Free Will and Decision Making (moved from "Designed? Or Not? How do you know? in E&O)

[RexT]

OK, in this scenario, is a decision being made:

Program: Read A. If A > 10 then Write "YES" else Write "NO".
Input: 5
Output: NO
Input: 10
Output: NO
Input: 42
Output: YES

Is this a series of 'decisions', or is it a deterministic set of results?

Compare with this: You have a beam balance with 20 grams in the left pan and nothing in the right pan. If you place 25 grams in the right pan, the measure's indicator will tip to the right. Did the measure make a 'decision'?A decision is made only when more than one option is present. The code in your example program above does not allow for more than one option. Any A greater than 10 will always output "YES", never "NO".

Now, if you could write a program that stated:

Read A. If A > 10 then Write "YES" or "NO"
Input: 5
Output: NO
Input: 5
Output: YES

your computer could be said to make a decision.

[Gagundathar Inexplicable]

OK, in this scenario, is a decision being made:

Program: Read A. If A > 10 then Write "YES" else Write "NO".
Input: 5
Output: NO
Input: 10
Output: NO
Input: 42
Output: YES

Is this a series of 'decisions', or is it a deterministic set of results?

Compare with this: You have a beam balance with 20 grams in the left pan and nothing in the right pan. If you place 25 grams in the right pan, the measure's indicator will tip to the right. Did the measure make a 'decision'?A decision is made only when more than one option is present. The code in your example program above does not allow for more than one option. Any A greater than 10 will always output "YES", never "NO".

Now, if you could write a program that stated:

Read A. If A > 10 then Write "YES" or "NO"
Input: 5
Output: NO
Input: 5
Output: YES

your computer could be said to make a decision.

Rex, that program wouldn't run. Or more properly SOME evaluation would be done to determine which logic path would be followed at the OR.
You could run a random number generator and say that it would be YES if the result were even, but in a normal computer program (not quantum computing) you always have an either/or type of decision, and it is a predetermined set of paths. And in your above example the input is ignored. It has no place in the computation of the result. It could even be absent and you would still get the same kind of result namely a random set of yeses and noes.

The question comes to this: we believe we make decisions as part of what we consider to be 'free will'. Can it be demonstrated that our decision making process is nondeterministic? If so, how so? If not, then can we verify that we have free will? If you are saying that all 'decisions' must be made by introducing a random element (which is what you are implying in your example), then consider the path of a trickle of water down a windshield. The meandering pathway is constantly changing. Are decisions being made here and if so, by what agent?

[RexT]

Rex, that program wouldn't run. Or more properly SOME evaluation would be done to determine which logic path would be followed at the OR.
You could run a random number generator and say that it would be YES if the result were even, but in a normal computer program (not quantum computing) you always have an either/or type of decision, and it is a predetermined set of paths. And in your above example the input is ignored. It has no place in the computation of the result. It could even be absent and you would still get the same kind of result namely a random set of yeses and noes.

The question comes to this: we believe we make decisions as part of what we consider to be 'free will'. Can it be demonstrated that our decision making process is nondeterministic? If so, how so? If not, then can we verify that we have free will? If you are saying that all 'decisions' must be made by introducing a random element (which is what you are implying in your example), then consider the path of a trickle of water down a windshield. The meandering pathway is constantly changing. Are decisions being made here and if so, by what agent?Yes, I know that my program wouldn't run. And that is why I'll say computers don't make choices. As you suggest, they can be set up to seem as if they are making choices, but that would only fool someone who is missing some information about how the computer supposedly decides.

If you believe that all events are deterministic, then the notion of randomness is incorrect. Things that appear random are just fooling us because we lack some information about them.

And I would suppose that if the world is really lawful it must also be deterministic. In which case, the world could theoretically be completely described with numbers and mathematics. Which would mean that there is no such thing as freewill. Thus, we are part of a matrix.

However, I don't know that the world is entirely deterministic. I can make irrational choices. I can refuse to make a choice. I can choose both yes and no at the same time. I can say maybe. I can look for a new choice that is not yet given. I can wish. I can doubt. I can believe.

Of course, it might be debatable whether such things are governed by some unknown law(s).

