quantum butterfly

[Garrett]

Some systems which appear to behave randomly or probabilistically may be highly sensitive to initial conditions - a small change in initial conditions may lead to large changes in outcomes. Weather, for example, or a die-roll. In theory, the behavior of such systems could be entirely deterministic with no "random elements" at all.

But what if the small change in initial conditions is provided by the probabilistic behavior of quantum events?

Then we have an interesting situation where the deterministic explanation for an apparently probabilistic event depends on probabilistic events!

For a specific example, imagine controlling all the initial conditions of a die-roll. Toss it from enough height and with enough spin so it seems to behave probabilistically. An edge or corner would eventually strike the surface of the craps table - maybe the position and velocity of an electron at that edge or corner would be the "butterfly" which determines the resulting trajectory, velocity and spin of the die - which ultimately determines which face would end showing up. But those factors - the position and velocity of that electron - are fundamentally indeterminate!

Iow, even though we exactly control the initial conditions, and assume a deterministic explanation for the behavior of the die, it may still behave probabilistically. (!)

My point is that chaos theory, intended to provide a determinstic explanation for probabilistic events, may actually fail to do so. Chaos theory can be true and determinism can still be false!

[His Noodly Appendage]

I've always thought of successive layers of randomness and determinism, like an onion.

Quantum randomness, in aggregate, makes Newtonian atoms. Newtonian atoms, in aggregate, make chaotic systems, like brownian motion. Brownian motion, in aggregate, makes deterministic, Boyle-esque pressure dynamics. Which in turn lead to chaotic turbulence, which add up to straightforward currents, which add up to chaotic meteorology... etc etc etc.

[Preno]

Quantum randomness, in aggregate, makes Newtonian atoms. Newtonian atoms, in aggregate, make chaotic systems, like brownian motion. Brownian motion, in aggregate, makes deterministic, Boyle-esque pressure dynamics. Which in turn lead to chaotic turbulence, which add up to straightforward currents, which add up to chaotic meteorology... etc etc etc.There is a closely related observation of Mandelbrot's which you might be interested in, namely that the dimension of objects depends on how closely you look at them. This would in and of itself be a triviality, the interesting part is of course that the notion dimension can, as you probably know, be defined to include the possibility of any non-negative real dimension in general and that the dimensions of diverse phenomena can be quantified.

So atoms are 3D, then 1D when you get further away, their interaction gives way to the Brownian motion would be a fractal of dimension 2, ideal gases/fluids would I assume be regular 3D objects, and Navier-Stokes turbulence are, according to Mandelbrot, "concentrated" in areas of dimension around 2.5. (His book was very confusingly written, so I'm afraid I can't elaborate any more on that.)

[Ian Nerr]

I need to make a time thread. Every thread about causality, determinism, etc. demonstrates the underlying assumptions we all make about time that we may not even realize we are making (or that they are unnecessary assumptions).

[His Noodly Appendage]

*notes the irony of planning this as a future action*

[Ian Nerr]

*notes the irony of planning this as a future action*

Can you explain it for me?

[His Noodly Appendage]

Time does not exist - at least as we see it! Causality is just an artifact of our perception!

Every thread on these topics has been misguided, because this point has not been established. I will, in the future create a thread on this topic and then, as a result this will be rectified.

[Ian Nerr]

Who said that?

[RexT]

I don't see Ian having said that either. I agree Ian, someone needs to create a thread on Time. But since you made that suggestion in this thread, it could be interpreted just as HNA does. Please do make a thread on Time and let us get back to the OP.

[Garrett]

His Noodly Appendage
I've always thought of successive layers of randomness and determinism, like an onion.
Very interesting. Your description makes sense.

However, if determinism is true, the layers of randomness are actually just more layers of determinism - and chaos theory is the leg that theory stands upon.

And I kicked that sole support out from under determinism. :)

I'm saying that maybe the layers of determinism are actually just more layers of randomness.

[RexT]

Whether layers or levels, you can't make a final determination on determinism (no pun intended) unless know where the foundation begins (or core begins, going on the onion metaphor). We might start with indeterminate chaos and pass through determined predictability, only to head into more indeterminate chaos at another level. I agree, it is an interesting description.

[dug_down_deep]

It seems to me that determinism is just a model -- a paradigm, if you'll allow the tired old buzzword -- that informs a belief system. It's essentially theological, or to put it less offensively, metaphysical. Of course there are deterministic systems, such as those that chaos theory is meant to harness, which is to say that the mathematics used to describe them involve no randomness.

I think this is an important distinction to make. Deterministic systems versus determinism.

When people argue free will versus determinism, I think they are engaged in essentially a theological debate. The science is used to support the belief, but as usual the science is not conclusive in regard to proving a metaphysical point.

(And HNA, please start a thread on any of the topics you mentioned, if you're so inclined.)

[Preno]

It seems to me that determinism is just a model -- a paradigm, if you'll allow the tired old buzzword -- that informs a belief system. It's essentially theological, or to put it less offensively, metaphysical.How so? Can we not test whether a system is deterministic or not? If we can, why would you say that determinism is "metaphysical"?

[David B]

If determinism implies that something is at least in theory predictable, then I would argue that we don't live in a deterministic world.

Quantum stuff is one thing, but there is something else.

Consider the possibility that a high energy gamma ray from some stellar explosion will impact the earth tomorrow, and in doing so have some sort of macroscopic consequence, like perhaps causing a mutation in a cell, leading to further consequences.

Since gamma rays are approaching at the speed of light, there is no way for us to predict that. As far as I can conceive, anyway.

David B

[dug_down_deep]

How so? Can we not test whether a system is deterministic or not? If we can, why would you say that determinism is "metaphysical"?
I think I just stated why, but maybe it wasn't clear. I'm pointing out that there's a difference between determinism and deterministic systems.

[Ian Nerr]

If determinism implies that something is at least in theory predictable, then I would argue that we don't live in a deterministic world.

Quantum stuff is one thing, but there is something else.

Consider the possibility that a high energy gamma ray from some stellar explosion will impact the earth tomorrow, and in doing so have some sort of macroscopic consequence, like perhaps causing a mutation in a cell, leading to further consequences.

Since gamma rays are approaching at the speed of light, there is no way for us to predict that. As far as I can conceive, anyway.

David B

Determinism does not imply predictability.

[David B]

Determinism does not imply predictability.

I agree.

Not sure that everyone would agree,though.

David B

[dug_down_deep]

Consider the possibility that a high energy gamma ray from some stellar explosion will impact the earth tomorrow, and in doing so have some sort of macroscopic consequence, like perhaps causing a mutation in a cell, leading to further consequences.

Since gamma rays are approaching at the speed of light, there is no way for us to predict that. As far as I can conceive, anyway.
Determinism is not really about predictability, IMHO. It's about causality. Do we think that there is a causal chain or web that connects all events in the world.

Predictability is just a feature of one's frame of reference. Like I cannot predict how many trees will fall down in a forest on a planet 7 million light years away, but this does not affect whether or not I believe the universe is fundamentally deterministic or not.

[Preno]

I think I just stated why, but maybe it wasn't clear. I'm pointing out that there's a difference between determinism and deterministic systems.Yes, just like there is a difference between fascism and a fascist state, now what does this trivial terminological reminder that have to do with metaphysics? If the universe followed Newtonian laws, it would have been deterministic. How is that a metaphysical claim?

[Linus]

Quantum randomness, in aggregate, makes Newtonian atoms.
What is a Newtonian atom?

[dug_down_deep]

Yes, just like there is a difference between fascism and a fascist state, now what does this trivial terminological reminder that have to do with metaphysics? If the universe followed Newtonian laws, it would have been deterministic. How is that a metaphysical claim?
It's determinism when you decide that the fundamental description of reality is deterministic. If you think not, then please show me where someone has demonstrated a scientific fundamental description of reality. It ain't there, because fundamental descriptions of reality are the business of theologians and metaphysicians.

And what do you mean by the universe following Newtonian laws? What part of the universe are you referring to? The physical part? Physicalism is a metaphysical position.

Do you see my point now? It's not just a 'trivial terminological reminder', it's a distinction between a useful mathematical description and a vague, probably untestable notion of how the fundamental stuff of reality behaves.

ETA: Fascism vs fascist is not a good analogy. Try probabilism vs probabilistic.

[Preno]

It's determinism when you decide that the fundamental description of reality is deterministic. If you think not, then please show me where someone has demonstrated a scientific fundamental description of reality. It ain't there, because fundamental descriptions of reality are the business of theologians and metaphysicians.Determinism is the belief that the universe is deterministic. I have no idea why you gratuitously add such phrases as "fundamental description of reality" into the definition.
And what do you mean by the universe following Newtonian laws?A universe following Newtonian laws is a universe, where processes happen according to the kinds of laws we imagined they do before we discovered QM.
What part of the universe are you referring to? The physical part? Physicalism is a metaphysical position.What are you talking about? A universe is (fully) deterministic if its future state is uniquely determined by its present state. There is nothing more metaphysical in saying that the universe is deterministic than in saying that salt is soluble is water. I don't see what that has to do with "physical parts" or other kinds of parts. Of course if your gratuitously add non-sense to a definition, you will get a non-sensical definition. But why would you do that in the first place?
Do you see my point now? It's not just a 'trivial terminological reminder', it's a distinction between a useful mathematical description and a vague, probably untestable notion of how the fundamental stuff of reality behaves.No, I don't see your point. Your point appears to be that you can gratuitously add random words to definitions in order to discredit perfectly acceptable concepts.

[Strange Loops]

OP: For a specific example, imagine controlling all the initial conditions of a die-roll. Toss it from enough height and with enough spin so it seems to behave probabilistically. An edge or corner would eventually strike the surface of the craps table - maybe the position and velocity of an electron at that edge or corner would be the "butterfly" which determines the resulting trajectory, velocity and spin of the die - which ultimately determines which face would end showing up. But those factors - the position and velocity of that electron - are fundamentally indeterminate!

What if the position and velocity of the electron *are* determined, even though we can't predict them (yet? ever? doesn't matter). Logically, can we ever step back all the way (and know it is all the way) and get a bird's eye perspective and see what is at the bottom of the causal chain?

