have), or at least some variation of that. I would rather have an authentic existence in which I suffer than a soma-induced felicitous and complaisant existence, where all I do is consume things that make me happy.

This reverses the problem of evil problem, and makes happiness the enemy of the good. And I think Christianity at its core takes this position.

You make an excellent point. Some people prefer to talk about "flourishing" rather than being happy. That's fine with me.

For, "happiness," or, "flourishing," you may substitute, "empathy, love, selflessness, authenticity, growth, and depth of feeling." That works for me too.

The Problem of Evil:


P1: A good god would want us to be E.L.S.A.G.D. (empathetic, loving, selfless, authentic, growing, and deeply feeling).
P2: An all-powerful god would be able to facilitate things so that we would be E.L.S.A.G.D.
C1: Therefore, if an all-good and all-powerful god existed, we would be E.L.S.A.G.D.
P3: We are not E.L.S.A.G.D.
C2: Therefor, no completely good and all-powerful god exists.

You can think of "happy" as shorthand for your longer formulation.

Or not. The PoE is compelling either way. Because, wouldn't a good god want us to be happy in addition to being E.L.S.A.G.D.? Isn't H.E.L.S.A.G.D. better than E.L.S.A.G.D.? Happiness doesn't logically conflict with E.L.S.A.G.D., so



P1: An all-powerful god could have us H.E.L.S.A.G.D. if he wanted us H.E.L.S.A.G.D.
P2: A good god would want us H.E.L.S.A.G.D.
C1: Therefore, if there were an all-powerful all-good god, we would be happy (in addition to being E.L.S.A.G.D.).
P3: Some of us are not happy.
C2: It follows that god, if he exists, is not all that good or all that powerful.



That's fine, but even this doesn't support your point.

If the whole point of "flourishing" is that it is authentic and must be choosen and worked for, then it cannot by definition be given to us by an all powerful God or anybody else. And as it is a choice, the possibility of failure must be part of the good it involves.

Accordingly, what such a God could give us is existential choices, which in fact we seem to have as a structure of our human exitence. We cannot avoid the responsibility of choosing who we are and who we want to become (even by refusing to choose and "drifting" we have made an existential choice, as Heidegger points out).

Is this "proof" of God? I'm not looking for proof and wouldn't know what that would mean in any case. But it does suggest that the problem of evil is ill-conceived as it relates to a relationship with God, if it used as an argument that God isn't good or isn't omnipotent (assuming those attributes have any meaning in relationship to an entity that is by definition infinite and transcendant).

[kombucha]

God can be good in a meaningful way, and still not want us to be happy, if suffering (or not being happy) is important to our humanity.
What, exactly, does it mean for suffering to be important to our humanity?

[SMS]

When I speak of an idea is there is evil, I mean that they are claiming evil actually exists. I want to know if the premise that "unnecessary evil exists" commits them to moral realism. If so, then there seems to be a rather easy theistic response:


if unnecessary evil exists, then God does not.
If unnecessary evil exists, then moral facts exist.
If moral facts exist, then God exists.


These three show that unnecessary evil cannot exist.
How are the elements in your list supposed to be related? You haven't labelled any of them as premise or conclusion; do you take them to be an argument?

(I don't see any reason to grant your third proposition.)


premise 1. If unnecessary evil exists, then God does not.
premise 2. If unnecessary evil exists, then moral facts exist.
premise 3. If moral facts exist, then God exists.

Therefore, unnecessary evil does not exist.

[Jet Black]

what's evil?

[gamera]

God can be good in a meaningful way, and still not want us to be happy, if suffering (or not being happy) is important to our humanity.
What, exactly, does it mean for suffering to be important to our humanity?

Well, let's assume we learn empathy from suffering. And let's assume that we don't learn empathy from being happy. And finally let's assume that growing in empathy makes us more "flourish" to use wiploc's phrase, or more authentic, or more humane -- whatever way you want to put it, put all to the point that empathy is important to being human. Then suffering would make us more human.

If empathy doesn't do it for you, then replace it with something else: authenticity, depth of feeling, selflessness, knowledge of self -- whatever you use to define human existence.