[Jet Black]

Which would mean that there is no such thing as freewill.

well I have never seen a good definition of free will anyway.

[Gagundathar Inexplicable]

The reason I brought up the 'trickle of water' example is to remind you of the chaotic nature of many systems. Our brains are chaotic. If they weren't it is highly likely that we would not be 'self-aware', at least according to several theories of consciousness.

We have gone far afield from the original post's subject.

[Febble]

Dennett, in Freedom Evolves, argues persuasively (IMO) that the relevant question is not whether will is free (who's Will?) but whether I am, and that the answer depends entirely on how I define "I".

The more narrow the boundaries I draw around myself, the less freedom I can assign to myself. The good news is that it lets me off the moral hook. The bad news is that I diminish myself. Defining oneself is the act of accepting moral responsibility. It has nothing to do with determinism.

If you make yourself really small, you can externalize virtually everything.

</derail>

[BWE]

Dennett, in Freedom Evolves, argues persuasively (IMO) that the relevant question is not whether will is free (who's Will?) but whether I am, and that the answer depends entirely on how I define "I".

The more narrow the boundaries I draw around myself, the less freedom I can assign to myself. The good news is that it lets me off the moral hook. The bad news is that I diminish myself. Defining oneself is the act of accepting moral responsibility. It has nothing to do with determinism.

If you make yourself really small, you can externalize virtually everything.

</derail>
I'm currently reading Freedom Evolves (slowly). The level of dislike I feel toward it surprises me. He moves around from points of view and sometimes equivocates patterns at different scales. I think the argument might be sound but I suspect it won't hold up as data becomes available. [//off topic]

Deterministic or determinism is the view from only a particular scale. No?

[Febble]

Dennett, in Freedom Evolves, argues persuasively (IMO) that the relevant question is not whether will is free (who's Will?) but whether I am, and that the answer depends entirely on how I define "I".

The more narrow the boundaries I draw around myself, the less freedom I can assign to myself. The good news is that it lets me off the moral hook. The bad news is that I diminish myself. Defining oneself is the act of accepting moral responsibility. It has nothing to do with determinism.

If you make yourself really small, you can externalize virtually everything.

</derail>
I'm currently reading Freedom Evolves (slowly). The level of dislike I feel toward it surprises me. He moves around from points of view and sometimes equivocates patterns at different scales. I think the argument might be sound but I suspect it won't hold up as data becomes available. [//off topic]

Deterministic or determinism is the view from only a particular scale. No?

His point is that determinism is irrelevant to the question.

What data would falsify his position?

[Jet Black]

The reason I brought up the 'trickle of water' example is to remind you of the chaotic nature of many systems. Our brains are chaotic. If they weren't it is highly likely that we would not be 'self-aware', at least according to several theories of consciousness.

We have gone far afield from the original post's subject.

yeah, this thread should be banished to philosophy.

[Dr. Nelson C. Armadingo]

The reason I brought up the 'trickle of water' example is to remind you of the chaotic nature of many systems. Our brains are chaotic. If they weren't it is highly likely that we would not be 'self-aware', at least according to several theories of consciousness.

We have gone far afield from the original post's subject.

yeah, this thread should be banished to philosophy.

Um, no.
I would, with insufficient humility, suggest that the totally off-topic material about perception, choice (as rexT has raised it, not as it pertains to the OP), determinism, and free-will be split out to philosophy.
Then this thread should be locked, as the original poster has clearly abandoned it after having had his clocks so thoroughly cleaned on the issues that there's nothing original or relevant left to be said.

Dr. Nelson C. Armadingo
and Nurse Durkin

[Jet Black]

brilliant idea. Dr N. and Nurse D for Admin.

[RexT]

The reason I brought up the 'trickle of water' example is to remind you of the chaotic nature of many systems. Our brains are chaotic. If they weren't it is highly likely that we would not be 'self-aware', at least according to several theories of consciousness.

We have gone far afield from the original post's subject.Well, I don't think it's far afield of the OP to talk about choice, since that is one way to define intelligence, and since intelligence is a component of design.