Randomness is such a weird concept.

Anyway, I'm not arguing that quantum events are deterministic, but I don't think we have proven they are not. Even a proof that we can't predict them doesn't mean they are deterministic (as others have pointed out, the limits of our reference frame don't speak to the metaphysical state of causality).


I think someone else in this thread may have been on the right track to say that the question of determinism at a fundamental metaphysical level is almost a question of faith (don't overinterpret that with theological baggage though). But regardless of the bottom level metaphysical condition (whatever it is, if it exists), all we can do is look at what happens and try to find ways to predict/explain things that account for what happens.

We can never logically prove that it isn't all random (randomness can account for any state and can never be fully falsified), and I doubt we can logically prove that it isn't all determined. But we can inductively 'support' any deterministic theories (at a given scale, macro, atomic, sub atomic,...) insofar as we can find a model to make predictions that keep standing up to test over and over again. When we can't make predictions at that level, it could be because they are unpredictable or because we don't know how to predict them yet, and even if they are completely unpredictable they could still be metaphysically determined by some prior causal chain no one can in principle have access to (e.g. a metauniverse that has rules we can't access which are determining what happens at a quantum level in our universe).

[dug_down_deep]

Determinism is the belief that the universe is deterministic. I have no idea why you gratuitously add such phrases as "fundamental description of reality" into the definition.
You're right. It's a belief. And like most metaphysical beliefs, it is vague and usually untestable. How would we test to see if the universe is deterministic? (First we have to define the universe of course.)

This distinguishes determinism from 'deterministic system', which is a term that denotes something specific and verifiable.

What are you talking about? A universe is (fully) deterministic if its future state is uniquely determined by its present state.
Unless you define 'state' specifically, you're not really saying anything meaningful.

No, I don't see your point. Your point appears to be that you can gratuitously add random words to definitions in order to discredit perfectly acceptable concepts.
No, that's not my point.

[Preno]

You're right. It's a belief. And like most metaphysical beliefs, it is vague and usually untestable. How would we test to see if the universe is deterministic? (First we have to define the universe of course.)First of all, I don't have to define everything in order to meaningfully talk about it. Second of all, talking about the universe does not commit me to metaphysical beliefs of any kind.
This distinguishes determinism from 'deterministic system', which is a term that denotes something specific and verifiable.Huh? So the fact that the world is deterministic is metaphysical, but saying that something is deterministic needn't be, therefore, you seem to have the bizarre belief that in order to talk about the world, I must commit myself to some metaphysical belief. Why?
Unless you define 'state' specifically, you're not really saying anything meaningful.Of course I am, but you can imagine that I am talking about my observations instead. You seem to be missing the point that I can reduce talk of universe to talk of observations. How is talk of observations "metaphysical"?
No, that's not my point.Then why do you gratuitously add phrases like "fundamental description of reality" to otherwise sensible definitions?

[dug_down_deep]

First of all, I don't have to define everything in order to meaningfully talk about it.
But it would help. Try it, please.

Second of all, talking about the universe does not commit me to metaphysical beliefs of any kind.
I didn't say it did, and this is not relevant to the topic.

Huh? So the fact that the world is deterministic is metaphysical, but saying that something is deterministic needn't be, therefore, you seem to have the bizarre belief that in order to talk about the world, I must commit myself to some metaphysical belief. Why?
What I said was clear. What you are twisting it into is not.

1) There is no fact that the world is deterministic, since the phrase the world doesn't necessarily denote anything that can be analyzed.

2) Yes, saying some system is deterministic needn't be metaphysical.

Of course I am, but you can imagine that I am talking about my observations instead. You seem to be missing the point that I can reduce talk of universe to talk of observations. How is talk of observations "metaphysical"?
You didn't say 'observations'. You said 'state'. Please address the point. If you're doing this stuff intentionally, it's just a strawman, mixed with shifting goalposts. Right now I'm assuming you just don't understand my point.

Then why do you gratuitously add phrases like "fundamental description of reality" to otherwise sensible definitions?
I was leaping forward and assuming your position. Sorry.

[kennethamy]

Determinism is the belief that the universe is deterministic. I have no idea why you gratuitously add such phrases as "fundamental description of reality" into the definition.
A universe following Newtonian laws is a universe, where processes happen according to the kinds of laws we imagined they do before we discovered QM.
What are you talking about? A universe is (fully) deterministic if its future state is uniquely determined by its present state. There is nothing more metaphysical in saying that the universe is deterministic than in saying that salt is soluble is water. I don't see what that has to do with "physical parts" or other kinds of parts. Of course if your gratuitously add non-sense to a definition, you will get a non-sensical definition. But why would you do that in the first place?
No, I don't see your point. Your point appears to be that you can gratuitously add random words to definitions in order to discredit perfectly acceptable concepts.

It does seem to me that "the Universe" is a problematic notion (it did also seem so to Kant). One problem is that if it is supposed to mean, "Everything" whether the notion of everything is supposed to be taken collectively or distributively. I suppose that when you say that the Universe is deterministic, that what you mean is that natural law is deterministic, and that makes (I suppose) more sense.

[Garrett]

Strange Loops
What if the position and velocity of the electron *are* determined, even though we can't predict them (yet? ever? doesn't matter).
My understanding is that the experts are in general agreement that hidden local variables are ruled out. The electron has no deterministic position and velocity.

Even a proof that we can't predict them doesn't mean they are deterministic (as others have pointed out, the limits of our reference frame don't speak to the metaphysical state of causality).
Determinism isn't about the limits of our reference frame, but is the claim (as Preno says) that the future state of our universe is uniquely determined by its present state. We don't know the gamma rays are coming, but the universe does (so to speak).

Determinism makes three distinct claims: all events are caused, all causes are antecedent, and no causes are probabilistic.

Probability theory is involved in all levels of scientific description, from galaxy formation to diverse human affairs to molecular motion. The inductive evidence shows that our universe is probabilistic. Determinism claims that all those apparently probabilistic events can be deterministically explained by chaos theory. Hence the op.

Quantum events are fundamentally probabilistic, not due to the limits of our knowledge about the variables involved in quantum events, but due to the uncertain nature of our universe. Again determinism fails.

There is no relevant difference between determinism and fatalism.

It's time to realize the classical notion of a deterministic universe is outdated. Join the modern world.

[kennethamy]

There is no relevant difference between determinism and fatalism.



Since determinism says that human actions are also causes, and fatalism denies that human actions are causes (because the event in question would occur whether the human action was performed or not: "what will be will be") then clearly if determinism and fatalism are incompatible. And if they are incompatible, then there is a difference between determinism and fatalism, since they cannot both be true.

[His Noodly Appendage]

Someone had an interesting way of putting it - I have no idea if it's remotely valid, but it's cute:

The universe is the results. Particles don't act probabilistically. They're made of probability; local maxima incarnate, successive solutions for t. A sort of a cross between emergent behaviour and hindsight.

It doesn't have much explanatory value, but it's an elegant way of reconciling the downright irrational behaviour of quantum events with the apparently causal nature of the layers above them.

[kennethamy]

Someone had an interesting way of putting it - I have no idea if it's remotely valid, but it's cute:

The universe is the results. Particles don't act probabilistically. They're made of probability; local maxima incarnate, successive solutions for t. A sort of a cross between emergent behaviour and hindsight.

It doesn't have much explanatory value, but it's an elegant way of reconciling the downright irrational behaviour of quantum events with the apparently causal nature of the layers above them.

Yes, indeed. Layers upon layers of metaphor to try to make understandable what few (if anyone) understand.

[dug_down_deep]

Someone had an interesting way of putting it - I have no idea if it's remotely valid, but it's cute:

The universe is the results. Particles don't act probabilistically. They're made of probability; local maxima incarnate, successive solutions for t. A sort of a cross between emergent behaviour and hindsight.

It doesn't have much explanatory value, but it's an elegant way of reconciling the downright irrational behaviour of quantum events with the apparently causal nature of the layers above them.
That would be one -- controversial -- interpretation. :)

[Garrett]

kennethamy
fatalism denies that human actions are causes
Fatalism is the doctrine that all events are predetermined by fate and are therefore unalterable.

Let's say it was a fact that our universe is either deterministic or fated. How could we detect which?

[kennethamy]

Fatalism is the doctrine that all events are predetermined by fate and are therefore unalterable.

Let's say it was a fact that our universe is either deterministic or fated. How could we detect which?

Easily. If a soldier refuses to take precautions against being shot because he claims that precautions will make no difference since "if the bullet has my name on it nothing I do can prevent my being shot" I would point out statistics that show that it is far more likely that he will be shot if he does not take precautions than if he does take precautions.

Abstract thinking is the enemy of thought.

[Strange Loops]

kenne:

Surely if words and actions bubble up deterministically out of the chuggings of neurons and chemicals and particles in a person's brain and body, then they could as easily be determined to say or do anything (including claim they have free will, or ponder and end up picking a hamburger over nuggets at McDonalds).

If something is going to happen regardless, then whether or not someone believes in fatalism, or prepares for different situations, does nothing to contradict this.

In other words, your example doesn't work. In your example, the soldier presumably believes in fatalism (which could happen in a deterministic world or a non-deterministic one, and could happen in a fatalistic world or a non-fatalistic one), but that same soldier is a moron. Why? Because he doesn't know what the outcome is. For all he knows, it is fatalistically determined that he will make that statement, refuse to take precautions, get quoted some stats by you, and subsequently get shot. Or maybe it is fatalistically determined that he will make that statement, refuse to take precautions, get quoted some stats by you, and subsequently not get shot.

I'm not trying to prove determinism or fatalism here, but you seem to be working under a really odd idea of what fatalism means. Isn't that like saying that if someone is a determinist but they manage to pick between medium and small fries then that proves determinism false? Or claiming that because a ball keeps falling when dropped, there is no free will in the universe?

[kennethamy]

I'm not trying to prove determinism or fatalism here, but you seem to be working under a really odd idea of what fatalism means. Isn't that like saying that if someone is a determinist but they manage to pick between medium and small fries then that proves determinism false? Or claiming that because a ball keeps falling when dropped, there is no free will in the universe?