The point is, in that scenario (leaving aside whether it's true or false), a good and omnipotent God would allow suffering.



, since we are finite beings thrown into a world not of our making and subject to a history that defines us without asking us, that we learn

[wiploc]

God can be good in a meaningful way, and still not want us to be happy, if suffering (or not being happy) is important to our humanity.
What, exactly, does it mean for suffering to be important to our humanity?

Well, let's assume we learn empathy from suffering.

There's the problem with your argument. If the empathy is the goal, then an omnipotent god could achieve it without suffering. The only thing an omnipotent god can't achieve without suffering is suffering itself.

So, if god wants us to suffer, he isn't omnibenevolent. And if he can't get us empathy (or whatever, anything besides suffering) without suffering, then he isn't omnipotent. Either way, the omnipotent omniscient god does not exist.

crc

[gamera]

What, exactly, does it mean for suffering to be important to our humanity?

Well, let's assume we learn empathy from suffering.

There's the problem with your argument. If the empathy is the goal, then an omnipotent god could achieve it without suffering. The only thing an omnipotent god can't achieve without suffering is suffering itself.

So, if god wants us to suffer, he isn't omnibenevolent. And if he can't get us empathy (or whatever, anything besides suffering) without suffering, then he isn't omnipotent. Either way, the omnipotent omniscient god does not exist.

crc

Well, but what if the whole purpose is the achieving of it, i.e., the path to it actually taken and experienced.

If the experience to the goal is the goal, then in fact suffering would not be bad, anymore than if travelling is the goal, and not just getting to the destination, then you actually have to make the journey (and not get transported there by God).

Now, I'm sympathetic to your paradox in the sense that ominipotence leads to paradox. The question "can God create a boulder that is too heavy for him to lift" is "yes" in my theology (in contradition to traditional Christian theology). I.e., God can do the logically impossible and contraditory, or what's the point of omnipotence. Otherwise God would be subject to logic, and hence not omnipotent.

But the paradox can be turned against you. Hence: if God is ominipotent can he be good while using suffering to teach us empathy? Answer "yes" because he's ominipotent.

Do you see, the use of ominipotence to create paradoxes can be used to support my position as well as yours.

Ultimately, I think arguments from ominipotence are not very illuminating for this reason. Ominipotence is incomprehensible to us, as finite beings. So seeking the logical implications of it seems nugatory.

[wiploc]

Well, let's assume we learn empathy from suffering.

There's the problem with your argument. If the empathy is the goal, then an omnipotent god could achieve it without suffering. The only thing an omnipotent god can't achieve without suffering is suffering itself.

So, if god wants us to suffer, he isn't omnibenevolent. And if he can't get us empathy (or whatever, anything besides suffering) without suffering, then he isn't omnipotent. Either way, the omnipotent omniscient god does not exist.

crc

Well, but what if the whole purpose is the achieving of it, i.e., the path to it actually taken and experienced.


Right. If the suffering is the point, and not just what you get from the suffering, then even an omnipotent god can't get that without suffering. But, if suffering is the goal, then god isn't good.




If the experience to the goal is the goal, then in fact suffering would not be bad, anymore than if travelling is the goal, and not just getting to the destination, then you actually have to make the journey (and not get transported there by God).
Excellent example. If you are backpacking from London to Rome, just being in Rome may not be the point. The point might be (at least in part) the scenery, the knowledge of other cultures. Of course, an omnipotent god could show you that scenery and give you that knowledge without the actual backpacking.

And therefore, any theist who claimed that god was omniscient, omnipotent, and omni-against-backpacking would be demonstrably wrong, as is made clear by the PoB (problem of backpacking).



P1: An omnipotent god could give us Rome and scenery and cultural knowledge without backpacking.
P2: An opposed-to-backpacking god would want us to have Rome and scenery and cultural knowledge without backpacking.
C1: Therefore, if an omnipotent opposed-to-backpacking god existed, there would be Rome and scenery and cultural knowledge, but there would not be backpacking.
P3: There is backpacking.
C2: Therefore, no omnipotent opposed-to-backpacking god exists.