But to your notion of chaos being necessary for consciousness, that seems far afield. I don't think consciousness is a necessary component of design.

[Jet Black]

hold on.... so intelligence is a component of design, and consciousness is not a necessary component of design, so consciousness is not a necessary component of intelligence and intelligence is not a necessary component of consciousness?

[RexT]

hold on.... so intelligence is a component of design, and consciousness is not a necessary component of design, so consciousness is not a necessary component of intelligence and intelligence is not a necessary component of consciousness?What makes consciousness necessary for intelligence?

[Jet Black]

hold on.... so intelligence is a component of design, and consciousness is not a necessary component of design, so consciousness is not a necessary component of intelligence and intelligence is not a necessary component of consciousness?What makes consciousness necessary for intelligence?

or intelligence necessary for consciousness? That's what I'm asking :)

it's just that the terms seem a bit nebulous to me.

[Febble]

hold on.... so intelligence is a component of design, and consciousness is not a necessary component of design, so consciousness is not a necessary component of intelligence and intelligence is not a necessary component of consciousness?What makes consciousness necessary for intelligence?

or intelligence necessary for consciousness? That's what I'm asking :)

it's just that the terms seem a bit nebulous to me.

They are.

But what is absolutely clear is that something that is well designed for its function (i.e. it benefits some other entity) can emerge from what is almost certainly a non-conscious process. It's up to us whether you want to call a process that can produce such a thing intelligent, but that's not really the issue. If it isn't intelligence, then intelligence is not required for design. If it is, then consciousness is not required for design.

[BWE]

Dennett, in Freedom Evolves, argues persuasively (IMO) that the relevant question is not whether will is free (who's Will?) but whether I am, and that the answer depends entirely on how I define "I".

The more narrow the boundaries I draw around myself, the less freedom I can assign to myself. The good news is that it lets me off the moral hook. The bad news is that I diminish myself. Defining oneself is the act of accepting moral responsibility. It has nothing to do with determinism.



</derail>
I'm currently reading Freedom Evolves (slowly). The level of dislike I feel toward it surprises me. He moves around from points of view and sometimes equivocates patterns at different scales. I think the argument might be sound but I suspect it won't hold up as data becomes available. [//off topic]

Deterministic or determinism is the view from only a particular scale. No?

His point is that determinism is irrelevant to the question.

What data would falsify his position?

I get the point (and agree with it mostly) but iirc, he claimed somewhere in there (I'm not at home so I might be remembering wrong, but I'll post the quote and p. # if I ever manage to stop by home again) that for the same reasons, determinism is irrelevant in the formation of solar systems. The variables, once they are sufficiently complex to allow an emergent behavior that varies within some broad spectrum, stop being statistical constraints. I thought it was a good analogy but bad logic because it assumed a similarity that he didn't establish. The reason I felt that way about it is long and probably boring. I'll see if I can't write something up with a bit more organized thinking than normal for me.

:)

At the mo9ment I'm sleep deprived and delusional. As opposed to the typical delusional.

[Kissaki]

OK, in this scenario, is a decision being made:

Program: Read A. If A > 10 then Write "YES" else Write "NO".
Input: 5
Output: NO
Input: 10
Output: NO
Input: 42
Output: YES

Is this a series of 'decisions', or is it a deterministic set of results?
It is both. As a matter of fact, I cannot think of any type of decision which isn't deterministic. If something is not deterministic, then it is random -- if something is random, it is beyond your control. If it's beyond your control, how is it a choice?


Compare with this: You have a beam balance with 20 grams in the left pan and nothing in the right pan. If you place 25 grams in the right pan, the measure's indicator will tip to the right. Did the measure make a 'decision'?
A decision is based on the weighing of different options, and selecting the one that appears optimal at the time. I don't see any "ifs", "gotos" or errorlevels in the mechanism of a scale, so the scale does not make a decision as such.

[David B]

OK, in this scenario, is a decision being made:

Program: Read A. If A > 10 then Write "YES" else Write "NO".
Input: 5
Output: NO
Input: 10
Output: NO
Input: 42
Output: YES

Is this a series of 'decisions', or is it a deterministic set of results?
It is both. As a matter of fact, I cannot think of any type of decision which isn't deterministic. If something is not deterministic, then it is random -- if something is random, it is beyond your control. If it's beyond your control, how is it a choice?