The traditional notion of fatalism is "whatever will be, will be". That whatever a person does, the outcome will be the same. So that human actions have no effect on the future. A well-know example of this is the following:

DEATH SPEAKS:

There was a merchant in Bagdad who sent his servant to market to buy provisions and in a little while the servant came back, white and trembling, and said, Master, just now when I was in the market-place I was jostled by a woman in the crowd and when I turned I saw it was Death that jostled me. She looked at me and made a threatening gesture; now, lend me your horse, and I will ride away from this city and avoid my fate. I will go to Samarra and there Death will not find me. The merchant lent him his horse, and the servant mounted it, and he dug his spurs in its flanks and as fast as the horse could gallop he went. Then the merchant went down to the market-place and he saw me standing in the crowd and he came to me and said, Why did you make a threatening gesture to my servant when you saw him this morning? That was not a threatening gesture, I said, it was only a start of surprise. I was astonished to see him in Bagdad, for I had an appointment with him tonight in Samarra.

-W. Somerset Maugham

The point is, as you can see, that it made no difference what the servant did. He would die anyway.

[Ian Nerr]

You seem to be saying that if A is now and C is the man's death, he can change B but not C.

Fatalism would mean the idea "no matter what he does" is meaningless since he can't vary it.

Your story does not address Strange Loops' point.

[kennethamy]

Fatalism would mean the idea "no matter what he does" is meaningless since he can't vary it.

I don't understand that. The servant can, and does, vary what he does. But he dies anyway. That is what the soldier is saying when he says that whatever he does (tries to protect himself or not) he will either get shot or not, so that protecting himself will have no effect on whether he will be shot or not. Therefore, for example, no soldier should bother putting on body armor. But that, of course, is not the same as determinism. The determinist says that of course body armor will make a difference to the likelihood of being shot (or hurt if shot). So a fatalist would not bother putting on body armor, a determinist would.

[Preno]

It does seem to me that "the Universe" is a problematic notion (it did also seem so to Kant). One problem is that if it is supposed to mean, "Everything" whether the notion of everything is supposed to be taken collectively or distributively. I suppose that when you say that the Universe is deterministic, that what you mean is that natural law is deterministic, and that makes (I suppose) more sense.As far as I am concerned, the two mean the same thing (if we abstract from the presupposition that there is natural law that the latter has).

I don't understand what you mean by taking it collectively or distributively, or at least, I don't understand how it pertains to someone claiming that the Universe is deterministic, any more than it does to saying that a system of, say, two particles in a force field in a potential field is deterministic. How does the truth of the statement differ according to whether you take it "collectively" or "distributively"?
But it would help. Try it, please.I think it will be more convenient to paraphrase it. Since your objection is that the claim is metaphysical, how about our observations being determined by some past states? (Both "being determined" and "states" can easily be expanded in a way that makes it clear that there is nothing metaphysical going on here.)
What I said was clear. What you are twisting it into is not.

1) There is no fact that the world is deterministic, since the phrase the world doesn't necessarily denote anything that can be analyzed.What does analyzability have to do with this and why can the world not be analyzed? Are you not analyzing the world into parts when you speak of chairs and cities and books?
Of course I am, but you can imagine that I am talking about my observations instead. You seem to be missing the point that I can reduce talk of universe to talk of observations. How is talk of observations "metaphysical"?You didn't say 'observations'. You said 'state'. Please address the point. If you're doing this stuff intentionally, it's just a strawman, mixed with shifting goalposts. Right now I'm assuming you just don't understand my point.Yes, the notion of state is reducible to the notion of observations. To say that something is in some state is to say that if we perform such an such observations, we obtain such and such results. The two ways of talking are trivially intertranslatable, and neither commits anyone to any sort of metaphysical assumptions.

I really don't see what your objection to talk about states is or how it is metaphysical. If you object to talk about states on the grounds that it is metaphysical, you object to science on the grounds that it is metaphysical.

[Ian Nerr]

I don't understand that. The servant can, and does, vary what he does. But he dies anyway. That is what the soldier is saying when he says that whatever he does (tries to protect himself or not) he will either get shot or not, so that protecting himself will have no effect on whether he will be shot or not. Therefore, for example, no soldier should bother putting on body armor. But that, of course, is not the same as determinism. The determinist says that of course body armor will make a difference to the likelihood of being shot (or hurt if shot). So a fatalist would not bother putting on body armor, a determinist would.

Whether he will wear the body armor or not is just as fated as whether he gets shot or not.

Fatalism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fatalism) generally refers to several of the following ideas:

1. That free will does not exist, meaning therefore that history has progressed in the only manner possible. This belief is very similar to determinism.
2. That actions are free, but nevertheless work toward an inevitable end. This belief is very similar to compatibilist predestination.

3. That acceptance is appropriate, rather than resistance against inevitability. This belief is very similar to defeatism.

The idea in number 2 and as you are describing is clearly false since actions can be shown to affect outcomes.

[Linus]

Easily. If a soldier refuses to take precautions against being shot because he claims that precautions will make no difference since "if the bullet has my name on it nothing I do can prevent my being shot" I would point out statistics that show that it is far more likely that he will be shot if he does not take precautions than if he does take precautions.
Your example parallels Aristotle's problem of tomorrow's sea battle and is an example of the modal fallacy (http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/swartz/freewill1.htm#part2). How can any conclusions about the truth or falsity of fatalism be drawn from the soldier's mistaken reasoning or the statistical data about precautions?

[kennethamy]

Whether he will wear the body armor or not is just as fated as whether he gets shot or not.



The idea in number 2 and as you are describing is clearly false since actions can be shown to affect outcomes.

Not fated, but determined. For whether or not he wears body armor is up to him. It is not as if he would wear body armor whether or not he chose to wear it, and put it on.

I agree that Fatalism is false.

[Garrett]

kennethamy
Easily. If a soldier refuses to take precautions against being shot because he claims that precautions will make no difference since "if the bullet has my name on it nothing I do can prevent my being shot" I would point out statistics that show that it is far more likely that he will be shot if he does not take precautions than if he does take precautions.

And both your's and the soldier's behavior (whether he seeks protection or not) were fated.

Abstract thinking is the enemy of thought.
:banana:

You failed to identify any difference between a predetermined world and a fated world - and you can't even detect your own failure! Yet you pontificate intellectual superiority!

:yourock:

[kennethamy]

Your example parallels Aristotle's problem of tomorrow's sea battle and is an example of the modal fallacy (http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/swartz/freewill1.htm#part2). How can any conclusions about the truth or falsity of fatalism be drawn from the soldier's mistaken reasoning or the statistical data about precautions?

No, it is different. Aristotle's is logical fatalism based on the law of the excluded middle. The kind of fatalism I describe is often called "Eastern Fatalism" and simply has it that human actions are inefficacious. Aristotle's logical fatalism says nothing about human actions. I don' t understand your last question. The soldier's fatalism ignores statistics. He might say (if he was sophisticated) that he was talking about his one particular situation, and that statistics was about what was likely to happen if some soldier, but no particular soldier, was to don body armor.

[Ian Nerr]

Not fated, but determined. For whether or not he wears body armor is up to him. It is not as if he would wear body armor whether or not he chose to wear it, and put it on.

I agree that Fatalism is false.

Yeah but whether he wears armor or not is still fated. If he is fated to wear it, he is also fated to choose to wear it.

Just because he remembers weighing the pros and cons in his mind and felt like he could choose does not mean that he could have chosen differently from how he did.

[kennethamy]

As far as I am concerned, the two mean the same thing (if we abstract from the presupposition that there is natural law that the latter has).

I don't understand what you mean by taking it collectively or distributively, or at least, I don't understand how it pertains to someone claiming that the Universe is deterministic, any more than it does to saying that a system of, say, two particles in a force field in a potential field is deterministic. How does the truth of the statement differ according to whether you take it "collectively" or "distributively"?


I was talking about how the notion of the the universe was problematic, because if it meant something like everything, the question would arise whether the "the universe" meant everything taken collectively, or taken distributively. I was not thinking about determinism there. If we supposed there was a God who was creator of the universe, would God be included in everything? Or when we are told that a Big Bang was the origin of the universe, is the Big Bang a part of the universe?

[Preno]

But what I said about the universe was perfectly neutral with regard to this distinction, so unless you're saying that no sense can be made of the word, I don't think you can object to what I said on the basis that in some other contexts, it might be unclear just what is meant by the word.

[dug_down_deep]

I think it will be more convenient to paraphrase it. Since your objection is that the claim is metaphysical, how about our observations being determined by some past states? (Both "being determined" and "states" can easily be expanded in a way that makes it clear that there is nothing metaphysical going on here.)
So the world is made of our observations? That's still a metaphysical claim.

What does analyzability have to do with this and why can the world not be analyzed? Are you not analyzing the world into parts when you speak of chairs and cities and books?
Until you define 'the world', I have no idea how to analyze it. The term is ambiguous. Pretty please...define it for me. Are you talking about the world we experience? The phenomenal world?

Yes, the notion of state is reducible to the notion of observations. To say that something is in some state is to say that if we perform such an such observations, we obtain such and such results. The two ways of talking are trivially intertranslatable, and neither commits anyone to any sort of metaphysical assumptions.
Oh no, this is not a trivial distinction at all, between observation and state. You're suggesting that what we can know is equivalent to what is. And that is a metaphysical assumption, and a highly controversial one at that.

I really don't see what your objection to talk about states is or how it is metaphysical. If you object to talk about states on the grounds that it is metaphysical, you object to science on the grounds that it is metaphysical.
I haven't said any of that. You make a lot of unfounded assumptions.