Now, I'm sympathetic to your paradox in the sense that ominipotence leads to paradox. The question "can God create a boulder that is too heavy for him to lift" is "yes" in my theology (in contradition to traditional Christian theology). I.e., God can do the logically impossible and contraditory, or what's the point of omnipotence. Otherwise God would be subject to logic, and hence not omnipotent.

But the paradox can be turned against you. Hence: if God is ominipotent can he be good while using suffering to teach us empathy? Answer "yes" because he's ominipotent.
No paradox there. If he's omnipotent he can do that. But if he wants to do that, then he's not omnibenevolent. That's not a paradox either. That's just logic:


P1: An omnipotent god could prevent suffering.
P2: A good god would want to prevent suffering.
C1: Therefore, if there were an omnipotent omnibenevolent god, there would be no suffering.
P3: There is suffering.
C2: Therefore, there is no omnipotent omnibenevolent god.

No paradox there, just bulletproof logic.




Do you see, the use of ominipotence to create paradoxes can be used to support my position as well as yours.
How so?




Ultimately, I think arguments from ominipotence are not very illuminating for this reason. Ominipotence is incomprehensible to us, as finite beings. So seeking the logical implications of it seems nugatory.
I wasn't talking about true omnipotence (where god could do anything, even violate logic). I was talking about punk omnipotence (where god can do anything except violate logic). I hope I didn't confuse you. Most people who talk about omnipotence are really talking about punk omnipotence. That's because they are trying to use logic themselves, and know they will be frustrated in that attempt if logic doesn't work.

For instance, you say that if god can violate logic then he can create a stone so heavy that he can't lift it. That doesn't follow. If logic weren't reliable, there would be no logical conclusions about what god could or could not do.

[gamera]

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Right. If the suffering is the point, and not just what you get from the suffering, then even an omnipotent god can't get that without suffering. But, if suffering is the goal, then god isn't good.

That only follows if suffering is bad. I've asserted the assumption that it's not, if suffering make us a more empathetic, humane, fill in the blank. The assumption may be wrong, but we aren't really in the realm of empirical data here, but logical conclusions from differing assumptions.


Excellent example. If you are backpacking from London to Rome, just being in Rome may not be the point. The point might be (at least in part) the scenery, the knowledge of other cultures. Of course, an omnipotent god could show you that scenery and give you that knowledge without the actual backpacking.

He could, but like a say, if you're making that argument, then I can make the parallel argument: an ominipotent God can do bad things and still be good. Why, because like you say, he's ominipotent. The argument works not only for you, but against you (since omnipotence is really incomprehensible)

And therefore, any theist who claimed that god was omniscient, omnipotent, and omni-against-backpacking would be demonstrably wrong, as is made clear by the PoB (problem of backpacking).

Well, anybody who tries to come to conclusions about God's "attributes" outside a sacred story is demonstrably wrong, yes, that we can agree upon. Stories have meaning -- theological constructs about omnipotence are virtually incomprehensible. I think we can agree on that.



P1: An omnipotent god could give us Rome and scenery and cultural knowledge without backpacking.
P2: An opposed-to-backpacking god would want us to have Rome and scenery and cultural knowledge without backpacking.
C1: Therefore, if an omnipotent opposed-to-backpacking god existed, there would be Rome and scenery and cultural knowledge, but there would not be backpacking.
P3: There is backpacking.
C2: Therefore, no omnipotent opposed-to-backpacking god exists.


An omnipotent God can exist on any terms he wants, even if it is illogical and paradoxical. So this gets us nowhere. Your assumption is that omnipotence is subject to logic. And how could that possibly be?

No paradox there. If he's omnipotent he can do that. But if he wants to do that, then he's not omnibenevolent. That's not a paradox either. That's just logic:


P1: An omnipotent god could prevent suffering.
P2: A good god would want to prevent suffering.
C1: Therefore, if there were an omnipotent omnibenevolent god, there would be no suffering.
P3: There is suffering.
C2: Therefore, there is no omnipotent omnibenevolent god.

No paradox there, just bulletproof logic.