Compare with this: You have a beam balance with 20 grams in the left pan and nothing in the right pan. If you place 25 grams in the right pan, the measure's indicator will tip to the right. Did the measure make a 'decision'?
A decision is based on the weighing of different options, and selecting the one that appears optimal at the time. I don't see any "ifs", "gotos" or errorlevels in the mechanism of a scale, so the scale does not make a decision as such.

Yabbut there might only be two options, and only two responses.

The simplest case I can imagine is a thermostat 'deciding' whether to keep power on, or cut it, or vice versa.

Another pretty simple case - a plant seed sending roots down and shoots up, rather than vice versa.

I'd look at them as proto decisions, or quasi decisions, myself.

Deciding whether to buy or sell shares, given that there is an opportunity cost in not having money elsewhere, transaction costs, and an uncertain future in which one has to weigh up the balance of probabilities in an uncertain world is much more complicated.

If you decide, tomorrow, to buy (or sell) shares, then that is clearly a decision.

A plant 'deciding' 'roots down, shoots up' rather more problematic. Not really a decision as the word is generally understood, I'd suggest.

Lots of shades of grey.

David B

[Kissaki]

Yabbut there might only be two options, and only two responses.

The simplest case I can imagine is a thermostat 'deciding' whether to keep power on, or cut it, or vice versa.

Another pretty simple case - a plant seed sending roots down and shoots up, rather than vice versa.

I'd look at them as proto decisions, or quasi decisions, myself.

Deciding whether to buy or sell shares, given that there is an opportunity cost in not having money elsewhere, transaction costs, and an uncertain future in which one has to weigh up the balance of probabilities in an uncertain world is much more complicated.

If you decide, tomorrow, to buy (or sell) shares, then that is clearly a decision.

A plant 'deciding' 'roots down, shoots up' rather more problematic. Not really a decision as the word is generally understood, I'd suggest.

Lots of shades of grey.

David B

Inevitably, though, all decisions are based on something. Deciding whether or not to buy or sell shares merely involves a lot more variables, but it is still basically input/output.

[David B]

Yabbut there might only be two options, and only two responses.

The simplest case I can imagine is a thermostat 'deciding' whether to keep power on, or cut it, or vice versa.

Another pretty simple case - a plant seed sending roots down and shoots up, rather than vice versa.

I'd look at them as proto decisions, or quasi decisions, myself.

Deciding whether to buy or sell shares, given that there is an opportunity cost in not having money elsewhere, transaction costs, and an uncertain future in which one has to weigh up the balance of probabilities in an uncertain world is much more complicated.

If you decide, tomorrow, to buy (or sell) shares, then that is clearly a decision.

A plant 'deciding' 'roots down, shoots up' rather more problematic. Not really a decision as the word is generally understood, I'd suggest.

Lots of shades of grey.

David B

Inevitably, though, all decisions are based on something. Deciding whether or not to buy or sell shares merely involves a lot more variables, but it is still basically input/output.

Yup.

All decisions are indeed based on something.

This is why trying to introduce indeterminacy as a way of somehow allowing some mystical FREE WILL is doomed to failure.

This doesn't imply that choices, in a meaningful sense of the word, and including moral choices, can't be made.

David B

[dug_down_deep]

Freedom's just another word for nothin' left to lose. It's so highly ambiguous a term as to be useless in any kind of semi-rigorous analysis. Will means intent, and human beings certainly have that. Determinism is a theory about everything based on the fact that we can generally identify causes and effects when we analyze systems. Which isn't adequate evidence, since there are systems where we cannot do so.

Free will vs. determinism is an obsolete debate.

[Garrett]

^ Or, modern physics has shown determinism to be false.

And 'free will' is just the common term for volition, which is studied by science. We've identified disorders of volition, which would not be the case if volition didn't exist.

The no-free-willers are choosing to oppose the existence of volition. It's hard to find a more concrete example of cognitive dissonance.