[Linus]

No, it is different. Aristotle's is logical fatalism based on the law of the excluded middle. The kind of fatalism I describe is often called "Eastern Fatalism" and simply has it that human actions are inefficacious.
In that case "Eastern Fatalism" is either patently false (does it assert that human actions have no effects?) or commits the modal fallacy.
Aristotle's logical fatalism says nothing about human actions.
Aristotle's dilemma were related to the conclusion that the neither of the two admirals' actions would make any difference. Your hypothetical soldier would not take any precautions in the belief that it would make no difference. Thus, whatever other disanalogies there may be between the examples, they both share the invocation of the modal fallacy.
I don' t understand your last question. The soldier's fatalism ignores statistics. He might say (if he was sophisticated) that he was talking about his one particular situation, and that statistics was about what was likely to happen if some soldier, but no particular soldier, was to don body armor.
It is difficult to understand fatalism as an empirical claim, yet you suggested that it is easily detectable (apparently by looking at statistical data about precautions and correlated events).

[Preno]

So the world is made of our observations? That's still a metaphysical claim.I don't know what it would mean for the world to be made of our observation, and I never claimed any such thing.
Until you define 'the world', I have no idea how to analyze it. The term is ambiguous. Pretty please...define it for me. Are you talking about the world we experience? The phenomenal world?I don't see how we can talk meaningfully about anything like "the world we don't experience", so yes, I am talking about the world we experience. The qualifier seems redundant to me, but if it makes you happy, why not.
Oh no, this is not a trivial distinction at all, between observation and state. You're suggesting that what we can know is equivalent to what is. And that is a metaphysical assumption, and a highly controversial one at that.I am saying that talk of states can be reduced to talk of observations, and that talk of states above and beyond wht we can observe is meaningless. How is that a metaphysical assumption?

Since you seem to be so keen on definitions, why don't you first define to me what you mean by a metaphysical assumption?

[kennethamy]

It is difficult to understand fatalism as an empirical claim, yet you suggested that it is easily detectable (apparently by looking at statistical data about precautions and correlated events).

I doubt that fatalism is really an empirical claim. It is rather, I think, a kind of attitude which may have had profound consequences for, for example, the difference between western and eastern industrial and scientific development. But, of course, taken as an empirical claim, it is false. What I wrote was in reply to the allegation (on this thread) that there is no significant difference between determinism and fatalism. It is clear that determinism and fatalism are incompatible, so that is a significant difference.

[Quizalufagus]

So the world is made of our observations? That's still a metaphysical claim.

I don't think that's the point at all. The world needn't be made of observations for us to acknowledge that our observations are all that we have access to (and hence all that can possibly matter to us in any immediate sense). That claim is essentially metaphysics-independent; it holds regardless of whether one is a realist, phenomenologist, or whatever.

Also, given that it's apparently difficult to say what we mean by 'exists' absent any observational criteria, we're in even worse shape than I've outlined above.

Oh no, this is not a trivial distinction at all, between observation and state. You're suggesting that what we can know is equivalent to what is. And that is a metaphysical assumption, and a highly controversial one at that.

Absent any observational criteria, what does it mean to be in a particular state? And if we can draw a distinction between 'X is in state Y' and our observations being consistent with 'X is in state Y', what could it matter?

[kennethamy]

Also, given that it's apparently difficult to say what we mean by 'exists' absent any observational criteria, we're in even worse shape than I've outlined above.





I don't know about that. W hy cannot something that is unobservable exist. After all, X exists means only that X has properties. Those properties need not be observable.

[dug_down_deep]

I don't see how we can talk meaningfully about anything like "the world we don't experience", so yes, I am talking about the world we experience. The qualifier seems redundant to me, but if it makes you happy, why not.
We can talk meaningfully about the world we do not experience. In fact, that is what we normally talk about. Think about it.

I am saying that talk of states can be reduced to talk of observations, and that talk of states above and beyond wht we can observe is meaningless. How is that a metaphysical assumption?
But talk of states cannot be reduced to talk of observations, nor can states be reduced to observations. Did you observe the big bang? Did anyone? Is talk of the big bang therefore meaningless?

Since you seem to be so keen on definitions, why don't you first define to me what you mean by a metaphysical assumption?
A metaphysical assumption is an assumption about ontology or epistemology, what is and the nature of knowing. States reduce to observations, if that is what you are saying, is an assumption that what is is limited to what is known. That is a philosophical claim, and not a trivial one.

[Preno]

We can talk meaningfully about the world we do not experience. In fact, that is what we normally talk about. Think about it.No, you think about it. You can either say that we magically use words to mean things we could never have learned them to mean and that the statement "there's a chair over there" is metaphysical, or you can take the normal approach and say that "there is a chair over there" only has meaning by virtue of us being able to observe the chair. Saying "there's a chair over there, but there is no way whatsoever that we can ever observe it" is contradicting yourself.

I understand your point, it is trivial and it is false, because there would be no way for anyone to learn the meaning of the word if it meant what you think it does.

ETA: And if you are saying that we don't experience chairs, that is prima facie evidence that your theory is wrong.
But talk of states cannot be reduced to talk of observations, nor can states be reduced to observations.Why not? What do we mean by saying that something is in a state other than that if we perform such and such observations, we will get such and such results?
Did you observe the big bang? Did anyone? Is talk of the big bang therefore meaningless?No, but what we observe its results. The statement "the big bang theory is correct" (which entails the statement "there was a big bang") is meaningful because we can look around and find evidence for or against it.
A metaphysical assumption is an assumption about ontology or epistemology, what is and the nature of knowing.One can not only make assumptions, but know about what is and about knowing without having to make "metaphysical assumptions". For example, one cannot know about anything that no-one can observe in any way. Or, there is a table in front of me. Neither of those is metaphysical, and they deal with what is and with the nature of knowing.
States reduce to observations, if that is what you are saying, is an assumption that what is is limited to what is known. That is a philosophical claim, and not a trivial one.It is a philosophical point, but you said that it was a metaphysical point, which it is not. To say that something is in such and such a state is to say that if we perform such and such observations, we will get such and such results. How is that metaphysical?

[dug_down_deep]

I don't think that's the point at all. The world needn't be made of observations for us to acknowledge that our observations are all that we have access to (and hence all that can possibly matter to us in any immediate sense). That claim is essentially metaphysics-independent; it holds regardless of whether one is a realist, phenomenologist, or whatever.
It's easy to get lost in these threads, as people wander about, mincing words and dancing around logic. The statement I want to reiterate, because it is why I posted in the first place, is that determinism is a metaphysical concept. Deterministic systems are what is metaphysics-independent (if anything is).

Of course I agree with you that we only have access to what we have access to, but I don't think that we can leap to the conclusion that what we have access to is the only reality that matters.

Also, given that it's apparently difficult to say what we mean by 'exists' absent any observational criteria, we're in even worse shape than I've outlined above.
I don't have any difficulty talking about things existing. Should I?

Absent any observational criteria, what does it mean to be in a particular state? And if we can draw a distinction between 'X is in state Y' and our observations being consistent with 'X is in state Y', what could it matter?
This is wandering far from the point. I apologize if I played the piper here.

Here's Preno's basic idea as I understand it: The world is in successive states, and each one is determined by the state that preceded it. (Correct me if I'm wrong.)

I can't do anything with that, because I don't know if "the world" is chairs and tables, atomic particles, strings, fluid systems, gravitational systems, or what.

[kennethamy]

No, you think about it. You can either say that we magically use words to mean things we could never have learned them to mean and that the statement "there's a chair over there" is metaphysical, or you can take the normal approach and say that "there is a chair over there" only has meaning by virtue of us being able to observe the chair. Saying "there's a chair over there, but there is no way whatsoever that we can ever observe it" is contradicting yourself.

I understand your point, it is trivial and it is false, because there would be no way for anyone to learn the meaning of the word if it meant what you think it does.
Why not? What do we mean by saying that something is in a state other than that if we perform such and such observations, we will get such and such results?


I agree with what you say in the first paragraph, but isn't what you say in the second paragraph inconsistent with it? I don't mean by saying that something is a chair that if we perform such and such observations we will get such and such results, and I don't mean that sort of thing by something is in a state (or decomposition, e.g.) In the one case I mean that there is a chair whether or not I perform any observations; and in the second case, I mean there is such a state whether or not I perform (perform?) any observations?

[dug_down_deep]

No, but what we observe its results. The statement "the big bang theory is correct" (which entails the statement "there was a big bang") is meaningful because we can look around and find evidence for or against it.
One can not only make assumptions, but know about what is and about knowing without having to make "metaphysical assumptions". For example, one cannot know about anything that no-one can observe in any way. Or, there is a table in front of me. Neither of those is metaphysical, and they deal with what is and with the nature of knowing.
It is a philosophical point, but you said that it was a metaphysical point, which it is not.
Okay, never mind.

[Preno]

I agree with what you say in the first paragraph, but isn't what you say in the second paragraph inconsistent with it? I don't mean by saying that something is a chair that if we perform such and such observations we will get such and such results, and I don't mean that sort of thing by something is in a state (or decomposition, e.g.) In the one case I mean that there is a chair whether or not I perform any observations; and in the second case, I mean there is such a state whether or not I perform (perform?) any observations?I agree that it's true that there is a chair whether or not I perform any observations. Just like a pinch of salt is soluble in water, whether or not someone dissolves it in water.
Okay, never mind.So you're not going to reply to my points, for example answer what makes you think that there is more to talk of states than talk of observations?

[dug_down_deep]

I agree that it's true that there is a chair whether or not I perform any observations. Just like salt is soluble in water, whether or not someone dissolves it in water.
So you're not going to reply to my points, for example answer what on Earth makes you think that there is more to talk of states than talk of observations?
I can't understand your points. They don't make any sense to me. Why are you talking about magic words? It does not compute.

[Preno]

You are saying that saying that there is a chair over there has some meaning above and beyond the fact that we can observe a chair over there. However, if this is what the expression meant, it would have been unlearnable. Therefore, the word cannot mean what you think it does.

[dug_down_deep]

When we talk about states, we are talking about what is, whether or not it's observed. When we talk about observations, we are talking about observations.

The difference is that simple, and that indissoluble.

[dug_down_deep]

You are saying that saying that there is a chair over there has some meaning above and beyond the fact that we can observe a chair over there. However, if this is what the expression meant, it would have been unlearnable. Therefore, the word cannot mean what you think it does.
Saying that something is there does not require that we be able to observe it. Again, the big bang.