Omnipotence trumps logic and axiology, by definition. An omnipotent God can (fill in the blank). There's nothing you can put in the blank that wouldn't be "true." So an ominipotent God can do evil, create an evil universe and still be good (assuming omnipotence).

I think the problem here is you are moving between two putative realms of knowledge. One is ontological (God is above Being), the other is discursive (we decide what's moral or not, not God). But even that wouldn't help you, if you are taking omnipotence seriously.

How so?

See above. An ominipotent God can be illogical and immoral and still be good, since, assuming omnipotence. Once you take omnipotence "seriously" (a mistke), no conclusion about God is impermissible, and hence none is useful.

I wasn't talking about true omnipotence (where god could do anything, even violate logic). I was talking about punk omnipotence (where god can do anything except violate logic). I hope I didn't confuse you. Most people who talk about omnipotence are really talking about punk omnipotence. That's because they are trying to use logic themselves, and know they will be frustrated in that attempt if logic doesn't work.

Well, needless to say, that definition isn't ominipotence at all, and in fact makes logic the ground of everything, which is dubious at best. Though I admit most historical Christianity is arguing at the punk omnipotence level.

For instance, you say that if god can violate logic then he can create a stone so heavy that he can't lift it. That doesn't follow. If logic weren't reliable, there would be no logical conclusions about what god could or could not do.

Reliability isn't the issue. Omnipotence is. If you assume omnipotence, logic goes out the window, period. Now if your point is that historical Christianity for the most part takes that position that logic trumps omnipotence, and then argues for the "logic" of God's morality, well, then I agree. They lose that argument. And if that's what you're doing, we aren't really disagreeing.

[SMS]

P1: An omnipotent god could prevent suffering.
P2: A good god would want to prevent suffering.
C1: Therefore, if there were an omnipotent omnibenevolent god, there would be no suffering.
P3: There is suffering.
C2: Therefore, there is no omnipotent omnibenevolent god.

No paradox there, just bulletproof logic.




Actually, C1 does not strictly follow from P1-2. The language found in your premises needs to be found in your conclusion.

[wiploc]

P1: An omnipotent god could prevent suffering.
P2: A good god would want to prevent suffering.
C1: Therefore, if there were an omnipotent omnibenevolent god, there would be no suffering.
P3: There is suffering.
C2: Therefore, there is no omnipotent omnibenevolent god.

No paradox there, just bulletproof logic.


Actually, C1 does not strictly follow from P1-2. The language found in your premises needs to be found in your conclusion.

How about,


P1: A good god would prevent suffering if he could.
P2: An omnipotent god could prevent suffering.
C1: An omnipotent good god would prevent suffering.

[SMS]

P1: An omnipotent god could prevent suffering.
P2: A good god would want to prevent suffering.
C1: Therefore, if there were an omnipotent omnibenevolent god, there would be no suffering.
P3: There is suffering.
C2: Therefore, there is no omnipotent omnibenevolent god.

No paradox there, just bulletproof logic.


Actually, C1 does not strictly follow from P1-2. The language found in your premises needs to be found in your conclusion.

How about,


P1: A good god would prevent suffering if he could.
P2: An omnipotent god could prevent suffering.
C1: An omnipotent good god would prevent suffering.



That does not fly either. Is it only the conclusion you want to establish or must it be that the conclusion comes from similar premises?

[wiploc]

Actually, C1 does not strictly follow from P1-2. The language found in your premises needs to be found in your conclusion.

How about,


P1: A good god would prevent suffering if he could.
P2: An omnipotent god could prevent suffering.
C1: An omnipotent good god would prevent suffering.




That does not fly either. Is it only the conclusion you want to establish or must it be that the conclusion comes from similar premises?

I'm not understanding. I don't understand your question, so maybe you could rephrase; and I don't understand how my syllogism could not fly, so maybe you could instruct me.

[SMS]

Wiploc,

There is no rule of inference that would allow your conclusion to be deduced. If you can think of one, then let me know. In the mean time, try something like:


Everyone who is wholly food prevents every evil that he can prevent
everyone who is omnipotent can prevent every evil
If someone prevents every evil, then there is no evil.
there's evil
Either God is not omnipotent or God is not wholly good.