[Garrett]

This is why trying to introduce indeterminacy as a way of somehow allowing some mystical FREE WILL is doomed to failure.
Now consider secular free will in an indeterminate reality.

For fuck's sake get outside of the theistic box. And get outside of the carved in stone box. Join reality.

[David B]

This is why trying to introduce indeterminacy as a way of somehow allowing some mystical FREE WILL is doomed to failure.
Now consider secular free will in an indeterminate reality.

For fuck's sake get outside of the theistic box. And get outside of the carved in stone box. Join reality.

What theistic box would that be?

David B

[Febble]

^ Or, modern physics has shown determinism to be false.

And 'free will' is just the common term for volition, which is studied by science. We've identified disorders of volition, which would not be the case if volition didn't exist.

The no-free-willers are choosing to oppose the existence of volition. It's hard to find a more concrete example of cognitive dissonance.Well, I agree - that's very neat: "free will is just the common term for volition".

But I don't know why you are getting mad with David - I think he would entirely agree.

And the point is that if "free will is just the common term for volition", whether or not the universe is deterministic or not is irrelevant.

Which is Dennett's point (or one of them) in "Freedom Evolves". We have volition - as you say, we study it; the paper I am currently working on has "volitional control" in the title! - therefore we have free will.

And nothing in my paper mentions quantum physics.

[RexT]

And the point is that if "free will is just the common term for volition", whether or not the universe is deterministic or not is irrelevant.I think QM pretty much killed La Place's determinist world.

But there are still some who believe that the world is deterministic because they believe in a lawful universe. This is just a belief, however.

I wonder though, if anyone really understands volition. Is it something like an action potential, where a 'binary switch' is triggered from a statistical imbalance in ions (or whatever the cause)? Or is it something like a virtual particle that 'pops' into existence from nowhere? Is it something else?

[Febble]

And the point is that if "free will is just the common term for volition", whether or not the universe is deterministic or not is irrelevant.I think QM pretty much killed La Place's determinist world.

But there are still some who believe that the world is deterministic because they believe in a lawful universe. This is just a belief, however.


Oh, I think it is highly likely that the wolrld is not determininsitc. My point is that whether it is or not has nothing to do with "free will". Or rather that is Dennett's point, and which I find persuasive.

I wonder though, if anyone really understands volition. Is it something like an action potential, where a 'binary switch' is triggered from a statistical imbalance in ions (or whatever the cause)? Or is it something like a virtual particle that 'pops' into existence from nowhere? Is it something else?

Neither. Or, at least, if I have to choose, more like that first thing, but not really. Here is a parable:

A national leader has to make a decision as to whether to go to war. He writes all the reasons to go to war on a piece of paper, and on another, he writes all the reasons not to. And then he cuts up the pieces of paper so that there is one reason per piece. And he drops them all into a hat.

And he says that he will draw, at random, one piece of paper out of the hat. If it has a reason for going to war on it, he will go to war. If it has a reason against going to war on it, he will not.

Is he exercising free will?

In one sense, no - because he is relying on "chance" - as long as he makes sure he gives the hat a good shake first.

In once sense, yes - because he has stacked the deck, or may have done. If there are ninety good reasons for not going to war and only ten good reasons for going to war, he is far more likely to pull out a Not-Going-To-War ticket than a Go-To-War ticket.

And the point of the parable is that to the extent that random forces are involved he is NOT exercising free will. And to the extent that he has stacked the deck, he IS.

In other words, the random component is the unfree part of the process - the free part is deciding what goes into the hat in the first place.

If the tickets are finely balanced (as they sometimes are in life: Do I want strawberry or chocolate icecream?) then it may well be that the chance drift of a single ion may tip the balance. In which case, the decision is resolved by a random event (possibly even by a quantum event) but is, precisely because of that, involuntary. However, if there are different reasons for choosing one rather than the other (the strawberry is also low-fat; I like chocolate better) then the decision becomes one of volition. The net deck may be equally stacked, but will only remain so while my neural pathways are busy putting my decision on hold (anterior cingulate inhibiting putamen, possibly!) while the in rest of my brain, programs concerned with visualising myself as thinner, and programs in my reward circuits antipating that delicious full-fat chocolate, slug it out.