[Preno]

When we talk about states, we are talking about what is, whether or not it's observed. When we talk about observations, we are talking about observations.You are of course right there. Now how does that have any bearing on what I said? Namely on the fact that if saying that there is a chair over there has some meaning above and beyond the fact that we can observe a chair over there, it would have been unlearnable.
Saying that something is there does not require that we be able to observe it. Again, the big bang.The thing is, however, that we don't, or at least needn't, verify statements in isolation. To say that the big bang happened is a meaningful statement by virtue of the fact that we have a whole theory that links it to what we observe. It's called the Big Bang Theory.

But, since you seem to disagree on much more basic stuff, why don't we stick to simpler examples?

[dug_down_deep]

I may have to contact fast, and borrow Crooked Tail Kitty for this discussion. :D

[dug_down_deep]

You are of course right there. Now how does that have any bearing on what I said? Namely on the fact that if saying that there is a chair over there has some meaning above and beyond the fact that we can observe a chair over there, it would have been unlearnable.
Nonsense. We can model systems that we have no chance of ever observing. Determinism is one such model, though a gross and unusable one.

[dug_down_deep]

The thing is, however, that we don't, or at least needn't, verify statements in isolation. To say that the big bang happened is a meaningful statement by virtue of the fact that we have a whole theory that links it to what we observe. It's called the Big Bang Theory.
Right, so...?

But, since you seem to disagree on much more basic stuff, why don't we stick to simpler examples?
I have no idea what you mean by this statement. What basic stuff do I disagree with? And I'm fine with you introducing examples, but please allow me to introduce mine as well. One can leap to the wrong conclusions based on the wrong types of examples.

[Preno]

Nonsense. We can model systems that we have no chance of ever observing. Determinism is one such model, though a gross and unusable one.Such as? If you're thinking about atoms or neutron stars or some such, it's the same case as with the big bang.

Also, I notice that you're persistently refusing to answer my main point, namely how could anyone have learnt the word if it meant what you are saying it does? You know what the word "chair" means because you have seen people use it in some contexts, while sitting on a chair or locating something with respect to the chair or saying that you got your chair for cheap. How did you come to conclude, based on those situations, that talk of chairs was somehow more than talk of what one can observe? Do you not perceive the same contradiction that I do in someone's saying "there is a chair over there but we cannot ever observe it in any way whatsoever"?
I have no idea what you mean by this statement. What basic stuff do I disagree with?The meaning of "there is a chair over there", for example.
And I'm fine with you introducing examples, but please allow me to introduce mine as well. One can leap to the wrong conclusions based on the wrong types of examples.You can introduce any example you want, of course.

[dug_down_deep]

Such as? If you're thinking about atoms or neutron stars or some such, it's the same case as with the big bang.
Yeah, those. See, this is the problem with you and me discussing this issue, Preno. I have no idea why you're asking this question, and you seem to have no idea why I'm asking mine.

Also, I notice that you're persistently refusing to answer my main point, namely how could anyone have learnt the word if it meant what you are saying it does? You know what the word "chair" means because you have seen people use it in some contexts, while sitting on a chair or locating something with respect to the chair or saying that you got your chair for cheap. How did you come to conclude, based on those situations, that talk of chairs was somehow more than talk of what one can observe?
You think that I think that talk of chairs is about more than chairs that can be observed? Why in the world do you think I think that? Of course chairs can be observed.

What word? Exist?

Do you not perceive the same contradiction that I do in someone's saying "there is a chair over there but we cannot ever observe it in any way whatsoever"?
If someone says that, you might answer them that way. I did not say it, so I have no idea why you have answered me that way. When I talk about not observing things, I mean just what I say, not observing things.

Observing in any way whatsoever means what, exactly? Not actually observing, but implying that it's sort of like observing and probably reducible to it?

[kennethamy]

You think that I think that talk of chairs is about more than chairs that can be observed? Why in the world do you think I think that? Of course chairs can be observed.



I think that Preno believes that chairs are what cause you have have chair-observations, so that if you have chair-observations, but there is no chair, you are hallucinating. Is that what you believe?

[David B]

Easily. If a soldier refuses to take precautions against being shot because he claims that precautions will make no difference since "if the bullet has my name on it nothing I do can prevent my being shot" I would point out statistics that show that it is far more likely that he will be shot if he does not take precautions than if he does take precautions.

Abstract thinking is the enemy of thought.

I'm reminded of Baldrick, who wrote his own name on a bullet, and kept it in his pocket, where it was safe enough:D

David B

[dug_down_deep]

I think that Preno believes that chairs are what cause you have have chair-observations, so that if you have chair-observations, but there is no chair, you are hallucinating. Is that what you believe?
Sure. Why not?

[Preno]

I think that Preno believes that chairs are what cause you have have chair-observations, so that if you have chair-observations, but there is no chair, you are hallucinating. Is that what you believe?I do think that chairs cause our chair-observations and observing a chair without there being one means that you might, for example, be hallucinating. On the other hand, I understand chairs as potentials to produce chair-observations.
You think that I think that talk of chairs is about more than chairs that can be observed? Why in the world do you think I think that? Of course chairs can be observed.You seem to be saying that if I say that there is a chair over there, I am making a metaphysical statement. And that there is more to saying that there is a chair over there than just that we can observe a chair over there.
What word? Exist?the word "chair"
If someone says that, you might answer them that way. I did not say it, so I have no idea why you have answered me that way.I don't understand what you are saying, then, in particular why you are thinking that determinism is a metaphysical belief. Whether determinism is true can be checked by observations. If we see that stuff follows Newtonian laws, it is deterministic, for example. There is nothing metaphysical about that, unless you want to say that the whole of science is metaphysical.
Observing in any way whatsoever means what, exactly? Not actually observing, but implying that it's sort of like observing and probably reducible to it?By that I meant that the object's existence has some sort of effect on our observations.

[kennethamy]

I do think that chairs cause our chair-observations and observing a chair without there being one means that you might, for example, be hallucinating. On the other hand, I understand chairs as potentials to produce chair-observations.

By that I meant that the object's existence has some sort of effect on our observations.

Chairs certainly have the potential to produce chair-observations. But I don't understand what you mean by saying you "understand" chairs as potentials to produce chair-observations.

There must be many objects in the universe that have no effects whatever on our observations.

[Preno]

Chairs certainly have the potential to produce chair-observations. But I don't understand what you mean by saying you "understand" chairs as potentials to produce chair-observations.

There must be many objects in the universe that have no effects whatever on our observations.Depends on what you mean. If you mean that there are objects which we couldn't detect, no matter what observation we performed, I don't think any such exist and would like to see an example if you think they do. If you mean that there are objects that we simply haven't observed and perhaps never will, you are right.

[Garrett]

Preno
I don't see how we can talk meaningfully about anything like "the world we don't experience", so yes, I am talking about the world we experience. The qualifier seems redundant to me, but if it makes you happy, why not.
If we all died, the world would still be there, wouldn't it? Are we unable to talk about that world?

[Garrett]

kennethamy
It is clear that determinism and fatalism are incompatible, so that is a significant difference.
Again, you are challenged to identify some detectable difference between them. You've already failed once, but you are invited to try again.

[Garrett]

Preno
If you mean that there are objects which we couldn't detect, no matter what observation we performed, I don't think any such exist and would like to see an example if you think they do.
The universe other than the observable universe.

[kennethamy]

Again, you are challenged to identify some detectable difference between them. You've already failed once, but you are invited to try again.

The detectable difference between them is that fatalism can be shown to be statistically false, since it implies that the probability that the soldier who takes precautions will be shot is equal to the probability that he will not be shot. Determinism, on the other hand, does not have that implication.

Do try to understand.

[kennethamy]

If we all died, the world would still be there, wouldn't it? Are we unable to talk about that world?

Or, indeed, the world that existed before the existence of human beings.

[kennethamy]

Depends on what you mean. If you mean that there are objects which we couldn't detect, no matter what observation we performed, I don't think any such exist and would like to see an example if you think they do. If you mean that there are objects that we simply haven't observed and perhaps never will, you are right.

But there are certainly objects in the universe which are intrinsically undetectable, since the light which would enable them to be detected would not arrive on Earth until all human beings had vanished from the Earth.

[dug_down_deep]

You seem to be saying that if I say that there is a chair over there, I am making a metaphysical statement. And that there is more to saying that there is a chair over there than just that we can observe a chair over there.
Let me focus on this, because it goes to my central point. Saying there is a chair over there is not a metaphysical claim. Saying the world is chair-like is.

Parallel analogy to: Saying there is a deterministic system over there is not a metaphysical claim. Saying the world is deterministic is.

I don't understand what you are saying, then, in particular why you are thinking that determinism is a metaphysical belief. Whether determinism is true can be checked by observations. If we see that stuff follows Newtonian laws, it is deterministic, for example. There is nothing metaphysical about that, unless you want to say that the whole of science is metaphysical.
By that I meant that the object's existence has some sort of effect on our observations.
Determinism (please note the -ism suffix, which should raise a red flag for an empiricist positivist type such as yourself), inasmuch as it means the state of the world is caused by the immediately preceding state of the world is unverifiable. Because state is an unspecified variable, and world is an unspecified variable. And as long as those variables are unspecified, they are implied to be universal, i.e., to apply to any observed system. Or if they don't apply to any observed system, then any observed system must be reducible to a system to which the claim does apply.

Maybe it's so, maybe it's not. It is an ontological claim, and therefore a metaphysical one, assuming I am using those philosophical terms correctly.

[kennethamy]

Let me focus on this, because it goes to my central point. Saying there is a chair over there is not a metaphysical claim. Saying the world is chair-like is.

.

Fortunately, I would never say that the world was chair-like since I haven't any idea what that would mean (except that the world is like a chair, and no one would say that literally). What have you in mind, I wonder? If an ontological claim is a claim about what exists, then why isn't the claim that there is a chair over there and ontological claim? I think (and I seem to be forever interpreting Preno) that what Preno meant by saying you thought that there is a chair is a metaphysical claim is that he thinks you believe that to make that claim is to claim something that transcends observation. He thinks you think that no one ever observes a chair. Is that right?