And if the strawberry decision wins out, then we say that I have exercised volition. And we say that because in order to choose the strawberry, circuits implicated in executive control of action won out over the more direct stimulus-driven/immediate reward-driven circuits involved in my appetitive response to the sight of the chocolate.

And my predisposition to choose actions that will result in a slimmer me will swamp out the quantum noise - and that predisposition is a component of what I call my self. My will. Something that earlier decisions have (or have not, in this case, probably!) contributed to building up - a strong sense of the future slimmer me that tends to inhibit my more immediate desire for full-fat chocolate ice-cream.

To summarise: quantum noise is the opposite of volitional factors. What volition IS is the exercise (or not) of inhibitory control by our "executive" circuits over our more immediate appetites. It may be determined by lots of things, including our genetic inheritance. But it is nonetheless what we own when we accept responsibility for our decisions.

"I couldn't resist the full-fat chocolate" is a confession that I failed to exercise free will ("The chocolate made me do it").

"I took the strawberry because I really need to lose some weight, even though the chocolate looked delicious " is a statement that I succeeded in exercising volitional control - free will.

And "I couldn't decide so I tossed a coin" is a straight abnegation of all responsibility for the decision (except of course for the decision to abnegate responsibility.....)

Now, "executive control of action" may sound like I have snuck a homunculus in there, and, in a way, I have. But what the homunculus IS is everything that makes me me - a lifetime of prior decisions, my genetic inheritance, the experiences I have undergone, the sensory stimuli I have been exposed to (that long-forgotten first taste of chocolate ice-cream; the sight of slim women in countless magazines). It's what I bring to the decision-making process, and what will determine whether or not I decide to succumb to the chocolate, choose the strawberry, or toss a coin (either literal or quantum). It's the way I stack the deck, or rather the way the deck is stacked is what I consist of, right now.

And if I own that deck, then I can consider myself free. Unless a perfect storm of quantum events comes along and takes it away.

[Kissaki]

I do not see how quantum mechanics is in any way relevant to the topic of free will. So quantum mechanics has shown that not everything is deterministic -- what does that say of our decision making processes? If there truly is such a thing as randomness (and not just in the sense that we cannot predict it), and this affects our decision making, then this is still something beyond our control. Whether everything in the universe is ultimately completely deterministic, or whether there are random elements, we are still slaves of the process rather than masters of it.

What does it mean that we have free will? Does it mean that it is unbound by anything? Then why do we choose what we choose? This is a random scenario in which we have no control whatsoever. We inevitably make decisions based on something, this "something" being desire, past experiences, chemical balances etc. etc. Factors which we had no part in deciding, except past decisions which in turn are based on desire, past experiences, chemical balances etc. etc. We often do things for "no reason", but there is never literally no reason.

A decision is by definition one's own controlled choice. In fact, lack of control is a mitigating factor in legal cases. But you cannot control anything that is not deterministic. Decision-making, therefore, is entirely non-random.


Edit: I wrote this post without reading Febble's post. Just so you don't think I'm copy-catting. :p

[Garrett]

This is why trying to introduce indeterminacy as a way of somehow allowing some mystical FREE WILL is doomed to failure.
Now consider secular free will in an indeterminate reality.

For fuck's sake get outside of the theistic box. And get outside of the carved in stone box. Join reality.

What theistic box would that be?

David B
The one where free will is mystical (and capitalized!), for example, rather than secular.

Btw sorry if I seemed rude. I was feeling argumentative. :o

[Garrett]

^ Or, modern physics has shown determinism to be false.

And 'free will' is just the common term for volition, which is studied by science. We've identified disorders of volition, which would not be the case if volition didn't exist.

The no-free-willers are choosing to oppose the existence of volition. It's hard to find a more concrete example of cognitive dissonance.Well, I agree - that's very neat: "free will is just the common term for volition".

But I don't know why you are getting mad with David - I think he would entirely agree.
Okay. (I wasn't mad at David. Was stupid though maybe.)

And the point is that if "free will is just the common term for volition", whether or not the universe is deterministic or not is irrelevant.
Is not. If the universe is deterministic then our ability to make choices is not fundamentally different from a thermostat's ability to make choices - there is nothing more going on than physics and chemistry and mechanics.