[dug_down_deep]

Fortunately, I would never say that the world was chair-like since I haven't any idea what that would mean (except that the world is like a chair, and no one would say that literally). What have you in mind, I wonder?
Come on, ken. It's an analogy. Read the next paragraph.

[kennethamy]

Come on, ken. It's an analogy. Read the next paragraph.

Sorry, doesn't help. I still do not understand. And to tell you the truth, I really don't know what it means to say there is a deterministic system over there.

But isn't a metaphysical claim just a claim that goes beyond what is observable even in principle?

[dug_down_deep]

Sorry, doesn't help. I still do not understand. And to tell you the truth, I really don't know what it means to say there is a deterministic system over there.
I'll provide a Wiki link for anyone who wants one, but I doubt you are saying that out of simple unawareness. You must have a philosophical point to make. Is there something in this article that is wrong? Deterministic system

But isn't a metaphysical claim just a claim that goes beyond what is observable even in principle?
Yeah, I haven't been comfortable with that term since I started using it. What I'm getting at is that determinism is a belief that everything operates as a deterministic system. And it's an unverifiable belief, since we cannot know what everything is, nor can we verify to any degree of certainty that the principle of determinism applies universally.

[kennethamy]

Yeah, I haven't been comfortable with that term since I started using it. What I'm getting at is that determinism is a belief that everything operates as a deterministic system. And it's an unverifiable belief, since we cannot know what everything is, nor can we verify to any degree of certainty that the principle of determinism applies universally.

It isn't I think so much a matter of knowing what everything is. It is a matter of having some clear idea of what "everything" means. Unverifiability is very often the consequence of vagueness, and "determinism" is not the name of anything clear.

The same goes for whether we can be certain that determinism applies universally. Everywhere? Just as it is dubious whether we have any clear idea of what things are included in everything, so it is dubious that we have any clear idea of what "wheres" are included in everywhere.

[Preno]

Let me focus on this, because it goes to my central point. Saying there is a chair over there is not a metaphysical claim. Saying the world is chair-like is.Kennethamy has already answered this quite satisfactorily, I think.
Parallel analogy to: Saying there is a deterministic system over there is not a metaphysical claim. Saying the world is deterministic is.That's pretty bad, because saying the world is deterministic is nothing but saying that every system is deterministic.
Determinism (please note the -ism suffix, which should raise a red flag for an empiricist positivist type such as yourself), [bolding mine]?

What's wrong with the -ism suffix?
inasmuch as it means the state of the world is caused by the immediately preceding state of the world is unverifiable.It means that the state of the world is determined by some preceding state.

Also, the notion of an "immediately preceding state of the world" needn't even make sense if time is continuous.
Because state is an unspecified variable, and world is an unspecified variable.what

What do you mean by "unspecified variables"? Saying that an electron is in the state with a spin in the direction of some axis is saying that if we perform such and such measurements, he will behave in such and such ways. For example, in the Stern-Gerlach experiment he will go one way rather than the other. What is so problematic about that?
And as long as those variables are unspecified, they are implied to be universal, i.e., to apply to any observed system.Correct. I don't see where the problem is with that, though.
Maybe it's so, maybe it's not. It is an ontological claim, and therefore a metaphysical one, assuming I am using those philosophical terms correctly.If you're saying that determinism is a metaphysical claim, I think you are, because it is in the purview of physics, not philosophy, to tell us whether the world is deterministic. For some time people believed it is, from the 20th century on, based on empirical evidence, they believe that it fundamentally isn't. How could it be a metaphysical claim if it falls within the purview of physics?
And it's an unverifiable belief, since we cannot know what everything is, nor can we verify to any degree of certainty that the principle of determinism applies universally.By the same logic, every universal law of physics makes would be metaphysical, no?
I think (and I seem to be forever interpreting Preno) that what Preno meant by saying you thought that there is a chair is a metaphysical claim is that he thinks you believe that to make that claim is to claim something that transcends observation. He thinks you think that no one ever observes a chair. Is that right?Yes, that's right.

[Preno]

But there are certainly objects in the universe which are intrinsically undetectable, since the light which would enable them to be detected would not arrive on Earth until all human beings had vanished from the Earth.That all depends on what you mean (or rather, on what I mean) by the "can" or by "potential". I don't think this is a problem exclusively of an observation-based notion of existence. For example, is it true that if flew to the neighbouring galaxy, we would find stars with planets? Or is it possible to go arbitrarily close to the speed of light? Physicists would normally say it is, but it may well be that the total amount of energy that we can possibly spend on accelerating an object can only get us 99% of the speed of light (the real percentage would obviously be much closer to 100%, but that's besides the point). Do we want to say that the counterfactual "if an object goes at the speed of 99% of the speed of light relative to us, it shortens to such and such a fraction of its rest length?" is true or not? Surely there is no law that would prevent us from speeding an object up to this speed. On the other, if the total energy we can use is limited, it is also true that we cannot accelerate any object to such a speed. Imo the vagueness of talk of possibility manifests itself here quite clearly, and we can choose to use either formulation. We have reasons to believe that if it were possible to do X, we would have observed Y, even though X might not in fact be realizable. The whole doctrine of natural laws seems to be based on this talk of situations that we may not be able to realize/observe. I'm not particularly happy with this "solution" myself, but I don't see how it can be avoided in general.

So to answer your objection, in that sense, if we went to those parts of the universe, we would have observed this or that (which we infer on the basis of what we observe in other parts of the universe).
If we all died, the world would still be there, wouldn't it? Are we unable to talk about that world?It wouldn't make any difference to us, and you can inductively infer from the fact that the universe doesn't care about whether someone dies or not that it would. Basically, it's a more extreme variant of Ken's example, and the same treatment (whether it works or not) can be applied to both.
The universe other than the observable universe.Like what? If you mean something like the example kennethamy gave, see the paragraph above, if not, please clarify.

[dug_down_deep]

That's pretty bad, because saying the world is deterministic is nothing but saying that every system is deterministic.
Yes. And where and how did you (or any believer in determinism) observe that every system was deterministic, or otherwise come to that conclusion based on empirical evidence?

What's wrong with the -ism suffix?
Because it often is used to signify beliefs and ideologies. You know...metaphysical stuff.

What do you mean by "unspecified variables"?
I mean that these terms are meaningless, unless they have a specific application. I don't know why somebody who champions empiricism as you do would allow vague, universal terms to be used in the way you're using them. What empirical thing is the world? (I ask again.) What empirical thing is the state of the world? How shall we measure these things, or otherwise observe them in our experiments?

Saying that an electron is in the state with a spin in the direction of some axis is saying that if we perform such and such measurements, he will behave in such and such ways. For example, in the Stern-Gerlach experiment he will go one way rather than the other. What is so problematic about that?
This example has nothing to do with the claim about everything that determinists make. It has to do with one type of state, in one highly specific experiment. It's a red herring.

If you're saying that determinism is a metaphysical claim, I think you are, because it is in the purview of physics, not philosophy, to tell us whether the world is deterministic. For some time people believed it is, from the 20th century on, based on empirical evidence, they believe that it fundamentally isn't. How could it be a metaphysical claim if it falls within the purview of physics?
Classical physics is a deterministic system. Quantum mechanics is not. Neither classical physics nor quantum mechanics is equivalent to "the world". Determinism makes a universal claim that no respectable physicist would attempt to publish in a peer reviewed journal.

By the same logic, every universal law of physics makes would be metaphysical, no?
Now, that's an interesting question. Please state the Law of Determinism.

[kennethamy]

It wouldn't make any difference to us, and you can inductively infer from the fact that the universe doesn't care about whether someone dies or not that it would. Basically, it's a more extreme variant of Ken's example, and the same treatment (whether it works or not) can be applied to both.
Like what? If you mean something like the example kennethamy gave, see the paragraph above, if not, please clarify.

What relevance is it that it would make no difference to us? The fact is the world before there were sentient creatures in it had certain features which were unobservable by anyone. And we know there was such a world, since the existence of the world predates the existence of sentient creatures.

[Garrett]

kennethamy
The detectable difference between them
You aren't making sense. Of course we can see differences between the theories. The point is to imagine a fated world, and to imagine a predetermined world, and describe an observable difference between those two hypothetical worlds.

If the soldier takes precautions, that could be due to fated actions, or due to predetermined actions. No detectable difference! Same if he doesn't take precautions.

Do try to understand.
Please take your own advice!

[Garrett]

Preno
It wouldn't make any difference to us,
I thought the question was whether we can meaningfully talk about stuff we can't detect.

Like what?
The rest of the universe, of course. See the the observable universe (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Observable_universe).

[Strange Loops]

There's nothing in the following three scenarios that is incompatible with or contradicts fatalism, determinism or "free will" as they are usually thought of. All three (fatalism, determinism, free will) could each produce all of the scenarios below.


A soldier deliberates and ponder whether or not to put on armor.

Previously X out of Y soldiers have died in a similar situation when not wearing armor, and someone has collected and published the stats of this.

The soldier is informed of the statistics.

The soldier believes in fatalism and believes the stats don't apply to him, only serve as a summary of the fates of all those previous dudes who died or did not. Apparently most of those fated to live were also fated to wear armor! If he thinks fate is detectable, he should reason the following: the stats indicate that those who are fated to live were fated to put armor on, so if I end up with armor on, I am probably fated to live, though I certainly can't know this for sure; oh look, I was fated to decide to put armor on...phew. (in other words, if peoples' fates correlate in interesting ways -- i.e. 90% of the time, those fated to wear armor are fated to live, and those fates to not wear armor die -- then statistics do not say anything about fatalism being true or false!). He subjectively feels like he has a choice between armor or not, but he also believes (contrary to this feeling, thinking the feeling of genuine choice an illusion) that whether or not he puts the armor on (keeping in mind it still feels like a choice to him like us!) is fated. He either puts the armor on or he doesn't, and it feels like a choice.
OR
The soldier believes in determinism and believes the stats apply to the dudes that came before (who were determined to die based on the initial state of the universe). The initial state of the universe led to his brain feeding back on itself, processing inputs and producing outputs, and those are behind what we call (and perceive to be genuine) decisions/choices. His determined brain-chuggings lead to him either putting the armor on or not (and either way, he *felt* it as a genuine choice, but believes, because he believes in determinism) that it was determined by underlying neuro-chemical and atomic swirlings.
OR
The soldier believes in free will and believes the stats describe the dudes that came before and their decisions interacted with the rest of the world (some of it, like the velocity of the incoming bullet, being determined as long as its 4D path did not cross with the 4D action-cone of possible actions performable by some free thing). Meanwhile, he feels he is free to decide between armor or not, and bases his decision on the stats (because he thinks that part of the world is not free to vary -- things like the velocity of bullets, things that lead to observable statistical patterns!). He either puts the armor on or he doesn't (probably the former) and feels like he freely chose it.

Note that you can intermix these for more interesting results. In other words, the soldier's beliefs can be any of those positions in a fatalistic world, can be any of those positions in a deterministic world, can be any of those positions in a free world.

Maybe it's becoming more clear now what we are saying? No matter the stats (descriptions of what has happened) and no matter how we feel (possibly genuine choice, possibly illusory choice) and no matter what actions we end up taking, none of these can speak to the fatalist/determinist/free question!

And it seems to me that when you try to explicate how any number of events and beliefs and feelings can arise in a fatalistic world, and how the same could arise in a deterministic world, you're likely to find yourself coming up with the same story. That's because fatalism and determinism -- it seems to me -- both imply each other.

Determinism and fatalism both say that every successive state of the world is forced by the previous state and whatever laws dictate the transition between states (i.e. particles interacting by the laws of physics). Any particular state of the world (including the last one, if there is an end) is forced to be that one particular point in the chain, based on the laws governing transition between states, and this is true from the very first state.

Step back and see it as a 4D object, rather than a 3D world moving through time, and you see one object, just that one hyper object.

[kennethamy]

There's nothing in the following three scenarios that is incompatible with or contradicts fatalism, determinism or "free will" as they are usually thought of. All three (fatalism, determinism, free will) could each produce all of the scenarios below.


A soldier deliberates and ponder whether or not to put on armor.

Previously X out of Y soldiers have died in a similar situation when not wearing armor, and someone has collected and published the stats of this.

The soldier is informed of the statistics.

The soldier believes in fatalism and believes the stats don't apply to him, only serve as a summary of the fates of all those previous dudes who died or did not. Apparently most of those fated to live were also fated to wear armor! If he thinks fate is detectable, he should reason the following: the stats indicate that those who are fated to live were fated to put armor on, so if I end up with armor on, I am probably fated to live, though I certainly can't know this for sure; oh look, I was fated to decide to put armor on...phew. (in other words, if peoples' fates correlate in interesting ways -- i.e. 90% of the time, those fated to wear armor are fated to live, and those fates to not wear armor die -- then statistics do not say anything about fatalism being true or false!). He subjectively feels like he has a choice between armor or not, but he also believes (contrary to this feeling, thinking the feeling of genuine choice an illusion) that whether or not he puts the armor on (keeping in mind it still feels like a choice to him like us!) is fated. He either puts the armor on or he doesn't, and it feels like a choice.
OR
The soldier believes in determinism and believes the stats apply to the dudes that came before (who were determined to die based on the initial state of the universe). The initial state of the universe led to his brain feeding back on itself, processing inputs and producing outputs, and those are behind what we call (and perceive to be genuine) decisions/choices. His determined brain-chuggings lead to him either putting the armor on or not (and either way, he *felt* it as a genuine choice, but believes, because he believes in determinism) that it was determined by underlying neuro-chemical and atomic swirlings.
OR
The soldier believes in free will and believes the stats describe the dudes that came before and their decisions interacted with the rest of the world (some of it, like the velocity of the incoming bullet, being determined as long as its 4D path did not cross with the 4D action-cone of possible actions performable by some free thing). Meanwhile, he feels he is free to decide between armor or not, and bases his decision on the stats (because he thinks that part of the world is not free to vary -- things like the velocity of bullets, things that lead to observable statistical patterns!). He either puts the armor on or he doesn't (probably the former) and feels like he freely chose it.

Note that you can intermix these for more interesting results. In other words, the soldier's beliefs can be any of those positions in a fatalistic world, can be any of those positions in a deterministic world, can be any of those positions in a free world.

Maybe it's becoming more clear now what we are saying? No matter the stats (descriptions of what has happened) and no matter how we feel (possibly genuine choice, possibly illusory choice) and no matter what actions we end up taking, none of these can speak to the fatalist/determinist/free question!

And it seems to me that when you try to explicate how any number of events and beliefs and feelings can arise in a fatalistic world, and how the same could arise in a deterministic world, you're likely to find yourself coming up with the same story. That's because fatalism and determinism -- it seems to me -- both imply each other.

Determinism and fatalism both say that every successive state of the world is forced by the previous state and whatever laws dictate the transition between states (i.e. particles interacting by the laws of physics). Any particular state of the world (including the last one, if there is an end) is forced to be that one particular point in the chain, based on the laws governing transition between states, and this is true from the very first state.

Step back and see it as a 4D object, rather than a 3D world moving through time, and you see one object, just that one hyper object.

I am not sure I understand all this, but isn't there a difference between saying that whatever I do to avoid being killed (say putting on the armor, or not) makes no difference: and saying that if I put on the armor, I have a better chance of surviving, than if I don't put on the armor? It certainly seems so to me.

By the way, determinism does not say anything about effects being forced by their causes. It says that effect are caused by their causes. Causation is one thing, compulsion, another. All events that compel their effects, cause their effects, but not conversely. I have no idea what fatalism says (or does not say) about causes and effects. I don't think it implies anything about causes and effects.

[yautja_cetanu]

About the law of excluded middle and aristotle's example with the ships. What do you think this quantum physics has to do with that?

Essentially Aristotle is saying that if I make a truth statement now, its either true or false, this is time independant and therefore it is always true or false. This turns fatalism into something that is apparantly entirely logically true regardless of empirical evidence. Fatalism HAS to be true due to the nature of truth?

The guy I'm reading, taylor goes on to say that this is so obvious, the only reason why you'd disagree is because of pride and wanting free-will. Now I definitely think there are statements that the law of excluded middle doesn't apply to, ie nonsense statements (or poorly defined statements) such as "The Sky is six" (Not the Sky is six years old, but the abstract version of six) (I actually find it quite hard to come up with an entirely nonsense statement which works grammatically!)


But what I'm feeling Quantum physics (especially Quantum electro dynamics, which actually fully works) says to this is that that all definite statements about physical reality are nonsense statements. Its not possible to say "An Electron is here" You can either say "An Electron was measured to be here" (A statement about the measurement) or you can say "An Electron has a 90% probability to be here" (A Statement about the electron but involves probability).

Now this is fine, but its my gut feeling that says we should apply this is all statements (except this one :P, nah I'm kidding there, I haven't fully defined what I mean by "all" I think I mean all statements empiracally observable? I dunno). So for example. "I will not fall through a perfectly solid wall". Is not a statement that can be either true or false. Its probability is so high that I can pretty much assume I won't fall through walls. But there is a small chance depending on things like the alignment of electrons that I could?

So I would rebutt fatalism's use of the Law of excluded middle and aristotle by suggesting "Captain A wins the battle" is a nonsense statement. The Law cannot be applied here. I can say that when measured the captain will have won (A statement about the measurement not about reality in general or the captain) which isn't fatalism. Or I can say "There is a 99.9% chance the captain will win" which isn't fatalism.

Am I making sense? (I'll probably post this in a seperate thread depending on the response because it looks like this thread has moved on).





(On a side note about Eastern Fatalism. I have a friend of a friend who actually stopped revising due to a belief that it wouldn't make any difference! "Whatever will be will be:P") hehe

[kennethamy]

About the law of excluded middle and aristotle's example with the ships. What do you think this quantum physics has to do with that?

Essentially Aristotle is saying that if I make a truth statement now, its either true or false, this is time independant and therefore it is always true or false. This turns fatalism into something that is apparantly entirely logically true regardless of empirical evidence. Fatalism HAS to be true due to the nature of truth?

The guy I'm reading, taylor goes on to say that this is so obvious, the only reason why you'd disagree is because of pride and wanting free-will.

Well, I disagree because Aristotle seems to infer from: (Necessarily) [a sea-battle will occur or a sea-battle will not occur] the law of the excluded middle, to, [(necessarily) a sea-battle will occur, or (necessarily) a sea-battle will not occur] which is a modal fallacy. You just cannot put the necessary operator thought the parentheses, and distribute it like that.

[yautja_cetanu]

I'm confused, do you disagree with me or aristotle? I might have worded aristotle's thing wrongly, its here (http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/swartz/freewill1.htm#part2) But I'm guessing you've read that...

You just cannot put the necessary operator thought the parentheses, and distribute it like that.

Is there a typo in that sentence? Is that "throughout"?

O.k my understanding (based on the reading from Taylor). Is that he merely saying: "(Necessarily) [a sea-battle will occur or a sea-battle will not occur] the law of the excluded middle" but mentioning that there is nothing to do with tense in that statement. The Law of Excluded middle says it has to be one or the other and nothing else.

Essentially this gets rid of the statement "A Sea-battle might occur".

So to quote Taylor about the modal confusion

The fatalist argument just rests on a "confusion of modalities." The fact that something is true entails only that its denial is false, not that its denial is impossible. All that is impossible is that both should be true, or both false. Thus, if the president is going to be murdered, it is certainly false that he is not - but not impossible. What is impossible is that he will be both murdered and spared.

Here again we have only a distracting irrelevancy, similar to the point just made. The fatalist argument has nothing to do with impossibility in those senses familiar to logic. It has to do with unavoidability. It is, in other words, concerned with human abilities. That fact that a statement is true does not, to be sure, entail that is is necessary, nor do all false statements express impossibilities. Nonetheless, no one is able to avoid what is truly described, however cintingently in any statement , nor to bring about what is thus falsely described. Nor can anyone convert the one to the other, making suddenly true that which was false, or vice versa. It has never been done, and it never will be. It would be a conceit indeed for someone now to suggest that he, alone among men, might be able to accomplish this feat. This inability goes far beyond the obvious impossibility of making something both true and false at once. No metaphysics turns on that simple point

I quite like Taylor's argument here. I don't think fatalism includes this modal fallacy. I do, however this using the Law of Excluded middle is non-sensical. Reality has to be seen in terms of probabilities.