I think that whenever there is a secular objection to the existence of free will, the underlying reason is a belief in determinism. So the question of whether the universe is deterministic or not is not irrelevant.

We never bothered to invent the science of Thermostat Psychology. Lizzie, either the science of human psychology is unneeded for understanding human behavior, or there is more to human behavior than can be explained by physics and chemistry and mechanics.

Which is Dennett's point (or one of them) in "Freedom Evolves". We have volition - as you say, we study it; the paper I am currently working on has "volitional control" in the title! - therefore we have free will.
Okay.

And nothing in my paper mentions quantum physics.
So what? Just because quantum physics has established the fundamental indeterminate nature of this world doesn't mean that indeterminacy is confined to quantum physics! Does Dennett acknowledge that macro events are not necessarily determinate?

[Febble]

^ Or, modern physics has shown determinism to be false.

And 'free will' is just the common term for volition, which is studied by science. We've identified disorders of volition, which would not be the case if volition didn't exist.

The no-free-willers are choosing to oppose the existence of volition. It's hard to find a more concrete example of cognitive dissonance.Well, I agree - that's very neat: "free will is just the common term for volition".

But I don't know why you are getting mad with David - I think he would entirely agree.
Okay. (I wasn't mad at David. Was stupid though maybe.)


Is not. If the universe is deterministic then our ability to make choices is not fundamentally different from a thermostat's ability to make choices - there is nothing more going on than physics and chemistry and mechanics.

Well there isn't, when you look at things that close up. There's no more to anything than physics and chemistry and mechanics, when you look at the level of physics and chemistry and mechanics, but that doesn't mean that there are no systems above that level. The system that we call a brain is vastly different from the system we call a thermostat. That's why it makes sense to say a brain chooses, whereas a thermostat simply responds.

I think that whenever there is a secular objection to the existence of free will, the underlying reason is a belief in determinism. So the question of whether the universe is deterministic or not is not irrelevant.

Oh sure, the issue has to be tackled. I thought it was critical myself, and so do many people. But Dennett elegantly demonstrates that it isn't.

We never bothered to invent the science of Thermostat Psychology. Lizzie, either the science of human psychology is unneeded for understanding human behavior, or there is more to human behavior than can be explained by physics and chemistry and mechanics.

Thermostat psychology isn't required because it can be written on half a page of a school exercise book. More complex system require entire disciplines to study them, especially when they are found in nature, and we cannot simply ask the inventor what the thing is for and how it works.

Which is Dennett's point (or one of them) in "Freedom Evolves". We have volition - as you say, we study it; the paper I am currently working on has "volitional control" in the title! - therefore we have free will.
Okay.

And nothing in my paper mentions quantum physics.
So what? Just because quantum physics has established the fundamental indeterminate nature of this world doesn't mean that indeterminacy is confined to quantum physics! Does Dennett acknowledge that macro events are not necessarily determinate?

I don't know what you mean. As I said, Dennett regards the question as to whether the universe is deterministic or not as irrelevant to the question of free will. What do you mean by "macro events are not necessarily determinate"? Do you mean that quantum events can influence macro events (I'd say yes, though some say no - it seems to me obvious that the answer is yes)? Or do you mean that some other fundamentally indeterminate factor influences macro events? Or do you just mean "unpredictable except by running the entire system in simulation"? If the last thing, yes, Dennett acknowledges that, and, indeed, gives some nice examples.

[David B]

Now consider secular free will in an indeterminate reality.

For fuck's sake get outside of the theistic box. And get outside of the carved in stone box. Join reality.

What theistic box would that be?

David B
The one where free will is mystical (and capitalized!), for example, rather than secular.

Btw sorry if I seemed rude. I was feeling argumentative. :o

Ah - the sort I said that wasn't helped by indeterminacy.:p

David B

[Preno]

There's no more to anything than physics and chemistry and mechanics, when you look at the level of physics and chemistry and mechanicsquoted for quotability

[premjan]

A thermostat is more right-wing or something, at the level of individual choice.