I suppose what I'm asking is, where as we know quantum physics views reality in terms of probabilities and not certainties. Do we apply it to the rest of the physical world? And does this destroy fatalism. (~And also destroy a view of time that is constant and not flowing)

[kennethamy]

Aristotle seems to have committed the modal fallacy of distributing the necessity operator though the parentheses. (N) p or not-p does not imply (N)p or (N)not-p is Aristotle seems to think. So I disagree with Aristotle (and, I guess, with Taylor) because the law of the excluded middle does not seem to imply logical fatalism. And it is a fallacy that it does, for the reason I gave. Namely, it does not follow that because it is necessary that either a sea-battle will be fought, or a sea-battle will not be fought, that it is necessary that a sea-battle will be fought, or it is necessary that a sea-battle will not be fought.

[yautja_cetanu]

But doesn't that quote from Taylor deal with this? (Sorry, I'm still trying to understand all this!) By saying that fatalism is not suggesting altenrative worlds are impossible. Just unavoidable?

It goes, there is such thing as truth
Truth is not neccessarily time dependant
Something that is true, doesn't become true or cease to be true
"whatever is truth at all simply is true"

However if something is true, then it can't be false at the same time. Which is where the law of excluded middle comes in. This means there is no uncertainity of the truth of a truth statement. SO there is not might, not probability, its unavoidable...

I don't think I'm fully understanding this. But I can't see how the "whatever will be, will be" used like this commits a modal fallacy?

[Linus]

So to quote Taylor about the modal confusion
Which publication are you quoting from?
Quote from a text written someone with the surname Taylor:

"Here again we have only a distracting irrelevancy, similar to the point just made. The fatalist argument has nothing to do with impossibility in those senses familiar to logic. It has to do with unavoidability. It is, in other words, concerned with human abilities."
But the modal fallacy remains a fallacy even if we replace statements of the form "it is necessarily true that ..." with "has the ability to ...".
Quoted text continued...
That fact that a statement is true does not, to be sure, entail that is is necessary, nor do all false statements express impossibilities. Nonetheless, no one is able to avoid what is truly described, however cintingently in any statement , nor to bring about what is thus falsely described. Nor can anyone convert the one to the other, making suddenly true that which was false, or vice versa. It has never been done, and it never will be. It would be a conceit indeed for someone now to suggest that he, alone among men, might be able to accomplish this feat. This inability goes far beyond the obvious impossibility of making something both true and false at once. No metaphysics turns on that simple point"
This overlooks the fact whether or not a statement about what a person will do in the future is only true if the person does as stated. In other words, the truth conditions for the statement refer to the person's actions. It is therefore quite odd to say that the person cannot bring about what is going to happen.

For example, we may know that "John will not buy a philosophy book tomorrow", but it does not follow from that that "John cannot buy a philosophy book tomorrow". Nor does it follow that "John lacks the ability to buy a philosophy book tomorrow". There are of course many other reasons for not buying philosophy books than just lack of ability to do so (not wanting to, comes to mind as a reason).
Reality has to be seen in terms of probabilities.
I'm not sure if quantifying our uncertainty about the truth values of assertions leads to any fundamental difference in the present discussion. If there is such a thing as fate, does it matter if fate has a 0 % or, say, 0.5 % failure rate?

[Preno]

I thought the question was whether we can meaningfully talk about stuff we can't detect.You're right.
The rest of the universe, of course. See the the observable universe (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Observable_universe).Yes, I already answered that when I answered kennethamy, so you can reply to that post if you wish.
What relevance is it that it would make no difference to us? The fact is the world before there were sentient creatures in it had certain features which were unobservable by anyone. And we know there was such a world, since the existence of the world predates the existence of sentient creatures.As I said, you could easily interpret it that stuff would exist because if we were there, we would have observed it.

[kennethamy]

You're right.

As I said, you could easily interpret it that stuff would exist because if we were there, we would have observed it.

But, what if no one had been there. No one would have observed it. How can that mean that it would not have existed? If no one had observed it, then no one would have known it existed. But how can that mean that it would not have existed?

[Ian Nerr]

Before we get into the implications of quantum mechanics, what about relativity? There are events that have already occurred in some reference frames that are in my future. There is no universal present to divide past from future.

[kennethamy]

Before we get into the implications of quantum mechanics, what about relativity? There are events that have already occurred in some reference frames that are in my future. There is no universal present to divide past from future.

Goodness, but this is getting deep. I may be falling out of the bottom.

[yautja_cetanu]

Richard Taylor, ‘Fate’, ch 6 of Taylor’s Metaphysics, 4th ed. (Prentice Hall, 1992)

I don't know if you've guessed but rather then being a proper philosopher who just reads, I've only been able to look at whats fed to me :P (Not entirely true but almost). So thats a tutorial reading. I'll see if I can find an online copy of it.

You've made good points Linus, but I can't help feeling thats not the best way to attack fatalism. Fatalists (such as Taylor) have definitely tried to deal with to apparent modal fallacy.

I think you go with,

For example, we may know that "John will not buy a philosophy book tomorrow", but it does not follow from that that "John cannot buy a philosophy book tomorrow

Then, you are a fatalist. If its at all possible for the statement "John will not buy a book tommorrow" to be true (even if no one can ever know this truth). Then fatalism holds because that statement has nothing to do with time. Yeah its true he has the ability to buy the book because he wants to, but according to fatalism, thats unavoidable too. He will always not want to buy the book.

I think I need to think about it a bit more though.

Before we get into the implications of quantum mechanics, what about relativity? There are events that have already occurred in some reference frames that are in my future. There is no universal present to divide past from future.

Yeah, this is really interesting. At first I thought time has to be constant due to relativity. You can't believe in a time that "flows" or a statement of reality that says the future does not exist because relativity says otherwise. (If time flowed at a certain rate, and people travelled through time at a different rate then would you get time overlapping on itself???)

Anyways one person explained that he thinks its still possibly to believe in a past, present, future view of time. He suggests that the events in other reference frames actually haven't already occured. Instead you have a concept of personal time, and universal time. For example, if you take the Twin Paradox. The twin who has "travelled into the future" has actually travelled into the future at a faster rate with respect to his personal or perceived time. However he's actually gone into the future. The guy left back on earth is travelling into the future at a slower rate. So ages and dies before his twin returns.

However its not true that after 40 years with respect to universal time, the guy on earth is at a different time to his twin who is in the future, because the future doesn't exist yet. They just experience time at different rates.

Does that make sense? I tried to attack fatalism on the grounds of relativity, but I dunno if it works. (Richard Taylor also wrote about time travel I think using a concept of temporal parts that kind of deals with relativity)

[Preno]

But, what if no one had been there. No one would have observed it. How can that mean that it would not have existed? If no one had observed it, then no one would have known it existed. But how can that mean that it would not have existed?As I said, if someone were there, they would observe it.

Sure, it's a pretty desperate defense, but it seems to me to be the best alternative.

[kennethamy]

As I said, if someone were there, they would observe it.

Sure, it's a pretty desperate defense, but it seems to me to be the best alternative.

To say that if someone had been there he would have observed it, is one thing.
To say that someone was there, and he did observe it, is a different thing. "Best alternative" to what. That it is false?

[Kingreaper]

Parallel analogy to: Saying there is a deterministic system over there is not a metaphysical claim. Saying the world is deterministic is.That's pretty bad, because saying the world is deterministic is nothing but saying that every system is deterministic.


Can you analyse the entirety of everything? Including yourself? Can you then run several experiments starting from the same entirety of everything, and see if they turn out differently?

Of course not. But that's what you must do to a system to show that it's deterministic on the level of analysis. With any system you can show is deterministic, you CAN perform all of those actions, because there's NO NEED to include yourself.

Note; this is why there is no experiment that can determine whether the experimenter has "free will" or not. In fact, there is no experiment that can contradict determinism, because there could always be factors you've failed to isolate from your system which make the outcome unpredictable.

[Garrett]

Kingreaper
In fact, there is no experiment that can contradict determinism,
Quantum mechanics is nondeterministic.

In fact, there is no experiment that can contradict determinism, because there could always be factors you've failed to isolate from your system which make the outcome unpredictable.
Local hidden variables have been ruled out by the experts.

[Kingreaper]

Kingreaper
In fact, there is no experiment that can contradict determinism,
Quantum mechanics is nondeterministic.Quantum mechanics IS non-deterministic. True.
That means that EITHER the universe is non-deterministic at the most basic level OR we haven't reached the most basic level

In fact, there is no experiment that can contradict determinism, because there could always be factors you've failed to isolate from your system which make the outcome unpredictable.
Local hidden variables have been ruled out by the experts.

We've been through this, haven't we? I have no idea how it's even sensical to say you've ruled out local hidden variables, but non-local hidden variables (which given as EVERYTHING is non-local in quantum mechanics, are perfectly reasonable) will suffice.

[Garrett]

Kingreaper
Quantum mechanics IS non-deterministic.
And that's enough to disprove determinism, which claims no non-deterministic systems exist.

We've been through this, haven't we?
And until it takes, we'll go through it again, I guess.

I have no idea how it's even sensical to say you've ruled out local hidden variables,
Does your incredulity outweigh expert opinion?

but non-local hidden variables (which given as EVERYTHING is non-local in quantum mechanics, are perfectly reasonable) will suffice.
If non-local hidden variables are involved, determinism is again disproven. Because some of the causes for quantum behavior would not be antecedent to the effect! Einstein called it "spooky action at a distance" for good reason.

[Kingreaper]

Kingreaper
Quantum mechanics IS non-deterministic.
And that's enough to disprove determinism, which claims no non-deterministic systems exist. Nope, a system can be rendered non-deterministic even though it's part of a deterministic supersystem.

For example, the motion of a particle in a gas cannot be determined from it's position and velocity.
You need the position and velocity of the rest of the particles to stand a chance, because the particle you're studying interacts with them. Thus, the particle and its info